Juan Manuel Castorena was charged with first degree murder in Colorado’s Seventeenth Judicial District. At his first trial, a forensic scientist named Yvonne Woods from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation testified regarding DNA evidence. Following that trial, Woods became the subject of an internal and criminal investigation for potential misconduct in DNA analysis, and she was subsequently prosecuted by the First Judicial District Attorney’s Office. Castorena, preparing for a retrial after his conviction was vacated on appeal due to an evidentiary error, requested materials from Woods’s investigation for his defense, specifically seeking the complete investigative file held by the First Judicial District Attorney.After Castorena’s request, the Adams County District Court ordered the First Judicial District Attorney to disclose Woods’s investigative file to Castorena and his attorneys, requiring that the order be served on the First Judicial District Attorney, who was not a party to Castorena’s criminal case. Castorena’s attorneys emailed and mailed notice of the order, but did not serve it pursuant to the requirements for service of process. The First Judicial District Attorney appeared specially to object, asserting lack of jurisdiction and improper use of criminal discovery rules, and sought relief from the Supreme Court of Colorado under C.A.R. 21.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that while a trial court may order a nonparty governmental entity to produce materials during pretrial discovery under Crim. P. 16(I)(c)(2), such an order is only enforceable if the court has obtained personal jurisdiction over the nonparty through proper service. Because Castorena had not properly served the First Judicial District Attorney, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction, rendering its disclosure order void. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, vacated the trial court’s order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Castorena" on Justia Law

Amanda Ann Soron, who was unhoused, gave birth outdoors in freezing temperatures behind a retail store. Police discovered her with her newborn, who was still attached by the umbilical cord and subsequently pronounced dead at the hospital. Greenwood Village Police Officer Moreno accompanied Soron in the ambulance and remained present during her treatment, recording procedures and statements with a body-worn camera and documenting evidence during her hospital stay. Four months after the incident, Soron was arrested and charged with child abuse resulting in death. The prosecution sought and obtained a court order for production of all medical records related to Soron and her child’s hospital stay.In the Arapahoe County District Court, Soron moved to prevent the prosecution from accessing her medical records, arguing they were protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the request for records was misleading. After a period during which Soron was found incompetent and later restored to competency, the trial court ruled in her favor. The court found that the child abuse exception to the physician-patient privilege only applied to testimony, not to documents, and that the medical records—including those captured on Officer Moreno’s body-worn camera—were privileged. The court ordered the medical records and camera footage to be sealed and preserved, and denied Soron’s request for a veracity hearing as moot.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the suppression order on interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the trial court’s decision that Soron’s medical records are protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the child abuse exception does not extend to documentary evidence. However, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order sealing the body-worn camera footage and related notes, remanding for further factual findings to determine whether that material is privileged or subject to other policy considerations. View "People v. Soron" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple felony sexual offenses involving a child in Larimer County, Colorado. Over a period of several years, different attorneys for the defendant requested multiple competency evaluations, all of which were completed by various experts who consistently found the defendant competent to proceed. After each evaluation, neither party objected to the conclusions, and the district court made final competency determinations. In May 2025, the defense requested another competency evaluation, supported by a psychological report diagnosing the defendant with several mental health conditions but not opining on competency. The court granted the request, and the evaluation again resulted in a finding of competency. The defense then moved for a second-opinion competency evaluation and a hearing.The Larimer County District Court denied the request for a second-opinion evaluation, reasoning that there were no new indicators of incompetency and that multiple prior evaluations had already found the defendant competent. The court also suggested that the defense’s request was a dilatory tactic and not genuinely warranted. When the defense sought clarification, the court reiterated its denial of a second-opinion evaluation but granted a hearing. The defense subsequently filed a petition under Colorado Appellate Rule 21 to the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado exercised its original jurisdiction, holding that under Colorado law, once a court-ordered competency evaluation is completed, a timely request for a second-opinion evaluation must be granted. The court found that the district court erred by denying the defense’s request and by retroactively questioning the propriety of the initial evaluation. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause and remanded the case, directing the district court to grant the defense’s request for a second-opinion competency evaluation. View "People v. McGee" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Aleah Michelle Camp and Danielle Ashley Simons, were each charged by home-rule municipalities in Colorado (Westminster and Aurora, respectively) with non-felony offenses—low-level theft and trespass—under municipal ordinances that prohibited the same conduct as relevant state statutes. Following the enactment of Colorado’s Misdemeanor Reform Act, which lowered sentencing caps for these state offenses, the municipal codes continued to authorize penalties for identical conduct that were significantly harsher than those allowed under state law.In the Westminster Municipal Court and Aurora Municipal Court, both defendants moved to dismiss their charges, arguing that the municipal sentencing provisions were preempted by state law because the penalties exceeded those permitted under the revised state statutes. Both municipal courts denied the motions, relying on precedent that recognized the authority of home-rule municipalities to regulate low-level offenses and to set their own penalties, and found no preemption or conflict with state law.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed these cases under its original jurisdiction. The Court held that when a municipal ordinance and a state statute prohibit identical conduct, municipalities may not authorize penalties that exceed the maximum sentencing caps established by state law for the corresponding offense. The Court found that the establishment of penalties for low-level criminal conduct is a matter of mixed statewide and local concern, but that municipal sentencing provisions which allow harsher penalties than state law create an operational conflict and are thus preempted to the extent of that conflict. The Court made the orders to show cause absolute and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this holding. Camp and Simons may be prosecuted for their ordinance violations, but cannot be subjected to penalties greater than those permitted by state law for the same conduct. View "People v. Michelle" on Justia Law

