Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A public entity contracted with a general contractor to construct a major rail line project. The general contractor, in turn, subcontracted a significant portion of the work to a subcontractor. As the project progressed, it experienced numerous delays and disruptions, which the subcontractor claimed increased its costs. After completing its performance, the subcontractor, relying on expert analysis of its additional costs, filed a verified statement of claim under the Colorado Public Works Act, asserting it was owed additional millions for labor, materials, and other costs, including those stemming from delay and disruption.Following the filing, the general contractor substituted a surety bond for the retained project funds and the subcontractor initiated litigation in Denver District Court. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the subcontractor, concluding that its verified statement of claim was not excessive and that there was a reasonable possibility the claimed amount was due. The court awarded the subcontractor damages for delay, disruption, and unpaid funds. The general contractor appealed, contending the claim was excessive and should result in forfeiture of all rights to the claimed amount. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed in relevant part, holding that the verified statement of claim was excessive as a matter of law and that the subcontractor forfeited all rights to the amount claimed. This disposition left certain issues raised by the subcontractor on cross-appeal unaddressed.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted review and held that, under the Public Works Act, disputed or unliquidated amounts—including delay and disruption damages—may be included in a verified statement of claim if they represent the specified categories of costs and the claim is not excessive under the statute. The court also held that filing an excessive claim results only in forfeiture of statutory remedies under the Act, not all legal remedies. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co. v. Reg'l Rail Partners" on Justia Law

The case concerns a daycare provider who was charged with child abuse and operating a childcare facility without a license after allegations arose regarding inappropriate conduct by her teenage son toward children in her care. During the investigation, the provider voluntarily gave a recorded interview to police. Before trial, the county court suppressed part of the interview video, finding a Miranda violation during the latter portion of questioning. The prosecution appealed this suppression order under the applicable procedure and the district court reversed, holding there was no Miranda violation.After remand, as trial approached, the prosecution sought to introduce the entire interview video. The county court excluded portions of the video, not on constitutional grounds but as inadmissible under the Colorado Rules of Evidence due to concerns about relevance, prejudice, and cumulativeness. The prosecution attempted another pretrial interlocutory appeal, claiming the evidentiary ruling was a suppression of evidence. The district court dismissed this second appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling the order was strictly evidentiary, not a suppression ruling as required for an interlocutory appeal.After being convicted at trial, the defendant argued on appeal to the district court that her statutory speedy trial right was violated because the prosecution’s second pretrial appeal was not a proper interlocutory appeal and did not toll the statutory speedy trial deadline. The district court affirmed, finding the prosecution acted in good faith and their appeal had arguable merit.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the prosecution’s second pretrial appeal lacked arguable merit as an interlocutory appeal because it challenged an evidentiary ruling, not a suppression of evidence in the constitutional sense. Therefore, the speedy trial deadline was not tolled, and the defendant’s statutory right was violated. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charges with prejudice. View "Phillips v. People" on Justia Law

A group of shareholders brought a class action against a telecommunications company and its executives, alleging violations of securities laws related to the company’s merger with another entity. The plaintiffs claimed that the registration statement and prospectus for the merger contained false statements and omitted material facts about illegal billing practices known as “cramming,” which they argued were widespread, known to senior management, and impacted the company’s financial performance. The amended complaint incorporated allegations and statements made by confidential witnesses and public filings from related lawsuits, as well as affidavits from other cases, all supporting the claim of pervasive cramming practices.Initially, the Boulder County District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead material misrepresentations or omissions with particularity and denied leave to amend. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the denial of leave to amend the omissions claim based on the cramming theory, instructing that any borrowed allegations must be pleaded as facts after reasonable inquiry as required by C.R.C.P. 11. After the plaintiff amended the complaint, the district court dismissed it again, concluding that the plaintiff’s counsel had not satisfied the requirement to conduct a reasonable inquiry, as the complaint relied on allegations from other lawsuits without direct verification from the original sources or witnesses.The Colorado Supreme Court, en banc, reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal. The Supreme Court held that under C.R.C.P. 11(a), counsel must conduct a sufficient investigation to support allegations, at least on information and belief, but the extent of the required investigation is fact-dependent. Copying allegations from related complaints does not alone violate Rule 11 provided counsel’s inquiry is objectively reasonable in context. The Court found that the plaintiff’s counsel had met this standard and affirmed the judgment below. View "CenturyLink, Inc. v. Houser" on Justia Law

