Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After unlawfully entering his ex-wife’s home in violation of a court-issued protection order, the defendant was charged with second degree burglary and additional offenses. The protection order, issued under Colorado law, specifically prohibited the defendant from contacting his ex-wife or entering her residence. During the incident, the defendant jumped a fence, damaged property, and entered the home despite his ex-wife’s objections, prompting her to lock herself in the bathroom and call the police. Officers arrived to find the defendant leaving the property, and he was subsequently taken into custody.The Weld County District Court held a preliminary hearing on the burglary charge. The prosecution presented evidence of the defendant’s violation of the protection order. The defendant did not dispute the factual allegations but argued that his conduct did not amount to a “crime against another person or property” under the second degree burglary statute. The District Court, relying on the Supreme Court of Colorado’s decision in People v. Rhorer, concluded that violating a protection order is a predicate crime for second degree burglary because it constitutes a crime against a person or property. The court found probable cause and set the charge for trial.The Supreme Court of Colorado exercised its original jurisdiction to review the District Court’s ruling. The court affirmed the trial court’s interpretation of the law, holding that a criminal violation of a protection order under section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S., categorically qualifies as a “crime against another person or property” for purposes of the second degree burglary statute. Therefore, such a violation may properly serve as the predicate offense for second degree burglary. The Supreme Court discharged the order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Dilka" on Justia Law

In June 2013, a masked individual robbed a bank in Aurora, Colorado, taking cash and using a bank bag containing a GPS device. The GPS led police to a car belonging to the estranged wife of Jamale D. Townsell. Evidence collected included clothing, shoes, and a mask, many of which were forensically tested and matched Townsell’s DNA. Cell phone records also placed Townsell near the scene. At trial, Townsell’s defense relied on the mistaken belief that only one piece of evidence—the pantyhose—had been tested for DNA, leading to a trial strategy that did not address the full extent of the DNA evidence. The jury convicted Townsell, and he was sentenced to thirty-two years in prison.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Townsell’s conviction on direct appeal. Townsell subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to adequately investigate DNA evidence and to seek further testing of untested items. The postconviction court denied the motion without appointing counsel, finding Townsell had failed to allege facts sufficient to show prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Townsell did not explain how additional DNA testing would have overcome the evidence against him or how a DNA expert would have aided his defense.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that, to warrant appointment of postconviction counsel based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege with some factual basis how counsel’s deficiency caused prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. Because Townsell’s allegations regarding prejudice were conclusory and lacked supporting facts, his claim was deemed wholly unfounded, and the postconviction court did not err in denying his request for counsel. View "Townsell v. People" on Justia Law

Two individuals confronted a man outside a liquor store over an alleged debt. Surveillance footage showed the three men walking into an alley, after which one of the confrontors reemerged, followed by a flash of light and another man running away. The victim was later found in the alley, having suffered fatal gunshot wounds. The prosecution charged one of the confrontors with first degree murder and added crime of violence sentence enhancers, alleging he caused the victim’s death as the shooter.At trial in the Denver District Court, the prosecution was permitted to discuss complicity during jury selection, but the court later rejected a complicity instruction for lack of evidentiary support. The jury convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, and answered special interrogatories: it found he did not use or possess and threaten to use a deadly weapon, but did cause serious bodily injury or death. The defendant moved to vacate the verdict, arguing the interrogatory responses were inconsistent with the conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding no logical or legal inconsistency, as use of a deadly weapon was not an element of second degree murder.On appeal, a split panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, concluding that the jury’s findings were inconsistent and negated the elements of identity and causation, rendering the verdict infirm. The majority relied on precedent and structural error principles, while a dissenting judge argued the interrogatory did not negate any element, but agreed the verdicts were logically inconsistent absent a complicity instruction.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the jury’s finding regarding deadly weapon use did not negate any element of second degree murder and that the verdict reflected the jury’s unambiguous intent. Finding no legal or logical inconsistency, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of any unresolved issues. View "People v. Shockey" on Justia Law

