Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a ranch was divided into two parcels, the owners of each parcel continued to share irrigation ditches and granted each other easements for water conveyance. In recent years, cooperation between the parties deteriorated, leading to disputes over water usage. The plaintiffs, who own one parcel, alleged that the defendant, owner of the other parcel, had diverted more water than entitled, causing excess runoff and flooding on their land. The plaintiffs claimed violations of Colorado statutes relating to waste of water, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and asserted trespass and nuisance claims. The parties also disputed the scope of the plaintiffs' easement in one of the ditches.The District Court for Water Division 5 found in favor of the plaintiffs on their statutory, trespass, and nuisance claims, concluding that the defendant had diverted excess water, wasted water in violation of statutes, and caused flooding. The court awarded nominal damages, attorney fees under section 37-84-125, and issued an injunction restricting the defendant's ability to divert water in excess of its decreed rights. The court also recognized plaintiffs' easement rights but declined to specify the extent of the easement in the Lower Gaskill Ditch, since that issue was not properly raised at trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim for a declaration of waste, that section 37-84-108 does not create a private right of action, and that sections 37-84-124 and -125 do not apply to injuries from excess irrigation runoff or flooding. The court ruled the water court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the related trespass and nuisance claims and that the injunction must be vacated. The court affirmed the water court's refusal to address the scope of the Lower Gaskill Ditch easement, reversed the judgment on all waste, flooding, trespass, nuisance, and related injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Byers Peak Properties v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC" on Justia Law

The respondent was charged with aggravated robbery, menacing, and criminal mischief after engaging in erratic and violent behavior in Denver. According to his own testimony, earlier that evening he had consumed beer and accepted a marijuana joint from an acquaintance whose name he did not know. After smoking the joint, he began feeling paranoid and eventually blacked out, recalling nothing until after the events in question. During the trial, the respondent claimed that the joint contained an unknown substance, such as a stimulant, which caused his behavior, and he requested a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication.The Denver District Court denied the request for an involuntary intoxication instruction, finding the claim speculative, and a jury convicted the respondent on all counts. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statutory defense of involuntary intoxication is legally available when a defendant knowingly ingests what he believes to be a particular intoxicant, but unknowingly ingests a different intoxicant, and it is the unknown substance that deprives him of the capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The appellate court concluded that this was the essence of the respondent’s claim and that he was entitled to the jury instruction.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals. The Court held that, under Colorado law, when a defendant ingests a product containing multiple intoxicants, the relevant “substance” for purposes of the involuntary intoxication defense is the entire product—not each particular component. Because the respondent knowingly smoked a joint he knew or should have known was intoxicating, his intoxication was deemed self-induced, barring the involuntary intoxication defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. Mion" on Justia Law

A landscaping company, owned by an individual, contracted with a homeowner to install Christmas lights on a tree located near a high voltage power line operated by a utility company. Neither the company nor its owner provided advance notice to the utility about the work, as required when working near high voltage lines. While performing the work, the owner came into contact with the electrified tree, fell, and suffered severe, permanent injuries. The owner sued the utility for negligence, claiming it failed to maintain the power lines and tree safely. The utility moved to dismiss the claim, relying on a tariff limiting its liability and arguing that statutory notice requirements had not been met. The utility also sought indemnity from the landscaping company for any liability it incurred due to the incident.The District Court for the City and County of Denver granted summary judgment to the utility, holding that the tariff barred the owner's claims, but denied summary judgment based on the statutory notice requirement, finding it only applied to the contracting party, not the individual employee. The court also found the landscaping company liable to indemnify the utility for any liability arising from the owner's claim, since it had failed to provide required notice under the High Voltage Safety Act (HVSA). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the tariff did not bar the owner's claim because it could not limit liability to non-customers, and upheld that the statutory notice requirement applied only to the contracting party.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed in part and vacated in part the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that the Public Utilities Commission lacked authority to approve a tariff limiting the utility’s liability to non-customers, that the owner was not subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement as he was not the contracting party, and that the HVSA’s indemnification provision did not require a separate causation analysis. View "Public Service Company of Colorado v. Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC" on Justia Law