Late one night, the defendant called 911 to report his motel roommate was unconscious due to a possible overdose. When police and emergency medical personnel arrived, the roommate died, but the defendant was not initially considered a suspect. The police took his statement and released him. The following day, after the autopsy, police suspected a disturbance had occurred and brought the defendant to the station for further questioning. He was handcuffed during transport per department policy but was not under arrest. At the station, he waited in the lobby, was taken to an interview room, and was not restrained. During the interview, the detective began to read a Miranda advisement, at which point the defendant stated he wanted a lawyer. The detective agreed, and the defendant prepared to leave. Shortly afterward, police decided to arrest him, and upon being informed of his arrest for murder, the defendant indicated he would speak without a lawyer. He was then given a Miranda advisement, waived his rights, and made incriminating statements.The District Court for the City and County of Denver held a suppression hearing. The court, noting that both the prosecution and defense conceded the defendant was not in custody at the time he invoked his right to counsel, nonetheless ruled that his invocation was effective because a Miranda advisement had been attempted. The court suppressed the subsequent statements under Edwards v. Arizona, finding the police had not honored the defendant’s request for counsel by reinitiating questioning.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case. It concluded that the district court erred by applying Miranda and Edwards protections when the defendant was not in custody at the time he requested an attorney. The court held that an invocation of the right to counsel outside custodial interrogation is not effective, even when law enforcement attempts a Miranda advisement. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Lulei" on Justia Law

This case concerns requests made by two media organizations to the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS) for information about the number of child abuse or neglect reports made from three state-funded residential child care facilities (RCCFs) over a three-year period, and how many were screened for investigation. CDHS denied the requests, asserting that providing the facility-specific numbers would violate the confidentiality provisions of the Colorado Children's Code Records and Information Act, specifically section 19-1-307(1)(a), which protects the name, address, and other identifying information of any child, family, or informant in such reports. The media organizations declined CDHS's offer to provide aggregate numbers for all three facilities combined and sued for disclosure of the per-facility data under the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA).The Denver District Court agreed with CDHS, holding that subsection (1)(a) barred disclosure of the requested information, as it would necessarily identify the addresses involved in the reports. On appeal, a divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals found the statute ambiguous and, after considering legislative history and potential constitutional issues, determined that only information that constitutes "identifying information" is protected. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court to determine if the requested disclosures would reveal identifying information.On review, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that section 19-1-307(1)(a) is unambiguous and extends confidentiality to all names and addresses of children, families, or informants in reports of child abuse or neglect, as well as any other identifying information. However, the court found that CDHS failed to demonstrate that disclosing the requested six numbers would reveal protected information, as the RCCFs' addresses are already public. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered disclosure of the six numbers. View "Brubaker v. Colo. Sun & Tegna" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who struck and killed her boyfriend with her car, then left the scene. She claimed the incident was accidental, while the prosecution charged her with second degree murder and related offenses. A central issue at trial was her mental state at the time of the offense. The defendant wished to present expert testimony regarding her mental illness and the potential impact of not taking prescribed antipsychotic medication in the days leading up to the incident, as it might have influenced whether she acted knowingly, the mens rea for the charged offense.The District Court of Lake County denied her request to present this expert testimony, reasoning that she had not completed a required court-ordered mental-condition examination due to her lack of cooperation. However, during the relevant period, the defendant had been found incompetent to proceed, which affected her ability to cooperate with the examination process. Despite repeated efforts and court orders spanning several years, no mental-condition examination was completed while she was competent. The trial court excluded her expert's mental-condition evidence and the jury convicted her on all counts.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the convictions on all counts where culpability was at issue. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by faulting the defendant for failing to cooperate with the examination while she was incompetent and by excluding all of her expert's testimony without distinguishing between evidence probative of insanity and evidence relevant to other defenses.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, holding that a defendant must be competent before undergoing a mental-condition examination under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court concluded that it was improper to penalize the defendant for noncooperation while incompetent and that the trial court erred in excluding all mental-condition evidence on that basis. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Day" on Justia Law

After unlawfully entering his ex-wife’s home in violation of a court-issued protection order, the defendant was charged with second degree burglary and additional offenses. The protection order, issued under Colorado law, specifically prohibited the defendant from contacting his ex-wife or entering her residence. During the incident, the defendant jumped a fence, damaged property, and entered the home despite his ex-wife’s objections, prompting her to lock herself in the bathroom and call the police. Officers arrived to find the defendant leaving the property, and he was subsequently taken into custody.The Weld County District Court held a preliminary hearing on the burglary charge. The prosecution presented evidence of the defendant’s violation of the protection order. The defendant did not dispute the factual allegations but argued that his conduct did not amount to a “crime against another person or property” under the second degree burglary statute. The District Court, relying on the Supreme Court of Colorado’s decision in People v. Rhorer, concluded that violating a protection order is a predicate crime for second degree burglary because it constitutes a crime against a person or property. The court found probable cause and set the charge for trial.The Supreme Court of Colorado exercised its original jurisdiction to review the District Court’s ruling. The court affirmed the trial court’s interpretation of the law, holding that a criminal violation of a protection order under section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S., categorically qualifies as a “crime against another person or property” for purposes of the second degree burglary statute. Therefore, such a violation may properly serve as the predicate offense for second degree burglary. The Supreme Court discharged the order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Dilka" on Justia Law