Four juveniles conspired to rob a victim of vaping products in Colorado in 2019. During the incident, one of the juveniles, who is Black, shot and killed the victim. All four were initially charged with felony murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Subsequent investigation revealed that the shooter acted alone in confronting and shooting the victim, while the other three, including two non-Black juveniles, had more limited roles and cooperated with law enforcement. The two non-Black juveniles received plea deals allowing them to be tried in juvenile court and were sentenced to two years in the Division of Youth Services, while the two Black defendants, including the shooter, were prosecuted in district court and faced substantially harsher potential sentences.The District Court for Arapahoe County denied the shooter's motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, finding that he was not similarly situated to his non-Black codefendants due to his greater culpability as the shooter. The court also found that statistical evidence provided did not establish discriminatory purpose by the prosecution. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted the shooter, who was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after forty years. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, agreeing that the shooter was not similarly situated to the other defendants. The appellate division did not address whether the statistical evidence sufficed to show discriminatory purpose.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that the defendant failed to establish a claim of selective prosecution because he did not show a discriminatory effect or purpose. Specifically, he was not similarly situated to his non-Black codefendants, and his statistical evidence did not demonstrate that similarly situated non-Black individuals were treated differently. View "Mitchell v. People" on Justia Law

After her criminal charge for false reporting was dismissed, Rebeca Hinds filed a civil complaint in county court against Corrine Foreman, alleging that Foreman knowingly made false and defamatory statements to law enforcement, which led to Hinds being charged. Foreman responded by filing a special motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that her statements to police were protected as they related to a public issue and were made in an official proceeding. The county court found that while Hinds met her burden to show the statements’ falsity, she failed to provide sufficient evidence of actual malice. The court granted Foreman's motion to dismiss, entered a final judgment dismissing the case with prejudice, and awarded Foreman fees and costs.Hinds appealed the county court’s judgment to the Colorado Court of Appeals, relying on statutory provisions that appeared to authorize appeals of anti-SLAPP dismissals directly to that court. The Court of Appeals noted a jurisdictional issue because the Colorado Constitution and relevant statutes generally require appeals from county courts’ final judgments to be made to the district court or the Colorado Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. The division requested a determination of jurisdiction from the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the statutes authorizing the Court of Appeals to review final judgments from county courts in anti-SLAPP cases are unconstitutional to the extent they conflict with article VI, section 17 of the Colorado Constitution. The court ruled that appellate review of a county court’s final judgment must be by the district court or the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and granted Hinds leave to refile her appeal out of time in district court. View "Hinds v. Foreman" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered two debit cards in Garry Allen Hudson’s possession during a contact at a motel room and subsequent arrest. Each card was issued in a different person’s name, and Hudson denied knowing either individual. The detective who testified at trial was unable to determine whether the cards were active, whether Hudson knew the named individuals, or whether there was any money in the accounts. At least one of the cards had not been reported stolen in Colorado.Hudson was charged with criminal possession of two or more financial devices. At trial in the District Court, the jury convicted him of one count of criminal possession of a financial device, but did not specify which card formed the basis for conviction. The trial court sentenced Hudson to eighteen months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in a divided unpublished opinion, vacated Hudson’s conviction and sentence for criminal possession of a financial device. The majority held that the prosecution was required to prove the debit card could be used to obtain a thing of value at the time Hudson possessed it and found the evidence insufficient on that point.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under sections 18-5-903(1) and 18-5-901(6), the prosecution is not required to prove that a debit card was capable of use at the time of possession to support a conviction for criminal possession of a financial device. The Court concluded that the statutory inclusion of debit cards as financial devices is sufficient and no further qualification regarding usability is required. The case was remanded to reinstate Hudson’s conviction. View "People v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The City of Lakewood, Colorado enacted a business and occupation tax on certain telecommunications providers in 1969, which initially applied only to utility companies maintaining a telephone exchange and supplying local service within the city. Following changes in state and federal law promoting competitive neutrality and prohibiting barriers to entry, the city amended its tax ordinances in 1996 and again in 2015. The 1996 amendment expanded the tax to cover all providers of basic local telecommunications service, including some cellular services, while the 2015 amendment further broadened the scope to include all cellular and wireless voice service providers. Lakewood did not seek voter approval before enacting either amendment.After Lakewood audited MetroPCS California, LLC and assessed more than $1.6 million in unpaid business and occupation taxes, MetroPCS sued in the Jefferson County District Court. The district court granted summary judgment to MetroPCS, ruling that both the 1996 and 2015 Ordinances constituted "new taxes" under Colorado's Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR), and thus required advance voter approval. The court found the ordinances expanded the tax to previously untaxed providers and services, generating revenue that was not merely incidental or de minimis. Lakewood’s arguments that the ordinances simply clarified or updated the existing tax and did not produce significant new revenue were rejected. The district court declared both ordinances void and unenforceable for lack of voter approval.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case directly. Applying de novo review, it affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that both the 1996 and 2015 Ordinances imposed new taxes within the meaning of TABOR, as they expanded the tax base to include new classes of providers and services, and the resulting revenue increases were not incidental. Because Lakewood failed to obtain voter approval prior to enacting these ordinances, both were held void and unenforceable. The Court remanded the case for consideration of MetroPCS’s request for appellate fees and costs. View "MetroPCS Cal., LLC v. City of Lakewood" on Justia Law