Juan Manuel Castorena was charged with first degree murder in Colorado’s Seventeenth Judicial District. At his first trial, a forensic scientist named Yvonne Woods from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation testified regarding DNA evidence. Following that trial, Woods became the subject of an internal and criminal investigation for potential misconduct in DNA analysis, and she was subsequently prosecuted by the First Judicial District Attorney’s Office. Castorena, preparing for a retrial after his conviction was vacated on appeal due to an evidentiary error, requested materials from Woods’s investigation for his defense, specifically seeking the complete investigative file held by the First Judicial District Attorney.After Castorena’s request, the Adams County District Court ordered the First Judicial District Attorney to disclose Woods’s investigative file to Castorena and his attorneys, requiring that the order be served on the First Judicial District Attorney, who was not a party to Castorena’s criminal case. Castorena’s attorneys emailed and mailed notice of the order, but did not serve it pursuant to the requirements for service of process. The First Judicial District Attorney appeared specially to object, asserting lack of jurisdiction and improper use of criminal discovery rules, and sought relief from the Supreme Court of Colorado under C.A.R. 21.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that while a trial court may order a nonparty governmental entity to produce materials during pretrial discovery under Crim. P. 16(I)(c)(2), such an order is only enforceable if the court has obtained personal jurisdiction over the nonparty through proper service. Because Castorena had not properly served the First Judicial District Attorney, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction, rendering its disclosure order void. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, vacated the trial court’s order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Castorena" on Justia Law

Amanda Ann Soron, who was unhoused, gave birth outdoors in freezing temperatures behind a retail store. Police discovered her with her newborn, who was still attached by the umbilical cord and subsequently pronounced dead at the hospital. Greenwood Village Police Officer Moreno accompanied Soron in the ambulance and remained present during her treatment, recording procedures and statements with a body-worn camera and documenting evidence during her hospital stay. Four months after the incident, Soron was arrested and charged with child abuse resulting in death. The prosecution sought and obtained a court order for production of all medical records related to Soron and her child’s hospital stay.In the Arapahoe County District Court, Soron moved to prevent the prosecution from accessing her medical records, arguing they were protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the request for records was misleading. After a period during which Soron was found incompetent and later restored to competency, the trial court ruled in her favor. The court found that the child abuse exception to the physician-patient privilege only applied to testimony, not to documents, and that the medical records—including those captured on Officer Moreno’s body-worn camera—were privileged. The court ordered the medical records and camera footage to be sealed and preserved, and denied Soron’s request for a veracity hearing as moot.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the suppression order on interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the trial court’s decision that Soron’s medical records are protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the child abuse exception does not extend to documentary evidence. However, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order sealing the body-worn camera footage and related notes, remanding for further factual findings to determine whether that material is privileged or subject to other policy considerations. View "People v. Soron" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple felony sexual offenses involving a child in Larimer County, Colorado. Over a period of several years, different attorneys for the defendant requested multiple competency evaluations, all of which were completed by various experts who consistently found the defendant competent to proceed. After each evaluation, neither party objected to the conclusions, and the district court made final competency determinations. In May 2025, the defense requested another competency evaluation, supported by a psychological report diagnosing the defendant with several mental health conditions but not opining on competency. The court granted the request, and the evaluation again resulted in a finding of competency. The defense then moved for a second-opinion competency evaluation and a hearing.The Larimer County District Court denied the request for a second-opinion evaluation, reasoning that there were no new indicators of incompetency and that multiple prior evaluations had already found the defendant competent. The court also suggested that the defense’s request was a dilatory tactic and not genuinely warranted. When the defense sought clarification, the court reiterated its denial of a second-opinion evaluation but granted a hearing. The defense subsequently filed a petition under Colorado Appellate Rule 21 to the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado exercised its original jurisdiction, holding that under Colorado law, once a court-ordered competency evaluation is completed, a timely request for a second-opinion evaluation must be granted. The court found that the district court erred by denying the defense’s request and by retroactively questioning the propriety of the initial evaluation. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause and remanded the case, directing the district court to grant the defense’s request for a second-opinion competency evaluation. View "People v. McGee" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Aleah Michelle Camp and Danielle Ashley Simons, were each charged by home-rule municipalities in Colorado (Westminster and Aurora, respectively) with non-felony offenses—low-level theft and trespass—under municipal ordinances that prohibited the same conduct as relevant state statutes. Following the enactment of Colorado’s Misdemeanor Reform Act, which lowered sentencing caps for these state offenses, the municipal codes continued to authorize penalties for identical conduct that were significantly harsher than those allowed under state law.In the Westminster Municipal Court and Aurora Municipal Court, both defendants moved to dismiss their charges, arguing that the municipal sentencing provisions were preempted by state law because the penalties exceeded those permitted under the revised state statutes. Both municipal courts denied the motions, relying on precedent that recognized the authority of home-rule municipalities to regulate low-level offenses and to set their own penalties, and found no preemption or conflict with state law.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed these cases under its original jurisdiction. The Court held that when a municipal ordinance and a state statute prohibit identical conduct, municipalities may not authorize penalties that exceed the maximum sentencing caps established by state law for the corresponding offense. The Court found that the establishment of penalties for low-level criminal conduct is a matter of mixed statewide and local concern, but that municipal sentencing provisions which allow harsher penalties than state law create an operational conflict and are thus preempted to the extent of that conflict. The Court made the orders to show cause absolute and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this holding. Camp and Simons may be prosecuted for their ordinance violations, but cannot be subjected to penalties greater than those permitted by state law for the same conduct. View "People v. Michelle" on Justia Law

