Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant, while severely intoxicated, drove her vehicle into oncoming traffic, resulting in a collision that killed another driver and seriously injured two passengers, one of whom was partially paralyzed. At the time of the incident, her blood alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. The defendant had three prior drinking-and-driving convictions and was charged with felony DUI, vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, and related offenses. She pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide-DUI and vehicular assault-DUI in exchange for a sentencing range of eight to thirty-three years, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The court imposed consecutive sentences totaling twenty-nine years, including a twenty-four-year sentence for vehicular homicide-DUI.After sentencing, the defendant sought a proportionality review, arguing that her sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. The district court denied her motion, finding that vehicular homicide-DUI was per se a grave or serious offense. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed with this designation, holding that vehicular homicide-DUI is not per se grave or serious because it does not require proof of criminal intent, but nonetheless upheld the sentence, finding it was not grossly disproportionate.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed whether vehicular homicide-DUI should be classified as per se grave or serious and whether the defendant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate. The court held that vehicular homicide-DUI is not per se grave or serious for proportionality review purposes due to its strict liability nature, lacking a mens rea requirement. However, the court also held that, given the facts of the case—including the harm caused, the defendant’s history, and the sentence’s statutory authorization—the twenty-four-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "People v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought their dogs to a veterinary clinic for treatment. Dissatisfied with the care provided, both posted negative reviews on social media, detailing their experiences and criticizing the clinic’s practices. These posts were shared on multiple community Facebook pages and received significant engagement from the local community, including comments from others about the clinic. After the posters refused the clinic’s request to remove the reviews, the clinic filed a lawsuit for defamation per se against both individuals, alleging numerous defamatory statements.In the District Court for El Paso County, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their posts were protected as speech on a public issue. The district court denied the motion, finding that the statements concerned a private business dispute and did not address matters of public interest. The court also found that, even if the statute applied, the clinic had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its claims. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the posts provided consumer information relevant to the public but concluded they did not contribute to a broader public discussion, largely because they were motivated by personal animosity and aimed to harm the clinic’s business.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and determined that the lower courts had applied the wrong legal standard. The Supreme Court held that courts must use a two-step test to determine if speech is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute: first, whether an objective observer could reasonably understand the speech, in context, to be made in connection with a public issue or interest; and second, whether the speech contributed to public discussion of that issue. The court further held that the speaker’s motive is irrelevant to this analysis. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the matter was remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Lind-Barnett v. Tender Care Veterinary Ctr." on Justia Law

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that K.L.W. ("Father") waived his statutory right to a jury trial by failing to appear for the trial in 2021. The court then incorrectly adjudicated Father's five children as dependent or neglected by default. In 2023, the juvenile court vacated the default judgment and scheduled a new adjudicatory trial, again finding that Father had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to appear in 2021. Father did not demand a jury trial during the twenty days before the bench trial and acknowledged the bench trial in a pretrial pleading. On the morning of the 2023 trial, Father objected to the waiver finding, but the court proceeded with the bench trial and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's adjudicatory judgment, concluding that Father's 2021 waiver of a jury trial did not extend to the 2023 proceeding. The appellate court held that the 2023 trial was a new trial, and since Father appeared, he did not waive his right to a jury trial for the 2023 proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that even if the 2021 waiver was not binding for the 2023 trial, Father failed to demand a jury trial as required by statute and rule. The court found that Father's objection on the morning of the 2023 trial was not a valid or timely demand for a jury trial. The court emphasized that granting Father's objection would have delayed the proceedings, contrary to the children's best interests and the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the juvenile court correctly conducted a bench trial, and the appellate court erred in reversing the adjudicatory judgment. View "People ex rel. Kay. W. v. K.L.W." on Justia Law

During a covert surveillance operation in Denver, undercover police officers observed Arthur S. Mills engaging in behavior consistent with a drug transaction. Mills was stopped for a traffic violation, during which he failed to produce a valid driver's license or proof of insurance. Mills became uncooperative, and the officers, believing they had probable cause, decided to impound his vehicle and obtain a search warrant rather than conducting an on-scene search.The Denver County District Court granted Mills's motion to suppress the drug evidence found in his vehicle, ruling that although the police had probable cause to seize the vehicle, the delay in obtaining a search warrant was longer than necessary. The court cited Chambers v. Maroney, reasoning that the vehicle should only be held for the period necessary to obtain the warrant. The People filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and established a four-factor balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a delay in seeking a search warrant: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the nature and strength of the individual's possessory interest, (3) the strength of the government's justification for the delay, and (4) the government's diligence in applying for the warrant. Applying this test, the court concluded that the three-day delay, which included a weekend, was reasonable. The court noted that the police acted diligently and cautiously, considering officer safety and the thoroughness of the investigation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the delay in obtaining the search warrant did not render the seizure unconstitutional. View "People v. Mills" on Justia Law

Deshawn Lynn Randolph was charged with two counts of soliciting for child prostitution under Colorado law. The charges stemmed from interactions with an undercover investigator posing as a minor on a social networking platform. Randolph offered to arrange sex work for the investigator, who had claimed to be underage. At trial, Randolph argued that he did not intend to arrange sex work but was merely boasting to delay any action until the investigator turned eighteen.The district court instructed the jury that the applicable mental state for the charges was "knowingly," rejecting Randolph's proposed instruction that would have required proof of "intentionally." The jury found Randolph guilty, and he was sentenced to two concurrent nine-year terms. Randolph appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were incorrect. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that "knowingly" was the correct mental state.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to resolve the appropriate mental state for the crime of soliciting for child prostitution. The court held that the culpable mental state for the crime under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of the statute is "knowingly," aligning with the mental state explicitly designated in subsection (1)(c). The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. View "Randolph v. People" on Justia Law

