In early 2012, two uniformed Colorado Springs police officers went to Defendant Jeffrey Marshall's residence to serve a summons for his alleged indecent exposure. Defendant wasn't home at the time; the officers waited in their squad car for him in a nearby parking lot. Defendant eventually came home, parking in the same lot as the officers. He was carrying a black backpack with him at the time. The officers approached Defendant to serve the summons. Despite his apparent cooperation, one officer was concerned that Defendant might run away. Defendant was then put under arrest on the indecent exposure charge. While one officer placed Defendant in the squad car, the other officer opened the backpack and found six individual bags of marijuana weighing 7.4 grams total, an assortment of prescription pills, and a digital scale. Based on the items found in the backpack, the State charged Defendant with possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana, possession of a schedule-three controlled substance, and five habitual criminal counts. After two suppression hearings, the trial court found that Defendant's arrest was valid because the officers had a summons that required fingerprinting and processing Marshall at the Colorado Springs stationhouse. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that the subsequent search of the backpack was illegal because Defendant was handcuffed and either in, or standing next to, the police car at the time of the search. The trial court reasoned that under "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)), the search incident to arrest exception did not apply because the exigencies discussed in that case that would justify a search were absent. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State that the evidence in Defendant's backpack should not have been suppressed because the officer conducted a valid search incident to arrest. Therefore the Court reversed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence. View "Colorado v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued General Steel, Discount Steel, and those companies' presidents for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy, based on their filing an arbitration complaint against him. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by (1) refusing to include additional elements reflecting the heightened standard in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court (POME) in the jury instruction for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; and (2) trebling an exemplary damages award against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) POME does not apply where, as here, the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint that led to a purely private dispute; (2) therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to include additional elements reflecting POME's heightened standard in the jury instruction for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; and (3) the trial court did not err by trebling the exemplary damages award against Defendants. View "Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, Mother sought review of an order of the district court determining that it had jurisdiction to enter initial orders in a dispute concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities for Child. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause to decide whether the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction to make initial child custody determinations in this matter based on the parties' intent to indefinitely change their residence to Colorado rather than based on the analysis required under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding that the court applied the incorrect legal standard when it concluded that jurisdiction was proper in Colorado and, rather, should have applied the jurisdictional test required under the UCCJEA. View "In re Madrone" on Justia Law

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. Adopting its reasoning in "Neuhaus v. Colorado," (2012 CO 65, released concurrently with this opinion), the Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Escobedo v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. Adopting its reasoning in "Neuhaus v. Colorado," (2012 CO 65, released concurrently with this opinion), the Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court. View "Colorado v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. The Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. View "Neuhaus v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, along with "Hagos v. Colorado" (2012 CO 63), to address whether a determination on direct appeal that instructional error did not constitute plain error necessarily requires a determination in post conviction proceedings that trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction did not prejudice the defense. Upon review, the Court concluded that that a determination that an instructional error did not constitute plain error does not control a determination of prejudice under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)), because the plain error and Strickland standards are not the same. "The plain error standard requires that an error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a greater degree than the Strickland prejudice standard." Defendant Villarreal's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, nonetheless, failed under the separate, fact-specific Strickland analysis. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment but on different grounds. View "Villarreal v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this postconviction proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a determination on direct appeal that instructional error did not constitute plain error necessarily required a determination in postconviction proceedings that trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction did not prejudice the defense. The Court concluded that a determination that instructional error did not constitute plain error does not control a determination of prejudice under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)), because the two standards are not the same. The plain error standard requires that an error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a greater degree than the Strickland prejudice standard. Defendant Hagos' ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed under the separate, fact-specific Strickland analysis. The Court affirmed the appellate court but on different grounds. View "Hagos v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "People v. Gross," (07CA2255, slip op. at 7 (Colo. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (not selected for official publication)), which reversed the defendant's convictions arising out of a shooting at a campground. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed cumulative error by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor doctrine, which was requested by defense counsel; by allowing the prosecutor to argue that the defendant did not satisfy the duty to retreat, a requirement of the initial aggressor jury instruction; and by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder. In its holding, the court reasoned that the attorney incompetence exception to the invited error doctrine permitted plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the invited error doctrine precludes plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. The attorney incompetence exception does not apply to deliberate, strategic acts of defense counsel but rather to inadvertent errors or oversights. In this case, the invited error doctrine precluded the defendant from arguing that the trial court erred by giving the initial aggressor instruction because the defendant's trial counsel made a deliberate, strategic decision to request it. "Likewise, the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about the duty to retreat may not be raised on appeal." The Court held that the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder, but that this error did not amount to plain error. View "Colorado v. Gross" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, The Hannon Law Firm ("Hannon"), Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P.("Melat"), and Howarth & Smith ("Howarth") entered into a contingent fee agreement to represent multiple plaintiffs in an action against the Cotter Corporation regarding contamination from a uranium mill. The three firms entered into a fee sharing agreement to apportion the fees and costs of the litigation among themselves. Hannon withdrew mid-representation, citing a strained relationship with Howarth. Six years later, after the underlying litigation settled, Hannon filed a quantum meruit action against Melat and Howarth, seeking the reasonable value of the services it provided up to the time of withdrawal. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's judgment with regard to its interpretation of C.R.C.P. Chapter23.3 allowing a quantum meruit claim among co-counsel, but reversed the trial court's determination that the claim accrued when Hannon withdrew from the litigation, instead of when the recovery occurred that made funds available to the attorneys. The Supreme Court held that, where multiple attorneys are co-counsel in a contingent fee agreement, C.R.C.P. Chapter 23.3 does not bar a withdrawing attorney from pursuing a quantum meruit action against former co-counsel for a share of attorney fees obtained in the case, even though that attorney was barred from pursuing such an action against the former client. The claim accrues at the time the withdrawing attorney knows or should know of the occurrence of the settlement or judgment that will result in the payment of attorney fees. View "Melat, Pressman & Higbie, LLP v. Hannon Law Firm, LLC" on Justia Law