Canon City Police Department officers stopped Thomas James Havens in a Motel 6 parking lot for a traffic infraction. During the stop, officers arrested Havens on outstanding warrants and observed drug paraphernalia in his vehicle. Following a K-9 alert, a search of the vehicle uncovered illegal narcotics, a firearm, bullets, and a ledger. Havens stated he was staying in room 220 of the motel. Officer Modlin, having muted his body-worn camera (BWC) audio during unrelated conversations, entered the motel and spoke with a clerk, who indicated that Havens was actually staying in room 223. Officer Modlin failed to reactivate his BWC audio during this conversation. The clerk’s statement was the sole basis in the affidavit for a warrant to search room 223, where officers subsequently found additional narcotics and paraphernalia, leading to further charges against Havens.Havens moved to suppress the evidence found in room 223, arguing that the prosecution violated its discovery obligations under Colorado Criminal Procedure Rule 16 by failing to provide a report explaining why Officer Modlin muted his BWC audio. He also argued that the clerk’s statement was inadmissible under Colorado’s BWC statute, which creates a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility for unrecorded statements. The Fremont County District Court agreed, barring Officer Modlin’s testimony about the BWC issue and the clerk’s statements as a discovery sanction. The district court found that, without this testimony, the permissive inference of officer misconduct was unrebutted and the search warrant lacked probable cause, leading to suppression of the room 223 evidence.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the district court misinterpreted both the BWC statute and Rule 16. The Court ruled that the prosecution was not required to provide a report explaining the muted BWC audio and should have been permitted to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility regarding the clerk’s statement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for a hearing as required by the BWC statute. View "People v. Havens" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, while severely intoxicated, drove her vehicle into oncoming traffic, resulting in a collision that killed another driver and seriously injured two passengers, one of whom was partially paralyzed. At the time of the incident, her blood alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. The defendant had three prior drinking-and-driving convictions and was charged with felony DUI, vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, and related offenses. She pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide-DUI and vehicular assault-DUI in exchange for a sentencing range of eight to thirty-three years, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The court imposed consecutive sentences totaling twenty-nine years, including a twenty-four-year sentence for vehicular homicide-DUI.After sentencing, the defendant sought a proportionality review, arguing that her sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. The district court denied her motion, finding that vehicular homicide-DUI was per se a grave or serious offense. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed with this designation, holding that vehicular homicide-DUI is not per se grave or serious because it does not require proof of criminal intent, but nonetheless upheld the sentence, finding it was not grossly disproportionate.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed whether vehicular homicide-DUI should be classified as per se grave or serious and whether the defendant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate. The court held that vehicular homicide-DUI is not per se grave or serious for proportionality review purposes due to its strict liability nature, lacking a mens rea requirement. However, the court also held that, given the facts of the case—including the harm caused, the defendant’s history, and the sentence’s statutory authorization—the twenty-four-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "People v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought their dogs to a veterinary clinic for treatment. Dissatisfied with the care provided, both posted negative reviews on social media, detailing their experiences and criticizing the clinic’s practices. These posts were shared on multiple community Facebook pages and received significant engagement from the local community, including comments from others about the clinic. After the posters refused the clinic’s request to remove the reviews, the clinic filed a lawsuit for defamation per se against both individuals, alleging numerous defamatory statements.In the District Court for El Paso County, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their posts were protected as speech on a public issue. The district court denied the motion, finding that the statements concerned a private business dispute and did not address matters of public interest. The court also found that, even if the statute applied, the clinic had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its claims. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the posts provided consumer information relevant to the public but concluded they did not contribute to a broader public discussion, largely because they were motivated by personal animosity and aimed to harm the clinic’s business.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and determined that the lower courts had applied the wrong legal standard. The Supreme Court held that courts must use a two-step test to determine if speech is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute: first, whether an objective observer could reasonably understand the speech, in context, to be made in connection with a public issue or interest; and second, whether the speech contributed to public discussion of that issue. The court further held that the speaker’s motive is irrelevant to this analysis. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the matter was remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Lind-Barnett v. Tender Care Veterinary Ctr." on Justia Law