The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a claim under Colorado law for civil theft of a copyrightable work required a trial court to instruct the jury on principles of federal copyright law. Petitioner Steward Software hired Respondent Richard Kopcho to develop and market a new software program. Steward never entered into a written agreement governing the ownership of the software with Holonyx, Inc. (one of Respondent's multiple corporate entities) or Respondent. By the time the software was ready for testing, the relationship between the parties had become strained. Steward refused to make further payments and under Respondent's direction, Holonyx locked Steward out of the software code and refused to turn it over. Holonyx then filed a copyright registration for the software with the U.S. Copyright Office, listing the software's author a new corporation Respondent controlled called Ruffdogs Software, Inc. Steward sued Respondent for breach of contract and civil theft. Before trial, the parties tendered proposed jury instructions; one of Steward's proposed instructions pertained to the ownership and registration of copyrightable works. The trial court determined that copyright law did not pertain to Steward's civil theft claim and rejected the tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that ownership of the copyright in the code was irrelevant. The Court thus concluded the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the principles of copyright law. The court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's opinion. View "Steward Software Co. v. Kopcho" on Justia Law

Petitioner Monica Vickery sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed a district court's reduction of exemplary damages in her defamation suit against the mother and sister of her deceased husband in "Vickery v. Vickery," (2010 WL 963204 (Colo. App. March 18, 2010)). Both the district court and court of appeals understood section 13-21-102 C.R.S. (2011) to limit Petitioner's exemplary damages to an amount equal to the compensatory damages figure returned by the jury, before any adjustment for prejudgment interest. But the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, disagreeing with its interpretation of section 13-21-102. The Supreme Court found that "the amount of the actual damages awarded," to which "reasonable exemplary damages" are statutorily limited, refers not to the jury's assessment of total compensatory damages but to the compensatory damages awarded against the defendant as the direct result of that assessment, which necessarily includes statutorily mandated prejudgment interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vickery v. Evans" on Justia Law

This case arose from a pending medical malpractice case from the Denver district court. Plaintiff Ernest Ortega sued Defendants Dr. David Lieuwen and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado (Kaiser) alleging negligent medical treatment given to him in 2007. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his request for a protective order to cover his electronic medical records encompassing a ten-year period preceding the incident underlying this case. The trial court determined that Plaintiff's electronic medical records were not protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the records were relevant to prepare a defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Plaintiff's medical records were not protected as privileged and that Defendants could use unredacted copies of all of Plaintiff's medical records. View "Ortega v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court's order that granted Defendant Wal-Mart Stores a new trial based on a purportedly untimely disclosure and a jury verdict that allegedly was not supported by the evidence and instead was the result of prejudice. In 2007 Petitioner Holly Averyt, a commercial truck driver, slipped in grease while making a delivery to a Wal-Mart Store in Greeley. As a result of her fall, Petitioner's injuries ended her career as a truck driver and left her unable to perform many daily functions. Petitioner sued Wal-Mart, alleging claims of negligence and premises liability. During discovery, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought to obtain records from Wal-Mart documenting the grease spill. Despite Wal-Mart's persistent denial of the grease spill, Petitioner's attorney continued to seek evidence to verify its existence. While Wal-Mart was making its opening statement and claiming that there had been no grease spill, Petitioner's attorney received an email on his mobile telephone containing a memorandum referencing a grease spill and a related investigation and cleanup at a different Greeley Wal-Mart. During a recess at trial, Wal-Mart's attorney asked Petitioner's attorney whether he had been reading from a document when he questioned a witness. Petitioner's attorney then gave Wal-Mart's attorney a copy of the report. After this exchange, and before Wal-Mart began cross-examining the witness, Wal-Mart objected outside the presence of the jury to Petitioner's use of the report during direct examination. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's award was supported by substantial evidence, and was not the result of prejudice, finding that the report in question was one available to both parties. The Court refused to reverse the jury's award and grant a new trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order. View "In re Averyt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that Defendant BP America Production Company (BP) improperly deducted postproduction costs from royalty payments due between January 1986 and December 1997. To toll the applicable six-year statute of limitations, Plaintiffs claimed that BP fraudulently concealed material facts which gave rise to their claims. The trial court certified the class, and the appellate court affirmed. BP then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) proof of fraudulent concealment was inherently individualized, and not amenable to resolution on a class basis; and, (2) the class time period was overly broad and as a result, includes members who had no costs deducted under the "netback" methodology. BP thus argued that the trial court erred in certifying the class. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with either of BP's arguments, and affirmed the trial court's certification of the class. View "BP America Prod. Co. v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals' ruling that the Article X, Section 20 of the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 1) required statewide voter approval each time the Colorado Department of Revenue calculated an increase in the amount of tax due per ton of coal extracted as directed by the formula codified in C.R.S. 39-29-106. After Amendment 1 went into effect, the Department suspended using the tax mechanism for calculating upward adjustments in the amount of coal severance tax owed based on inflation. Following an auditor's review in 2006, an Attorney General's opinion and a rule-making proceedings, the Department recommended applying the statute to calculate the tax due. Implementation resorted in a tax of $0.76 per ton of coal as compared to $0.56 per ton collected in 1992 when Amendment 1 first passed. The Colorado Mining Association and taxpayer coal companies filed an action challenging collection of the $0.76 per ton amount. Colorado Mining asserted that whenever the Department calculated an upward adjustment in the amount of tax due under the statute, it must obtain voter approval. The Court of Appeals agreed, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the Department's implementation of section 39-29-106 was not a tax increase, but a "non-discretionary duty required by a pre-Amendment 1 taxing statute which did not require voter approval." Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which held that the Department must implement the statute as written. View "Huber v. Colo. Mining Ass'n" on Justia Law

