Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who was on parole and placed in county jail after violating a condition by moving residences without notifying his parole officer. Seeking release, the defendant called his mother and instructed her to lie to his parole officer, specifically telling her to say he was still in the process of moving rather than admitting he had already moved. The mother complied and conveyed this false information to the parole officer as instructed. Recordings of these phone calls were later reviewed, forming the basis for criminal charges.Following these events, the defendant was charged with attempting to influence a public servant by means of deceit under Colorado law, section 18-8-306. At trial, the prosecution introduced the recorded phone calls as evidence, and the defendant was convicted. He appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, arguing that the statute required him to personally deceive the public servant and that his mother’s actions did not constitute his own deceit. The division of the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the statutory language encompassed the defendant’s use of his mother to convey false information to the parole officer. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support it.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case on certiorari. The Court held that the phrase “by means of deceit” in section 18-8-306 includes a defendant’s use of a third party to engage in deception on the defendant's behalf. The Court determined that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude the defendant attempted to influence a public servant by means of deceit. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Hupke v. People" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are minor patients who had been receiving gender-affirming medical care at the TRUE Center for Gender Diversity, a specialized department at a major pediatric hospital serving the Rocky Mountain Region. Following a December 2025 declaration by the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services stating that medical gender-affirming care for minors was unsafe and could result in exclusion from federal health care payment programs, the hospital suspended such care for transgender patients under eighteen. The hospital continued to provide hormone therapy and puberty blockers to cisgender youth for other medical reasons. The plaintiffs, representing a class of similarly situated individuals, experienced immediate and significant emotional and physical harm as a result.The plaintiffs filed a class action in the District Court for the City and County of Denver seeking a preliminary injunction under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) to require the hospital to resume medically necessary gender-affirming care. The trial court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, faced irreparable harm, and lacked an adequate remedy at law, but denied the injunction. The court reasoned that granting the injunction was contrary to the public interest, the balance of equities favored the hospital, and the injunction was not sufficiently specific to preserve the status quo.The Supreme Court of Colorado, en banc, reviewed the trial court's denial for abuse of discretion. It concluded that the trial court misapplied the legal standards governing preliminary injunctions in discrimination cases, particularly regarding the public interest and balance of equities. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs satisfied all six required factors, including a reasonable probability of success on their CADA claim, and that the injunction would preserve the pre-suspension status quo. The trial court’s order was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to grant the preliminary injunction. View "Boe v. Children's Hosp. Colo." on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old boy, J.S., was approached by Javier Vega Dominguez at a Walmart and offered money in exchange for selling pornographic materials and performing sexual acts. J.S. declined and, with his father, reported the incident to police. Law enforcement then conducted an undercover operation, during which Vega Dominguez engaged in explicit communications with a detective posing as J.S., ultimately leading to his arrest when he arrived at an arranged meeting. Vega Dominguez was charged with soliciting for child prostitution, sexual exploitation of a child, criminal attempt to commit patronizing a prostituted child, and criminal attempt to commit inducement of child prostitution.Following a jury trial in the district court, Vega Dominguez was convicted on all four counts. He was sentenced to concurrent terms for three of the counts, with the sentence for sexual exploitation to run consecutively. On appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Vega Dominguez argued that his conviction for attempted patronizing a prostituted child violated equal protection because it punished the same conduct as attempted inducement of child prostitution but carried a more severe penalty. He also challenged the trial court’s jury instructions, arguing the mens rea for soliciting for child prostitution should be “intentionally” rather than “knowingly.” The Court of Appeals agreed with him on the equal protection claim and vacated that conviction, but upheld the rest.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed these decisions. It held that any error regarding the equal protection claim was not “plain” because it was not obvious under existing law, reversing the Court of Appeals’ judgment and vacating its merits analysis on that question. The court also held, consistent with its precedent in Randolph v. People, that the correct mental state for soliciting for child prostitution is “knowingly,” and that the jury was properly instructed when all instructions were read together. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the conviction for soliciting for child prostitution and reversed the judgment vacating the attempted patronizing conviction. View "People v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