Canon City Police Department officers stopped Thomas James Havens in a Motel 6 parking lot for a traffic infraction. During the stop, officers arrested Havens on outstanding warrants and observed drug paraphernalia in his vehicle. Following a K-9 alert, a search of the vehicle uncovered illegal narcotics, a firearm, bullets, and a ledger. Havens stated he was staying in room 220 of the motel. Officer Modlin, having muted his body-worn camera (BWC) audio during unrelated conversations, entered the motel and spoke with a clerk, who indicated that Havens was actually staying in room 223. Officer Modlin failed to reactivate his BWC audio during this conversation. The clerk’s statement was the sole basis in the affidavit for a warrant to search room 223, where officers subsequently found additional narcotics and paraphernalia, leading to further charges against Havens.Havens moved to suppress the evidence found in room 223, arguing that the prosecution violated its discovery obligations under Colorado Criminal Procedure Rule 16 by failing to provide a report explaining why Officer Modlin muted his BWC audio. He also argued that the clerk’s statement was inadmissible under Colorado’s BWC statute, which creates a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility for unrecorded statements. The Fremont County District Court agreed, barring Officer Modlin’s testimony about the BWC issue and the clerk’s statements as a discovery sanction. The district court found that, without this testimony, the permissive inference of officer misconduct was unrebutted and the search warrant lacked probable cause, leading to suppression of the room 223 evidence.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the district court misinterpreted both the BWC statute and Rule 16. The Court ruled that the prosecution was not required to provide a report explaining the muted BWC audio and should have been permitted to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility regarding the clerk’s statement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for a hearing as required by the BWC statute. View "People v. Havens" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, while severely intoxicated, drove her vehicle into oncoming traffic, resulting in a collision that killed another driver and seriously injured two passengers, one of whom was partially paralyzed. At the time of the incident, her blood alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. The defendant had three prior drinking-and-driving convictions and was charged with felony DUI, vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, and related offenses. She pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide-DUI and vehicular assault-DUI in exchange for a sentencing range of eight to thirty-three years, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The court imposed consecutive sentences totaling twenty-nine years, including a twenty-four-year sentence for vehicular homicide-DUI.After sentencing, the defendant sought a proportionality review, arguing that her sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. The district court denied her motion, finding that vehicular homicide-DUI was per se a grave or serious offense. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed with this designation, holding that vehicular homicide-DUI is not per se grave or serious because it does not require proof of criminal intent, but nonetheless upheld the sentence, finding it was not grossly disproportionate.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed whether vehicular homicide-DUI should be classified as per se grave or serious and whether the defendant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate. The court held that vehicular homicide-DUI is not per se grave or serious for proportionality review purposes due to its strict liability nature, lacking a mens rea requirement. However, the court also held that, given the facts of the case—including the harm caused, the defendant’s history, and the sentence’s statutory authorization—the twenty-four-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "People v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought their dogs to a veterinary clinic for treatment. Dissatisfied with the care provided, both posted negative reviews on social media, detailing their experiences and criticizing the clinic’s practices. These posts were shared on multiple community Facebook pages and received significant engagement from the local community, including comments from others about the clinic. After the posters refused the clinic’s request to remove the reviews, the clinic filed a lawsuit for defamation per se against both individuals, alleging numerous defamatory statements.In the District Court for El Paso County, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their posts were protected as speech on a public issue. The district court denied the motion, finding that the statements concerned a private business dispute and did not address matters of public interest. The court also found that, even if the statute applied, the clinic had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its claims. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the posts provided consumer information relevant to the public but concluded they did not contribute to a broader public discussion, largely because they were motivated by personal animosity and aimed to harm the clinic’s business.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and determined that the lower courts had applied the wrong legal standard. The Supreme Court held that courts must use a two-step test to determine if speech is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute: first, whether an objective observer could reasonably understand the speech, in context, to be made in connection with a public issue or interest; and second, whether the speech contributed to public discussion of that issue. The court further held that the speaker’s motive is irrelevant to this analysis. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the matter was remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Lind-Barnett v. Tender Care Veterinary Ctr." on Justia Law