In 2008, Kelly James Schnorenberg formed KJS Marketing, Inc. to secure funding and recruit agents for insurance companies. Between 2009 and 2015, KJS solicited over $15 million from approximately 250 investors, promising a 12% annual return. Schnorenberg failed to disclose to investors his past legal and financial troubles, including a lawsuit by the Colorado Division of Securities, a permanent injunction from selling securities in Colorado, a bankruptcy filing, and unpaid civil judgments.Schnorenberg was charged with twenty-five counts of securities fraud under section 11-51-501, with twenty-four counts based on materially false statements or omissions and one count based on a fraudulent course of business. He planned to defend himself by arguing that he acted in good faith reliance on the advice of his securities lawyer, Hank Schlueter. However, the trial court denied his motions for a continuance to secure Schlueter's testimony and excluded Schnorenberg's testimony about the specific advice he received, ruling it as hearsay.The Colorado Court of Appeals vacated seven of Schnorenberg's convictions as time-barred, reversed the remaining convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Schnorenberg's testimony about his lawyer's advice and in not instructing the jury that good faith reliance on the advice of counsel could negate the mens rea element of the securities fraud charges.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the mens rea of "willfully," synonymous with "knowingly," applies to each element of securities fraud under subsections 11-51-501(1)(b) and (c). The court concluded that Schnorenberg's testimony about his lawyer's advice was relevant to whether he had the requisite mens rea and that the trial court erred in excluding this testimony. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "People v. Schnorenberg" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kathleen Keaten and her daughter Delaney Keaten, lived in a Section 8 housing complex managed by the defendants, Terra Management Group, LLC, and Littleton Main Street LLC. They complained about physical ailments due to suspected methamphetamine fumes from the apartment below. The defendants evicted the tenant in the lower unit but failed to preserve evidence from the apartment. The Keatens later filed a lawsuit under the Colorado Premises Liability Act, alleging permanent injuries from the fumes.The Arapahoe County District Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Keatens, awarding significant damages. The court found that the chemical fumes from the lower unit caused the Keatens' injuries, relying on expert testimony and meth residue levels. The court also drew an adverse inference against the defendants for failing to preserve evidence from the lower unit.The defendants appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants should have known about their potential liability and upheld the adverse inference sanction. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for certiorari review.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that a duty to preserve evidence arises when a party knows or should know that litigation is pending or reasonably foreseeable. The court concluded that any error in the trial court's adverse inference sanction was harmless because the causation finding was based on independent evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Terra Mgmt. Grp. v. Keaten" on Justia Law

Kenneth Alfonso Gallegos and three friends attempted to obtain vaping products from a high school classmate, L.C. During the encounter, a struggle ensued, and one of Gallegos's friends fatally shot L.C. Gallegos was charged with felony murder, with predicate felonies of aggravated robbery, attempted robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. At trial, Gallegos denied planning to rob L.C. or knowing about the gun. He requested a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder, which the trial court denied, deeming it incompatible with his outright denial of involvement in the crime.The jury found Gallegos guilty, and he appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed his felony murder conviction, holding that defendants may both deny the predicate felony and raise the affirmative defense to felony murder. The court found that the trial court erred by not giving Gallegos's requested instruction.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that a defendant need not admit the predicate felony to raise the affirmative defense to felony murder. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that the plain language of the affirmative defense statute does not require an admission of the underlying felony. The court emphasized that the affirmative defense to felony murder can be raised even if the defendant denies committing the predicate felony, as long as there is some credible evidence supporting the defense's conditions. View "People v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Keith Ray, who was charged with multiple offenses related to the murders of Javad Marshall-Fields and Vivian Wolfe in a drive-by shooting. Marshall-Fields was set to testify against Ray in a separate shooting incident at Lowry Park, where Ray and his associate, Sir Mario Owens, were involved. Ray was convicted of nearly all charges related to the Dayton Street shooting and was initially sentenced to death. However, after Colorado abolished the death penalty, the Governor commuted Ray's sentence to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).The Arapahoe County District Court entered the judgment of conviction and sentenced Ray to death, which was later commuted to LWOP. Ray appealed his convictions and sentence directly to the Colorado Supreme Court, challenging several evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial misconduct, and the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence. He also alleged juror misconduct and sought to subpoena jurors to investigate these claims.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed Ray's appeal and found that while the district court made some errors in admitting certain evidence and that some of the prosecution's comments were improper, none of these errors warranted reversal. The court concluded that the district court properly denied inquiry into alleged juror misconduct under CRE 606(b) and upheld the constitutionality of Ray's LWOP sentence. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the commuted sentence. View "People v. Ray" on Justia Law

Isaiah Ismael Rios was charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder, related to a series of crimes over eighteen days. His trial, initially set for July 2020, was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court, following public health guidelines, excluded all spectators from the physical courtroom, providing virtual access instead. Rios objected, arguing this violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The trial proceeded with these restrictions, and Rios was convicted.The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the exclusion of the public from the courtroom constituted a nontrivial partial closure. However, it concluded that Rios's right to a public trial was not violated because the closure was justified under the Supreme Court's standard in Waller v. Georgia. The court found that the closure was warranted due to the public health crisis, was no broader than necessary, and that reasonable alternatives were considered.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that virtual access alone does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court determined that a courtroom closure occurred but concluded that the closure did not violate Rios's right to a public trial. The court found that the closure was justified under the Waller factors due to the public health concerns related to COVID-19. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Rios v. People" on Justia Law