In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review a district court order dismissing a misdemeanor charge in a county court case that was improperly transferred to the district court in violation of a chief judge's order governing such transfers within the judicial district. "While it is questionable whether the district court had jurisdiction to dismiss the county court charge," the Court nevertheless held that the only forum for an initial appeal of such a dismissal is in the court of appeals because it is a final judgment of the district court. The Court noted that to hold otherwise would render this "important issue of the respect owed to a controlling chief judge's order" unreviewable. Accordingly, the Court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over this appeal. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to review the district court's dismissal on the merits. View "Colorado v. Maser" on Justia Law

The prosecution brought this interlocutory appeal seeking to reverse the trial court's ruling that suppressed evidence obtained from the search of the apartment of the Defendant Andrian Arapu. Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents sought to contact Defendant, suspecting he was in the country illegally. In accordance with their standard protocol, ICE requested assistance from local law enforcement. When federal agents contacted Defendant, he refused to give them permission to enter his apartment, but he consented to the local detective entering the apartment to monitor a woman already inside. When the federal agents were arrested Defendant, he gave his consent to the local detective to gather his keys and phones, and to secure the apartment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a suspect who consented to a law enforcement officer entering his dwelling to monitor another person inside permits the law enforcement officer to ask the monitored person for identifying information. Further, the Court held that a suspect who consents to a law enforcement officer remaining inside his dwelling to gather belongings and to secure the dwelling, permits the law enforcement officer to remain in the apartment until all law enforcement personnel have left the dwelling. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's suppression of the drug-related evidence, and reversed the district court's suppression of a firearm because it would have been discovered in a search pursuant to a warrant supported by a redacted affidavit that independently established probable cause to search the apartment for drug-related evidence. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Arapu" on Justia Law

After losing on her Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim at the county court, Elizabeth Flood's trial counsel, Gary Merenstein, paid the fees of several appellate attorneys who represented Flood in an appeal to the district court and later to the Supreme Court because they were not willing to work on a contingency basis. Flood ultimately prevailed in her appeal, and the Supreme Court awarded attorneys' fees. On remand to the county court to determine Flood's entitlement to and the amount of the attorneys' fees, the opposing party, debt collector Mercantile Adjustment Bureau(MAB), argued that Flood was not entitled to receive attorneys' fees for her appellate counsel's work. MAB argued that the arrangement between Merenstein and Flood, wherein he agreed to pay her appellate attorneys' fees and expected to be reimbursed for these fees from any court award of attorneys' fees received by Flood, constituted unethical financial assistance of a client in violation of Rule 1.8(e) of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. The county court rejected MAB's argument and awarded Flood the requested attorneys' fees. MAB appealed to the district court, which affirmed the county court. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Merenstein did not violate Rule 1.8(e) by paying the fees of Flood's appellate counsel and therefore affirmed the district court's decision in part. However, the Court concluded that the district court erred in applying the Colorado Appellate Rules, which require an appellee to make her request for attorneys' fees in her answer brief, to an appeal to the district court from the county court. The Court reversed that part of the district court's ruling applying the Colorado Appellate Rules to deny Flood's request for attorneys' fees incurred in the current appeal. The case was remanded to the district court to return it to the county court for proceedings to determine whether Flood was entitled to appellate fees as the prevailing party in this appeal and, if so, the amount of Flood's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal—including the proceedings before the Supreme Court. View "Mercantile Adjustment Bureau v. Flood" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court came from an unpublished opinion by the court of appeals reversing the trial court's allocation of primary parental responsibilities to the half-sister of a minor child on grounds that the sister lacked standing to petition for an allocation of parental responsibilities. The court of appeals construed sections14-10-123(1)(b) and (1)(c), C.R.S. (2011), as requiring that, in order to establish standing to petition for an allocation of parental responsibilities, a nonparent must show that the child's parents voluntarily permitted the nonparent to assume responsibility for or share in the child's care. The Court held that parental consent is not required for nonparent standing. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the remaining issues raised on appeal. View "In the Interest of Child: B.B.O." on Justia Law