Consumers brought a class action against ten automobile dealerships operating under the "Medved" name and their owner John Medved, alleging violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). Plaintiffs alleged that Medved's sales documents failed to disclose the price and existence of various dealer-added aftermarket products, injuring Plaintiffs who paid for those products. Plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: one which included customers who paid for the add-ons but that were never installed, and another class for those who paid for the add-ons but who were unaware of them due to Medved's sales documents. The trial court determined that Plaintiffs could prove causation and injury in their CCPA claims with circumstantial evidence. However, the trial court did not consider whether the individual evidence presented by Medved rebutted the class-wide inferences of causation and injury which was crucial to certification of both classes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by not rigorously analyzing the evidence presented by Medved to refute Plaintiffs' theories of liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further analysis to determine "to its satisfaction whether Plaintiffs could establish causation and injury. View "Garcia v. Medved Chevrolet, Inc" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case pertained to the standards a trial court applies when it decides whether to certify a class pursuant to C.R.C.P. 23. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' rulings: that the trial court must apply a "preponderance of the evidence" standard to C.R.C.P. 23's requirements, that the trial court must resolve factual or legal disputes dispositive of class certification regardless of any overlap with the merits, and that the trial court must resolve expert disputes regardless of any overlap with the merits. The Court also concluded that the trial court rigorously analyzed the evidence in determining that Plaintiffs in this case established an identifiable class and satisfied C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3)'s "predominance" requirement. View "Jackson v. Unocal Corp" on Justia Law

The class certification issue presented in this case arose from a dispute concerning the payment of medical bills under the Colorado Automobile Accident Reparations Act (No-Fault Act). Plaintiffs Pauline Reyher and Dr. Wallace Brucker filed suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) alleging that it failed to pay full, reasonable amounts in medical expenses in violation of the No-Fault Act and its own contracts. Plaintiffs subsequently moved to certify two classes that included all insureds and providers, respectively, who submitted medical bills to State Farm and were reimbursed for less than the full amounts. The trial court denied the motion for certification on grounds that Plaintiffs failed (among other things) to establish the "predominance" requirement. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case to enter an order certifying the class. State Farm appealed, arguing that the appellate court's finding of "predominance" was made in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and reversed the appellate court. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reyher" on Justia Law

The State petitioned the Supreme Court for review of an appellate court's judgment that affirmed two in limine evidentiary rulings in a prosecution for sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. The district court excluded testimony concerning the recantation of Defendant Mark Gabriesheski's step-daughter (the alleged victim). At trial, testimony by the victim's guardian ad litem appointed in a parallel dependency and neglect proceeding was ruled privileged under the attorney-client privilege. In addition, the trial court held that testimony by a social worker involved in the dependency and neglect proceeding could not be used without Defendant's consent (pursuant to Colorado law). The prosecutor conceded the victim's inability to go forward, and the case was dismissed. The appellate court concluded that Colorado law gave it jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal, but affirmed the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part the appellate court's decisions. The Court found the appellate court had jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal, but disapproved of its conclusions with regard to both evidentiary rulings. Because a child subject to a dependency and neglect proceeding is not a "client" of the guardian ad litem, the attorney-client privilege did not apply. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court misapplied Colorado law pertaining to the social worker's testimony, and accordingly failed to make sufficient findings to satisfy the statutory requirement that the statements at issue be made in compliance of that statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Gabriesheski" on Justia Law