A government-owned water activity enterprise, wholly owned by a regional water conservancy district, sought to acquire permanent and temporary construction easements on property owned by a private landowner for the purpose of surveying, constructing, operating, and maintaining pipelines and related infrastructure as part of a regional water supply and distribution project. This project aimed to provide a reliable water supply to several municipalities and water districts. The enterprise initiated condemnation proceedings in district court, claiming authority under several constitutional and statutory provisions specific to water conservancy districts and water activity enterprises.After the petition was filed, the landowner moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the enterprise lacked statutory authority to exercise eminent domain. The Weld County District Court denied the motion, finding that the enterprise did have condemnation authority under the cited provisions. The landowner then sought relief from the Supreme Court of Colorado under C.A.R. 21, which allows for original proceedings in cases where an appellate remedy would be inadequate due to potential immediate possession and damage to the land during the pendency of an appeal.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that, under the express terms of sections 37-45.1-103(4) and 37-45-118(1)(c) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, a water activity enterprise possesses the power to condemn private property in relation to water activities. The Court reasoned that these statutes allow the enterprise to exercise the parent district’s legal authority, including eminent domain, for activities relating to water, and that construction and maintenance of water delivery pipelines and infrastructure fall within this scope. The Court discharged its order to show cause and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "N. Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enter. v. VIMA Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and other offenses, and was sentenced to life without parole. After his conviction was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals, he sought postconviction relief and was appointed new counsel due to a conflict with the Public Defender’s Office. Postconviction counsel discovered that large portions of the pretrial discovery materials were missing from prior counsel’s file. When attempts to obtain the missing materials from the prosecution were met with instructions to request them through the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (CCJRA) and pay associated fees, counsel instead moved the district court to compel disclosure of the discovery.The Jefferson County District Court denied the motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to order discovery in postconviction proceedings except in death penalty cases, and relying on prior Colorado Supreme Court cases such as People v. Silva-Jaquez and People v. Owens. The district court concluded that neither the rules, statutes, nor the Constitution provided a basis to compel postconviction discovery outside of those limited situations.The Supreme Court of Colorado, en banc, reviewed the case as an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21. The court held that if an indigent defendant seeking postconviction relief shows that specific facts likely contained in pretrial discovery—which is unavailable to current counsel—would help substantiate claims for relief, the postconviction court should order the prosecution to provide a free copy of the requested duplicate discovery. The court further held that postconviction counsel is not required to rely on the CCJRA process, as it does not guarantee access to complete, unredacted discovery and may impose unjustified financial burdens. The Supreme Court made the order to show cause absolute, reversed the district court’s denial, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Bell" on Justia Law

Two individuals were injured while riding in a rental car after the driver, who had rented the vehicle from a car rental company, purchased a supplemental insurance policy that included uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. The policy was issued by a third-party insurer, with the car rental company listed as the named insured and the driver and passengers as additional insureds. After the accident, the third-party insurer’s claims administrator processed the injury claims, but the payments made were less than the medical expenses incurred by the passengers, leading them to file suit against the car rental company for breach of contract, bad faith, and violation of insurance statutes.The District Court for Arapahoe County determined that the car rental company was neither a statutory insurer under Colorado’s insurance code nor a common-law de facto insurer, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. The court reasoned that legislative amendments following the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Co. had distinguished car rental companies from insurers. It further found that, under Cary v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Co., the car rental company’s limited involvement in claim processing did not rise to the level needed for de facto insurer status, as it lacked primary responsibility for claims handling.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the car rental company could qualify as a statutory insurer and that factual disputes remained as to whether it acted as a de facto insurer under Cary. On review, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, in light of legislative amendments, car rental companies offering supplemental insurance are not statutory insurers under Colorado law. The court also clarified that only entities whose primary business is claims handling and who have significant financial risk in claim outcomes may qualify as de facto insurers under Cary, which did not apply to the car rental company here. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered reinstatement of the district court’s dismissal. View "Hertz Corp. v. Babayev" on Justia Law