Alexander Rudnicki suffered permanent brain damage at birth due to Dr. Peter Bianco’s negligent use of a vacuum extractor, resulting in lifelong medical needs and disabilities. Nine years after the injury, Rudnicki’s parents filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Bianco on his behalf. Their individual claims were dismissed as time-barred, but the claim for Alexander proceeded. A jury found Bianco liable and awarded $4 million in damages. The trial court found good cause to exceed Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act ("HCAA") $1 million damages cap, citing the unfairness of limiting recovery given Rudnicki’s extensive care requirements. The court reduced the award by $391,000, excluding pre-majority medical expenses based on then-existing precedent. On appeal, this reduction was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court, which reinstated the $391,000 in damages.After remand, the trial court reinstated the previously excluded damages and awarded prejudgment interest, including $319,120 in prefiling interest, resulting in a total judgment of about $1,357,000. The court maintained its finding of good cause and awarded the full amount, holding that the statutory cap did not limit the inclusion of prejudgment interest. Bianco appealed, arguing that prefiling interest could only be awarded up to $1 million, even if the good cause exception applied. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, interpreting the HCAA to treat prefiling interest as part of economic damages, subject to the cap and the good cause exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the statutory language and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that prefiling interest accruing on economic damages is part of the economic damages award and thus falls within the good cause exception to the HCAA’s $1 million cap. The Court clarified that prefiling interest is not a separate category of damages and overruled conflicting precedent. View "Bianco v. Rudnicki" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers from a drug task force conducted several undercover drug transactions with a defendant, exchanging cash (“buy money”) for controlled substances over the course of nearly a year. After the defendant’s eventual arrest, officers were unable to recover any of the buy money used in these operations. The defendant was charged in multiple cases and ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of a controlled substance. The district court sentenced him to prison and, following a restitution hearing, ordered him to pay $1,640 in restitution to the drug task force for the unrecovered buy money.On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacated the restitution order. The appellate court reasoned that the buy money was not “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” within the meaning of Colorado’s restitution statute, since the agency was not a statutory “victim” and did not suffer a pecuniary loss in the relevant sense. The court also found that the buy money did not qualify as “extraordinary direct public investigative costs,” because such expenditures are routine, budgeted expenses for law enforcement, not unusual or irregular costs. The division explicitly declined to follow a prior decision, People v. Juanda, which had permitted restitution for buy money under similar circumstances.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari to resolve whether law enforcement is entitled to restitution for unrecovered buy money under the relevant statute. The court held that buy money used in undercover drug transactions is neither “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” nor “extraordinary direct public investigative costs” as defined by statute. Therefore, law enforcement agencies cannot recover buy money as restitution from defendants in these circumstances. The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacating the district court’s restitution order was affirmed. View "People v. Hollis" on Justia Law

Samuel Perez filed a lawsuit in 2022 against By the Rockies, LLC, alleging that during his employment in 2016 and 2017, he and other employees were denied required meal and rest breaks, in violation of Colorado’s Minimum Wage Act. Perez sought recovery for unpaid wages based on these alleged violations. By the Rockies moved to dismiss the claim as untimely, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations was two years, as set forth in the Colorado Wage Claim Act, while Perez contended that the general six-year limitations period for actions to recover a liquidated debt should apply, since the Minimum Wage Act itself does not specify a limitations period.The District Court for Larimer County agreed with By the Rockies and dismissed Perez’s complaint, applying the Wage Claim Act’s two-year statute of limitations. Perez appealed, and a divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. The majority held that the six-year limitations period in section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) applied, reasoning that the Wage Claim Act’s limitations period was restricted to claims brought specifically under that Act, not under the Minimum Wage Act. The dissent argued that the Wage Claim Act’s limitations period was more specific and appropriate in light of the overall statutory scheme governing wage claims in Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari to resolve which limitations period applies to claims under the Minimum Wage Act. The Court held that the two-year limitations period set forth in the Wage Claim Act governs such claims, reasoning that both Acts are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme addressing unpaid wages and that the Wage Claim Act is more specific to wage disputes than the general limitations provision. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the district court’s order of dismissal. View "By the Rockies, LLC v. Perez" on Justia Law