Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

HIVE Construction, Inc. served as the general contractor for the construction of Masterpiece Kitchen, a restaurant. The contract required HIVE to follow specific architectural plans, including installing two layers of drywall on a wall separating the kitchen and dining area. Instead, HIVE installed one layer of drywall and one layer of combustible plywood without approval. A fire started within the wall, causing significant damage and forcing the restaurant to close. Mid-Century Insurance Company, as the property insurer and subrogee of Masterpiece Kitchen, paid for the damages and then sued HIVE for negligence, alleging willful and wanton conduct.The district court initially allowed Mid-Century to amend its complaint to include a breach of contract claim but later reversed this decision, requiring Mid-Century to proceed with the negligence claim. At trial, the jury found HIVE's conduct to be willful and wanton, awarding damages to Mid-Century. HIVE appealed, arguing that the economic loss rule barred the negligence claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the district court's decision and instructing a verdict in HIVE's favor.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the economic loss rule does not provide an exception for willful and wanton conduct. The court held that the rule barred Mid-Century's negligence claim because the duty HIVE allegedly breached was not independent of its contractual obligations. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals, upholding the application of the economic loss rule to bar the negligence claim. View "Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. HIVE Construction" on Justia Law

Late on the night of August 26, 2022, Arapahoe County Sheriff Deputy Swank heard gunshots while on patrol in Centennial, Colorado. He and other officers arrived at the scene near the Green Tree Hotel and found Sheron Mario Furness and his friend V.M. near a dark-colored Lexus sedan. Furness claimed to have seen a shooter and was looking for his car keys. Officers found the keys in a nearby grass-covered area and observed an empty gun case and an empty bottle of whiskey in the car. Furness was arrested for violating a protection order due to his admitted alcohol consumption. A witness identified Furness as the shooter, leading officers to search the vehicle, including the trunk, where they found a handgun, ammunition, drugs, and other items.The Arapahoe County District Court found that officers had probable cause to search the passenger compartment but not the trunk, as there was no access from the backseat to the trunk. The court suppressed the evidence found in the trunk, leading the People to file an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the officers had probable cause to search the trunk based on the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that Furness was near the trunk when officers arrived, the car windows were down, and a witness identified Furness as the shooter. The court held that it was reasonable for officers to believe the trunk contained evidence of a crime. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the district court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Furness" on Justia Law

J.D., a juvenile defendant, faced multiple charges and challenged his competency to proceed. The juvenile court ordered the Department of Human Services (the "Department") to conduct an in-custody competency evaluation, which found J.D. incompetent but restorable. The court then ordered outpatient restoration services. Subsequently, J.D. was charged with additional delinquent acts, and the court extended its incompetency finding to all cases, ordering the Department to oversee inpatient restoration services and provide periodic status reports.The Department later reassessed J.D.'s competency without a court order and concluded that he had been restored to competency. J.D. moved to strike the Department's report, arguing that the Department lacked the authority to conduct the evaluation without a court order under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to conduct restoration evaluations as part of its responsibility to provide restoration services.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the Department's responsibility to provide restoration services under section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) includes the authority to perform restoration evaluations without a court order. The court concluded that restoration evaluations are part of the "services necessary to competency restoration." Therefore, the juvenile court properly accepted and considered the Department's evaluation in finding J.D. restored to competency. The order to show cause was discharged. View "In re People ex rel. J.D." on Justia Law

Jina Garcia received treatment from St. Anthony North Hospital, operated by Centura Health Corporation, following a motor vehicle accident. Garcia informed the hospital that she had Medicare and Medicaid coverage and that her automobile insurance carrier was Progressive Insurance. Centura asserted a hospital lien against Garcia for $2,170.35 without billing Medicare first. Garcia filed a class action lawsuit against Centura, alleging violations of the hospital lien statute by filing liens before billing Medicare, seeking damages of twice the amount of the asserted liens.The District Court of the City and County of Denver certified a class and ordered Garcia to respond to substantial discovery requests from Centura. Garcia objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant, overbroad, and violated her privacy. The district court required Garcia to provide much of the requested discovery. Garcia sought relief from the Colorado Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine the relevance and proportionality of the discovery requests.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case again and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in ordering Garcia to respond to the discovery requests. The court found that the discovery sought by Centura was not relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and was not proportional to the needs of the case. The court emphasized that the principal factual issues were whether Centura asserted liens without billing Medicare and the amount of those liens. The court made its order to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Garcia v. Centura Health Corp." on Justia Law

Bradford Wayne Snedeker was convicted of various fraud and theft charges in two separate Boulder County District Court cases. In the first case, he was sentenced to four years in prison for securities fraud and a consecutive one-year term of work release plus twenty years of probation for theft. In the second case, he was sentenced to fifteen years of probation for theft, to run concurrently with the first case's sentence. After serving the prison term, Snedeker argued that his sentences were illegal under the ruling in Allman v. People, which held that a court cannot impose both imprisonment and probation for different offenses in the same case. The district court agreed that the first case's sentence was illegal and ordered resentencing but found the second case's sentence legal.The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the Fraud Case and affirmed the district court's resentencing decision. Snedeker then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for review, arguing that reimposing the original probationary sentence after serving the prison term still violated Allman and that imposing concurrent prison and probation sentences in separate cases also violated Allman.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that when a sentence is illegal under Allman and the defendant has already served the prison portion, the court can reimpose a probationary term because probation remains a legal sentencing option. The court also held that it does not violate Allman to sentence a defendant to imprisonment in one case and probation in a separate case. Thus, the court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment in the Fraud Case and the district court's resentencing in the Theft Case. View "Snedeker v. People" on Justia Law