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that K.L.W. ("Father") waived his statutory right to a jury trial by failing to appear for the trial in 2021. The court then incorrectly adjudicated Father's five children as dependent or neglected by default. In 2023, the juvenile court vacated the default judgment and scheduled a new adjudicatory trial, again finding that Father had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to appear in 2021. Father did not demand a jury trial during the twenty days before the bench trial and acknowledged the bench trial in a pretrial pleading. On the morning of the 2023 trial, Father objected to the waiver finding, but the court proceeded with the bench trial and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's adjudicatory judgment, concluding that Father's 2021 waiver of a jury trial did not extend to the 2023 proceeding. The appellate court held that the 2023 trial was a new trial, and since Father appeared, he did not waive his right to a jury trial for the 2023 proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that even if the 2021 waiver was not binding for the 2023 trial, Father failed to demand a jury trial as required by statute and rule. The court found that Father's objection on the morning of the 2023 trial was not a valid or timely demand for a jury trial. The court emphasized that granting Father's objection would have delayed the proceedings, contrary to the children's best interests and the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the juvenile court correctly conducted a bench trial, and the appellate court erred in reversing the adjudicatory judgment. View "People ex rel. Kay. W. v. K.L.W." on Justia Law

During a covert surveillance operation in Denver, undercover police officers observed Arthur S. Mills engaging in behavior consistent with a drug transaction. Mills was stopped for a traffic violation, during which he failed to produce a valid driver's license or proof of insurance. Mills became uncooperative, and the officers, believing they had probable cause, decided to impound his vehicle and obtain a search warrant rather than conducting an on-scene search.The Denver County District Court granted Mills's motion to suppress the drug evidence found in his vehicle, ruling that although the police had probable cause to seize the vehicle, the delay in obtaining a search warrant was longer than necessary. The court cited Chambers v. Maroney, reasoning that the vehicle should only be held for the period necessary to obtain the warrant. The People filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and established a four-factor balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a delay in seeking a search warrant: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the nature and strength of the individual's possessory interest, (3) the strength of the government's justification for the delay, and (4) the government's diligence in applying for the warrant. Applying this test, the court concluded that the three-day delay, which included a weekend, was reasonable. The court noted that the police acted diligently and cautiously, considering officer safety and the thoroughness of the investigation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the delay in obtaining the search warrant did not render the seizure unconstitutional. View "People v. Mills" on Justia Law

Deshawn Lynn Randolph was charged with two counts of soliciting for child prostitution under Colorado law. The charges stemmed from interactions with an undercover investigator posing as a minor on a social networking platform. Randolph offered to arrange sex work for the investigator, who had claimed to be underage. At trial, Randolph argued that he did not intend to arrange sex work but was merely boasting to delay any action until the investigator turned eighteen.The district court instructed the jury that the applicable mental state for the charges was "knowingly," rejecting Randolph's proposed instruction that would have required proof of "intentionally." The jury found Randolph guilty, and he was sentenced to two concurrent nine-year terms. Randolph appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were incorrect. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that "knowingly" was the correct mental state.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to resolve the appropriate mental state for the crime of soliciting for child prostitution. The court held that the culpable mental state for the crime under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of the statute is "knowingly," aligning with the mental state explicitly designated in subsection (1)(c). The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. View "Randolph v. People" on Justia Law