Acting on a petition filed by the child's father, the Arapahoe County District Court assumed jurisdiction to modify a Maryland child custody order on the grounds that neither the child nor the child's parents "currently resided" in Maryland. Petitioner George Brandt and his child lived in Colorado, and Respondent Christine Brandt lived in Texas. Respondent sought relief from the Colorado court order. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court failed to apply the appropriate standard of review when assuming jurisdiction to modify the Maryland child custody order. The operative statutory term "presently reside" is not equivalent to "currently reside" or "physical presence." Accordingly, the Court reversed and vacated the district court's order assuming jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Brandt" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Christopher Strimple with possession of an explosive or incendiary device and other crimes after a police search of the home he shared with his common law wife. Police responded to the home when Gabriele Thompson complained of domestic abuse. When police arrived, Defendant refused to let them in, threatened to kill officers if they entered, and engaged officers in a tense stand-off for nearly forty-five minutes. He ultimately surrendered peacefully, and police took him into custody. Thompson consented to an additional search during which the police discovered knives, a pipe bomb and drug paraphernalia. The trial court suppressed this evidence on the basis that, during the stand-off, Defendant had refused consent for entry into the home. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Thompson validly gave her consent to the second warrantless search because Defendant was no longer physically present and the police did not remove him from the scene in order to avoid his objection to the search. View "Colorado v. Strimple" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Mumford challenged his conviction for possession of one gram or less of cocaine, arguing, among other things, that an incriminating statement he made to a law enforcement officer should have been suppressed because it was obtained without proper warnings under "Miranda v. Arizona" (384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of "Miranda" at the time he made the statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances at the time he made the incriminating statement, a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have felt deprived of his freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest. View "Mumford v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Riley challenged the court of appeals' affirmance of his convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter, reckless second degree assault, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer. Defendant was charged stemming from a verbal confrontation at a store in early 2006 with Nisa Peelman, after Peelman allegedly touched Defendant in an inappropriate way. Defendant left the store. Shortly thereafter, Peelman and her brother, Gabriel Velasquez, walked out. Velasquez and Defendant exchanged words and began physically wrestling when the argument became more hostile. During the tussle, Velasquez told Peelman to "grab the heat from the truck." Defendant believed that the term "heat" meant a gun. He then pulled out a small knife from his pocket and "swung it" at Velasquez, hitting Velasquez in the neck, but failing to damage any vital structures. The court of appeals, relying on its interpretation of "People v. Jones," (675 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1984)), concluded that the trial court erred when it declined to submit Defendant's suggested "multiple assailants" instruction to the jury. The court of appeals determined, however, that the error was harmless. It thus affirmed Defendant's convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err when it rejected Defendant's "multiple assailants" instruction because "Jones" did not require the instruction in this instance. View "Riley v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This appeal came from a judgment and decree of the water court and the Alamosa County District Court in two consolidated cases. The combination of the two involved an amended plan for water management adopted by Special Improvement District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District (Subdistrict). Several parties objected to the approval of the Subdistrict's plan for ground water management. After two trials, the trial court determined the Plan to be "conceptually compatible" with the legal requirements of ground water management plans and the intent of the legislature in enacting SB 04-222. Among a series of findings, it found that (1) the Plan properly sought to stabilize the storage level of the unconfined aquifer at a "sustainable" level; and (2) the strategies proposed to meet that goal were reasonable and supported by the evidence. However, the trial court sent the Plan back to the Subdistrict board of managers and District board of directors for "further consideration and amendment because it lack[ed] detail, grant[ed] discretion with no guidance, fail[ed] to acknowledge the replacement of injurious depletions as a priority, and simply is not a 'comprehensive and detailed plan'" as required by statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Plan as approved and decreed, adequately addressed the replacement of well depletions that injure adjudicated senior surface water rights, along with restoring and maintaining sustainable aquifer levels in accordance with the applicable statutes. "The Subdistrict bears the burden of going forward and the burden of proof to demonstrate that annual replacement plans prevent material injury to adjudicated senior surface water rights caused by ongoing and past well depletions that have future impact." The Court affirmed the water court and Alamosa County District Court's decisions. View "In re Subdistrict No. 1" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' determination that Thomas Banner's assignment of his voting rights and right to receive distributions to Plaintiff Elizabeth Condo was ineffective because it violated an anti-assignment clause in the "Hut at Avon, LLC’s" (Hut Group) operating agreement. Plaintiff brought a tort action against the other members of the Hut Group, Thomas Conners and George Roberts, and the attorney who allegedly assisted them in purchasing Banner's membership interest in the Hut Group. She claimed that Defendants' purchase of Banner's membership interest tortiously interfered with his prior assignment to her and that that interference amounted to civil conspiracy because it was intended to destroy the value of her assignment. The Supreme Court held that the attempted assignment of the member's right to receive distributions and effective transfer of voting rights was invalid because it was made without the consent of the other members of the LLC, in violation of the anti-assignment clause in the operating agreement. Furthermore, because the Colorado LLC statute evinced a preference for the freedom of contract, the Court held that the anti-assignment clause at issue here rendered each LLC member powerless to make an assignment without the consent of all members and therefore was without any legal effect. View "Condo v. Conners" on Justia Law