Roberto C. Silva-Jaquez was convicted in 2014 of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of second-degree assault with a deadly weapon. His convictions were affirmed by the court of appeals. Silva-Jaquez then filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court appointed alternate defense counsel, who supplemented the motion. Before the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution requested disclosures related to the defense's expert witness, which Silva-Jaquez opposed.The postconviction court granted the prosecution's request, relying on its inherent authority to manage cases, despite acknowledging that Crim. P. 16 did not apply to postconviction proceedings. The court believed it could order disclosures to avoid surprise and delay, referencing People v. Owens, which discussed inherent authority in managing dockets.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that a trial court may not rely on its inherent authority to order discovery in a postconviction proceeding. The court emphasized that discovery in criminal cases must be authorized by a constitutional provision, statute, or rule. Since no such authority existed in this case, the court concluded that the postconviction court erred in ordering the disclosures. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Silva-Jaquez" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2020, Colorado State University (CSU) transitioned from in-person to online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Renee Alderman and Tyler Stokes, both students, filed class action lawsuits seeking refunds for tuition and fees paid for that semester, alleging CSU breached its contract to provide in-person learning and access to facilities. They also claimed unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the breach of contract claims, citing CSU's statutory authority to suspend operations during unforeseen calamities, and later dismissed the unjust enrichment claims, ruling that the contract covered the same subject matter.Alderman appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of her unjust enrichment claims, holding that CSU's invocation of the statute rendered the contract unenforceable, thus allowing the unjust enrichment claims to proceed.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the lower court erred in holding the contract unenforceable. The court held that the statutory provision allowing CSU to suspend operations was part of the contract, and the inability to state a breach of contract claim did not render the contract itself unenforceable. Consequently, Alderman's unjust enrichment claims failed as a matter of law because a valid, enforceable contract existed covering the same subject matter. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and directed reinstatement of the district court's judgment in favor of CSU. View "Bd. of Governors of the Colo. State Univ. v. Alderman" on Justia Law

In 2023, the Board of County Commissioners of Weld County approved a new map for electing county commissioners without complying with Colorado's redistricting statutes, arguing that as a home rule county, it was exempt from these requirements. Weld County residents, along with the League of Women Voters of Greeley and the Latino Coalition of Weld County, sued the Board, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the use of the new map.The Weld County District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting summary judgment and enjoining the Board from using the new map. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, the redistricting statutes applied to Weld County, and the Board had violated these statutes. The Board appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the plaintiffs petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for certiorari review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the redistricting statutes provide a private right of action and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court further held that home rule counties must comply with the redistricting statutes, as these statutes impose mandatory functions rather than structural requirements. The court reversed the district court's allowance for the Board to use the 2015 map and ordered the Board to draw and approve a new map in compliance with the redistricting statutes in time for the 2026 county commissioner election. View "League of Women Voters of Greeley v. The Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of the Cnty. of Weld" on Justia Law

Independence Water and Sanitation District (Independence) sought to amend an augmentation plan to provide water services for a proposed residential development in Elbert County, Colorado. The original 2006 decree allowed Independence to withdraw groundwater from the Denver Basin and included an augmentation plan for not-nontributary groundwater from the Upper Dawson aquifer for specific uses on the property. Independence applied to amend this plan to include additional uses both on and off the property.The Division 1 water court faced opposition from Franktown Citizens Coalition II, Inc. and West Elbert County Well Users Association (Opposers), who argued that the anti-speculation doctrine should apply, requiring Independence to show a non-speculative intent to use the water. The water court denied Opposers' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with Independence that the anti-speculation doctrine did not apply to the amendment of the augmentation plan, based on the precedent set in East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District v. Rangeview Metropolitan District.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the water court's decision. The court held that the anti-speculation doctrine does not apply to applications to amend augmentation plans for not-nontributary groundwater. The court reasoned that the anti-speculation doctrine and augmentation plans serve different purposes: the former prevents water hoarding within the prior appropriation system, while the latter allows out-of-priority diversions without injuring existing water rights. The court concluded that the sole inquiry for a water court reviewing an augmentation plan is whether the plan will cause injury to existing water rights, not the applicant's intent to use the water. The court found no clear error in the water court's determination that Independence's amended augmentation plan would not result in injury to existing water rights. View "Franktown Citizens Coal. II v. Indep. Water & Sanitation Dist." on Justia Law

Patrick Frazee was arrested in connection with the murder of his romantic partner, Kelsey Berreth. Following his arrest, the Teller County Department of Human Services took emergency custody of their daughter. Mary Longmire, a caseworker from the Department, met with Frazee in jail to discuss the child's welfare. During a subsequent meeting, Longmire asked Frazee questions about his background and relationship with Berreth, without providing Miranda warnings.The trial court denied Frazee's motion to suppress his statements to Longmire, ruling that Longmire was not a law enforcement officer or acting as an agent of law enforcement, and thus, Miranda warnings were not required. The court found that Longmire's actions were consistent with her duties under the Children's Code. The jury convicted Frazee of multiple charges, including first-degree murder.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that Frazee was not in custody for Miranda purposes during his meeting with Longmire. Frazee then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review.The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that Longmire was neither a law enforcement officer nor an agent of law enforcement. Therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. The court declined to adopt a bright-line rule that Miranda should apply to caseworkers conducting custodial interrogations involving criminal allegations. The court emphasized that Longmire's primary purpose was to assess the child's welfare, not to gather evidence for a criminal case. View "Frazee v. State" on Justia Law