In 2006,Jefferson County purchased securities through Capital Securities, Inc., Jerry Manning, and Adam Alves a purchase later determined unlawful under section 24-75-601.1, C.R.S. (2008). The county sued Capital Securities and, among other things, sought to disgorge the commissions earned by Capital Securities under a theory of common law restitution. Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that restitution was appropriate and ordered Capital Securities to disgorge their commissions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine whether restitution is an appropriate remedy in this context. Upon review, the Court held that it was not, and reversed the court of appeals: "The statutory scheme adopted by the General Assembly expressly sets forth a number of remedies available to a public entity against a seller when . . .the public entity unlawfully purchases securities under section 24-75-601.1. These remedies include forcing the seller to repurchase the securities 'for the greater of the original purchase principal amount or the original face value, plus any and all accrued interest, within one business day of the demand.' . . . Further, the securities commissioner may, inter alia, suspend or revoke a seller's license or license exemption if he 'knew or should have known' the securities were unlawful under section 24-75-601.1. sec. 11-51-410(k), C.R.S. (2011); sec. 11-51-402(4)(a), C.R.S. (2011)." View "Capital Securities, Inc. v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 38-5-105 C.R.S. (2011) granted condemnation authority to a company for the construction of a petroleum pipeline. Upon review, the Court concluded that the General Assembly did not grant expressly or implication, the power of eminent domain to companies for the construction of pipelines conveying petroleum. Therefore, section 38-5-105 did not grant that authority to Respondent Sinclair Transportation Company for its proposed pipeline project. The Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion that upheld the trial court's order granting Sinclair immediate possession of the property belonging to Petitioners Ivar and Donna Larson and Lauren and Kay Sandberg. View "Larson v. Sinclair Transp. Co." on Justia Law

The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's suppression of evidence obtained following an investigatory stop of Defendant Adolph Funez-Paiagua. Defendant was standing on the property of a closed auto-body shop at 1:15 in the morning. One of two responding officers approached where Defendant had been standing. After hearing a loud crash and seeing Defendant fleeing the property with "some large bags," the officer ordered Defendant to stop. The trial court found the officer's testimony credible, but concluded that the evidence did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Specifically, the trial court determined that the seizure occurred "at the time the [first] officer contacted [Funez-Paiagua]." The trial court found that, at that time, the officer knew that Defendant was standing on private property late at night. The trial court concluded that these facts did not support reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop and therefore the trial court suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop created reasonable suspicion. The investigatory stop was therefore not an unreasonable seizure, and the trial court incorrectly suppressed evidence resulting from the stop. View "Colorado v. Funez-Paiagua" on Justia Law

The two appeals consolidated for resolution in this case both arose from an attempt by John C. Harrison, acting as personal representative for the estate of Nolan G. Thorsteinson and trustee of The Margie (Dotts) M. Thorsteinson Trust, to avoid an order declaring abandoned a disputed 1.04 c.f.s. interest in the Mexican Ditch. Harrison appealed directly to the Supreme Court adverse rulings of the Water Court in the two cases. With regard to Harrison's Application for a Change of Water Right, the water court granted the Engineers' motion to dismiss at the close of Harrison's case, finding that he was required but failed, to establish the historic use of the right as to which he sought a change in the point of diversion. With regard to Harrison's protest to the inclusion of the interests he claimed in the Mexican Ditch on the Division Engineer's decennial abandonment list, the water court granted the Engineer's motion for abandonment, as a stipulated remedy for Harrison's failure to succeed in his change application. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Harrison neither proved historic use of the right for which he sought a change nor was excepted from the requirement that he do so as a precondition of changing its point of diversion; and because denying a change of water right for failing to prove the historic use of the right did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of property, the water court's dismissal of Harrison's application was affirmed. But because, Harrison did not stipulate to an order of abandonment as the consequence of failing to succeed in his change application, only as the consequence of failing to timely file an application reflecting historic use, the water court's order granting the Engineers' motion for abandonment was reversed. View "Thorsteinson v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Respondent Colorado Public Utilities Commission challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court of Routt County to consider changing the venue in regard to a petition for judicial review, arguing that the petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 40-6-115(1) and (5), C.R.S. (2011). Holding that section 40-6-115(5) pertained to venue, not jurisdiction, the Routt County District Court allowed a transfer of the case to the District Court for the City and County of Denver. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court: section 40-6-115(5) mandated venue and did not limit jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court discharged the rule. On remand, the Routt County District Court could transfer this case to the Denver District Court. View "In re Associated Gov'ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

In its order, the trial court in this case ruled that the prosecutorial work product doctrine under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) was limited to work product prepared in anticipation of the case before the court, and did not extend to work product prepared in anticipation of a different but related criminal prosecution. Prior to disclosing the contested materials, the State petitioned the Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21 to reverse the trial court arguing the prosecutorial work product protection under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) extended to all work product and was not limited to materials prepared in anticipation of prosecuting the case immediately before the court. Resolving this issue in accordance with the intent of Crim.P. 16(I)(e)(1) to protect the professional judgment and mental impressions of prosecutors from disclosure so that they may candidly analyze the merits of a case and plan their litigation strategy, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and made the rule absolute: the Court held that the protection of prosecutorial work product, under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1),extends to opinion work product prepared by the prosecution in anticipation of any criminal prosecution. Because the trial court did not inspect the contested materials nor decide whether they constituted opinion work product prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution, the Court remanded the case matter to the trial court to make this determination through an ex parte, in camera review. View "Colorado v. Angel" on Justia Law