In this case, the respondent was injured in a 2017 automobile accident and pursued benefits under three insurance policies: the tortfeasor’s liability policy, his own underinsured motorist (UIM) policy with State Farm, and an excess UIM policy with USAA held by his brother. Both insurers requested that he provide medical releases to apportion damages between the 2017 accident and a prior accident in 2014. The respondent either did not provide the requested releases or submitted deficient ones. With his claims unresolved and the statute of limitations approaching, he sued USAA and State Farm for breach of contract and bad-faith delay or denial of benefits.The trial court, the El Paso County District Court, granted summary judgment to the insurers. It found that providing a comprehensive medical release was a condition precedent to coverage under both policies, and the respondent’s failure to do so warranted summary judgment. The court also determined that the claim against USAA was improper because the respondent had not exhausted his primary State Farm policy. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 10-3-1118’s procedural requirements for insurer “failure-to-cooperate” defenses applied to all policyholder duties, and that USAA’s exhaustion clause was unenforceable because it conditioned payment on exhausting the primary insurer’s limits.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that section 10-3-1118 applies only to defenses based on a policy’s general cooperation clause, not all contractual duties or conditions precedent. The court reversed the appellate court’s contrary interpretation. The court further clarified that exhaustion clauses in excess UIM policies are enforceable only if they are triggered by the policyholder’s undisputed damages exceeding the underlying policy limits, not merely by payment from the primary insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed that USAA’s duty to investigate is triggered only once such undisputed damages are established, and otherwise, summary judgment was proper for the insurers. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Wenzell" on Justia Law

Two sixteen-year-old girls ran away from a treatment facility and were taken in by the petitioner, a forty-nine-year-old man, who let them stay at his residence for ten days. During this period, the petitioner provided the girls with drugs, made repeated sexual advances, and sexually assaulted one of them. He later pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault and distributing a controlled substance to a minor. Based on an evaluation using Colorado's Sexually Violent Predator Assessment Screening Instrument, the district court found that the petitioner met the criteria for a sexually violent predator (SVP) designation and imposed that status at sentencing. The court also sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.The petitioner appealed his SVP designation to the Colorado Court of Appeals, arguing that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The appellate court rejected this argument, relying on precedent holding that the SVP designation was not punishment. The court found no conflict between that precedent and a more recent Colorado Supreme Court decision that found mandatory lifetime sex offender registration to be cruel and unusual punishment as applied to juveniles. The appellate court thus affirmed the district court’s order.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted review to decide whether the SVP designation constitutes criminal punishment under the Eighth Amendment and, if so, whether it is cruel and unusual as applied to the petitioner. The court concluded that the Colorado General Assembly did not intend the SVP designation to be punitive and that its effects did not override that intent by “the clearest proof.” Therefore, it held that the SVP designation and its attendant requirements do not constitute punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals. View "Beagle v. People" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was injured after tripping over the base of a removed bus stop sign on a public sidewalk in Manitou Springs, Colorado, on August 26, 2021. The injured party promptly notified Manitou Springs of her injury as required by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which mandates notice to the liable public entity within 182 days of discovering the injury. Manitou Springs did not disclose its lack of responsibility for the sidewalk until April 2023, well after the statutory period had expired, when it told the claimant that Colorado Springs was responsible under an intergovernmental agreement. The claimant then notified Colorado Springs forty days later, but this notice was well outside the 182-day window.After the claimant brought suit against both cities for premises liability and negligence, Colorado Springs moved to dismiss, arguing that the notice was untimely under the CGIA and that equitable defenses were unavailable. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the notice period should have started when the claimant learned of Colorado Springs’ potential liability, not on the date of injury. The District Court reasoned that the claimant could not have known about the intergovernmental agreement without disclosure from Manitou Springs and thus had acted diligently.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the CGIA’s 182-day notice period is jurisdictional, cannot be tolled or waived, and begins when the injury is discovered, regardless of knowledge of the liable public entity. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed this judgment, holding that strict compliance with the notice provision was required and that the notice period began on the date of injury. Because the claimant’s notice to Colorado Springs was untimely, dismissal was required. View "Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with sexual assault by one in a position of trust and aggravated incest against his two minor children, N.L. and A.L. After their initial interviews with a social worker failed to produce accusations, both children later alleged sexual abuse by their father during forensic interviews with Kim Grimm. The defense’s theory was that the children’s maternal grandmother, who wanted to keep custody, had coached them to fabricate or form false memories of abuse. Throughout the trial, the defense repeatedly raised this coaching theory, supporting it with evidence and argument.After the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, he appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals. The division concluded that the expert’s testimony—that she perceived no indication of coaching during her interviews with the children—was inadmissible, as it amounted to improper vouching for the children’s credibility. However, the division upheld the trial court’s decision to allow this testimony under the “opening the door” doctrine, finding that the defense had clearly intended to suggest to the jury that the grandmother coached the children, thus permitting the otherwise inadmissible testimony for context.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case on the narrow question of whether the defense had “opened the door” to the challenged expert testimony. The court assumed, without deciding, that the testimony was otherwise inadmissible. It held that the defense’s persistent introduction of the coaching theory throughout trial opened the door to Grimm’s expert opinion that she saw no indication of coaching. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lopez v. People" on Justia Law