Colorado’s sexual assault statutes authorize the possibility of greater punishments for sexual crimes against children that are committed "as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse." Two cases, "Colorado v. Simon" and "Colorado v. Tillery" were consolidated for the Supreme Court's review in that they both involve interpretation of Section C.R.S. 18-3-405.3. The common issue presented by these cases was whether the statutory provisions and principles of double jeopardy permit only one class 3 felony conviction and sentence for a single "pattern" of abuse that comprises two or more incidents of sexual assault, or whether each separate act of sexual assault that composes a single "pattern" of abuse which may be elevated to a class 3 felony. In "Simon," one division of the court of appeals held that section 18-3-405.3(2)(b) and double jeopardy principles prohibit the trial court from entering multiple class 3 convictions and sentences for Simon’s ten counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, where those acts composed a single pattern of abuse against one victim. In "Tillery," a different division of the appellate court disagreed with the reasoning in "Simon." Finding no double jeopardy violation, the court upheld Tillery's class 3 convictions under 18-3-405(2)(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court held that these statutes unambiguously allow each separately charged incident of sexual assault to be elevated to a class 3 felony, where each incident is committed as part of a pattern of sexual abuse. Furthermore, the Court held that these statutes, construed according to their plain language, do not violate the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments under either the U.S. or the Colorado Constitution. View "Colorado v. Simon" on Justia Law

In this joint opinion, the Supreme Court addressed two direct appeals from the same water court proceedings. Meridian Service Metropolitan District's motion to intervene in a declaratory judgment action between Cherokee Metropolitan District and Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District (UBS) was denied by the water court. Meridian appealed the water court’s ruling to the Supreme Court. However, while Meridian’s appeal was pending, the declaratory judgment proceedings continued without Meridian’s participation, and the water court entered an order granting UBS's motion for declaratory judgment. Cherokee then appealed that order to the Supreme Court. The underlying water action began in 1998 as litigation between Cherokee and UBS over Cherokee’s water rights in the UBS basin. In 1999, Cherokee and UBS settled the litigation by entering a Stipulation and Release. In 2003, Cherokee and Meridian entered into an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) to build a new wastewater treatment facility. According to the IGA, wastewater from both Cherokee and Meridian would be treated at the facility, and the return flows would go back into the UBS basin. Upon learning of the Cherokee/Meridian Replacement Plan Application in late 2008, UBS filed a statement of objection with the Colorado Ground Water Commission and moved to dismiss the Replacement Plan Application. Meridian moved to intervene as of right in the underlying water action between UBS and Cherokee to challenge both the preliminary injunction and the motion for declaratory judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s order denying Meridian’s motion to intervene, and vacated the water court's order granting declaratory judgment. View "Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist." on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge a district court's suppression of evidence seized from the trunk of the Defendant Brittney Coates' vehicle. Upon discovering a bindle and single prescription pill in the driver's pants pocket, the police arrested the driver, placed him in their patrol car, and searched the vehicle. The district court found that the police lacked any reasonable and articulable basis to search Defendant's trunk incident to the arrest of the driver in accordance with "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)), and that they also lacked probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle's trunk pursuant to the automobile exception. The Supreme Court affirmed. It held, however, that because the evidence for which suppression was sought was not seized from the passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle, the search-incident-to-arrest exception could not justify its seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that it was able to determine from the district court's findings of fact that the police lacked probable cause to search Defendant's vehicle, whether or not they would have been justified in searching the passenger compartment on less than probable cause. View "Colorado v. Coates" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court involved orders of the District Court for Water Division No. 2 regarding the administration of water on Alvarado Creek in Custer County. Applicants-Appellants Catherine and Peter LoPresti and Opposers-Appellants City of Fountain and Widefield Water and Sanitation District claimed the water court erred in voiding a rotational no-call agreement titled the "Beardsley Decree." Opposers-Appellees John Brandenburg, Douglas and Nancy Brandon, Dilley Family Trust, James D. Hood, Ronald Keyston, Arlie Riggs, Schneider Enterprises, Inc., Dr. Charles Schneider, and Mund Shaikly argued that the Beardsley Decree was an improperly noticed change in water rights, and as such the water court correctly declared it void. The Supreme Court held that the Beardsley Decree was a valid rotational no-call agreement because, and by its plain language, it did not sanction a change in water rights. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the water court. View "LoPresti v. Brandenburg" on Justia Law