In June 2013, a masked individual robbed a bank in Aurora, Colorado, taking cash and using a bank bag containing a GPS device. The GPS led police to a car belonging to the estranged wife of Jamale D. Townsell. Evidence collected included clothing, shoes, and a mask, many of which were forensically tested and matched Townsell’s DNA. Cell phone records also placed Townsell near the scene. At trial, Townsell’s defense relied on the mistaken belief that only one piece of evidence—the pantyhose—had been tested for DNA, leading to a trial strategy that did not address the full extent of the DNA evidence. The jury convicted Townsell, and he was sentenced to thirty-two years in prison.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Townsell’s conviction on direct appeal. Townsell subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to adequately investigate DNA evidence and to seek further testing of untested items. The postconviction court denied the motion without appointing counsel, finding Townsell had failed to allege facts sufficient to show prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Townsell did not explain how additional DNA testing would have overcome the evidence against him or how a DNA expert would have aided his defense.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that, to warrant appointment of postconviction counsel based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege with some factual basis how counsel’s deficiency caused prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. Because Townsell’s allegations regarding prejudice were conclusory and lacked supporting facts, his claim was deemed wholly unfounded, and the postconviction court did not err in denying his request for counsel. View "Townsell v. People" on Justia Law

Two individuals confronted a man outside a liquor store over an alleged debt. Surveillance footage showed the three men walking into an alley, after which one of the confrontors reemerged, followed by a flash of light and another man running away. The victim was later found in the alley, having suffered fatal gunshot wounds. The prosecution charged one of the confrontors with first degree murder and added crime of violence sentence enhancers, alleging he caused the victim’s death as the shooter.At trial in the Denver District Court, the prosecution was permitted to discuss complicity during jury selection, but the court later rejected a complicity instruction for lack of evidentiary support. The jury convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, and answered special interrogatories: it found he did not use or possess and threaten to use a deadly weapon, but did cause serious bodily injury or death. The defendant moved to vacate the verdict, arguing the interrogatory responses were inconsistent with the conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding no logical or legal inconsistency, as use of a deadly weapon was not an element of second degree murder.On appeal, a split panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, concluding that the jury’s findings were inconsistent and negated the elements of identity and causation, rendering the verdict infirm. The majority relied on precedent and structural error principles, while a dissenting judge argued the interrogatory did not negate any element, but agreed the verdicts were logically inconsistent absent a complicity instruction.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the jury’s finding regarding deadly weapon use did not negate any element of second degree murder and that the verdict reflected the jury’s unambiguous intent. Finding no legal or logical inconsistency, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of any unresolved issues. View "People v. Shockey" on Justia Law

Four juveniles conspired to rob a victim of vaping products in Colorado in 2019. During the incident, one of the juveniles, who is Black, shot and killed the victim. All four were initially charged with felony murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Subsequent investigation revealed that the shooter acted alone in confronting and shooting the victim, while the other three, including two non-Black juveniles, had more limited roles and cooperated with law enforcement. The two non-Black juveniles received plea deals allowing them to be tried in juvenile court and were sentenced to two years in the Division of Youth Services, while the two Black defendants, including the shooter, were prosecuted in district court and faced substantially harsher potential sentences.The District Court for Arapahoe County denied the shooter's motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, finding that he was not similarly situated to his non-Black codefendants due to his greater culpability as the shooter. The court also found that statistical evidence provided did not establish discriminatory purpose by the prosecution. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted the shooter, who was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after forty years. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, agreeing that the shooter was not similarly situated to the other defendants. The appellate division did not address whether the statistical evidence sufficed to show discriminatory purpose.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that the defendant failed to establish a claim of selective prosecution because he did not show a discriminatory effect or purpose. Specifically, he was not similarly situated to his non-Black codefendants, and his statistical evidence did not demonstrate that similarly situated non-Black individuals were treated differently. View "Mitchell v. People" on Justia Law