The Supreme Court reviewed a judge disqualification issue raised by the appellate court's decision to reverse and remand an order that terminated the parental rights of Respondent, C.M. (Mother). In its review of the termination hearing, the court of appeals held that the trial judge should have recused himself on the grounds that his clerk was the mother of a material witness in the case. Although the court of appeals held that the judge should have been disqualified, Mother’s lateness in filing the motion for disqualification prompted the court to conclude that Mother may have waived her right to move for disqualification. According to the court of appeals, the question of whether Mother had waived the disqualification issue turned on whether her counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the motion for disqualification. Reasoning that Mother could not be bound by waiver if she had in fact received ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of appeals remanded for additional findings about counsel’s performance. The court then directed the chief judge of the district to transfer the case to himself or to a senior judge for the proceedings on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the transfer: "[w]ithout deciding what is required to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the supreme court acknowledges that, at the least, an allegation of prejudice is necessary. Moreover, the court holds that when an ineffective assistance claim is premised on counsel’s failure to file a motion for disqualification, the prejudice element cannot be satisfied without an allegation that the judge was actually biased. Because the respondent’s motion for disqualification was entirely based on an appearance of impropriety, rather than a claim of actual bias, it failed to satisfy the prejudice element." The Court held that Mother's motion was untimely and should not have been granted. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado ex rel. A.G" on Justia Law

The State appealed the reversal of Respondent Jerad Pickering's conviction for reckless manslaughter. The court of appeals held that the trial court's self-defense jury instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent acted recklessly. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's instruction did not shift the State's burden, and accordingly reversed the court of appeals' judgment and overruled contrary rules announced in "People v. Lara" and "People v. Taylor." View "Colorado v. Pickering" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found that Respondent J.L.B. (Father) had abandoned A.B. (Child) and that therefore the Child was available for adoption by Petitioner D.P.H. (Stepfather). The juvenile court also determined that the fact that Father had filed parenting-time motions in the dissolution court did not outweigh overwhelming evidence of abandonment, including the fact that Father had not seen the Child in the twenty-one months prior to the filing of the adoption proceeding. Father appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed. The court determined that a finding of abandonment was precluded by the fact that Father had filed motions for parenting time in the dissolution court. The court also concluded that the juvenile court should have delayed the adoption determination until the parenting-time motions were resolved. Upon review of the case by the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the "[i]t is the trial court's responsibility to consider the totality of the circumstances and to make this factual determination, which is to be disturbed only if it is clearly erroneous. ...It was therefore error for the court of appeals to determine that a single circumstance (the father's filing of a parenting-time motion) precluded a finding of intent to abandon, essentially as a matter of law." In addition, the Court found it was unnecessary for a trial court to delay adoption proceedings until a parenting-time motion in another court is resolved, so long as the trial court adequately considered the parenting-time motion in making its abandonment determination. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.P.H. v. J.L.B" on Justia Law

Defendant Gerald Lewis appealed his convictions and sentences for a number of offenses including three counts each of kidnapping and sexually assaulting his kidnap victims. The trial court sentenced Defendant for sexual assault and separately sentenced him for the second degree kidnapping of each victim, elevated to the level of a class two felony. Among its other holdings, the court of appeals rejected Defendant's contention that "People v. Henderson" should be overruled because of subsequent United States Supreme Court case law, and it affirmed each of his separate convictions and sentences. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether "Henderson" was still good law. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, holding that the federal Court's case law "neither undermine [the Colorado Court's] prior assessment of legislative intent in 'Henderson' nor in any way diminish[es] the dispositive impact of legislative intent on Lewis's double jeopardy and merger claims." View "Lewis v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case, the District Court for Jefferson County dismissed a condemnation petition for a private way of necessity because the developer of the allegedly landlocked parcel did not sufficiently define the scope of and necessity for the proposed condemnation. Evidence showed that the development might vary from one to thirty residential dwellings which prevented the court from entering a condemnation order that would minimize the burden to be placed upon condemnee’s property. The court of appeals ruled that the condemnation could proceed based only upon the zoning of the condemnor’s property. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, and reinstated the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, when a petitioner seeks to condemn a private way of necessity for access to property it wishes to develop in the future, it must demonstrate a purpose for the condemnation that enables the trial court to examine both the scope of and necessity for the proposed condemnation, so that the burden to be imposed upon the condemnee’s property may be ascertained and circumscribed through the trial court’s condemnation order. The record in this case supported the trial court’s dismissal of the condemnation petition. View "The Glenelk Ass'n, Inc. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted David Wood of manslaughter for fatally shooting someone in his apartment during a drug transaction. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request for immunity from prosecution under Colorado's "Make My Day" statute. Following its review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Defendant could have sought immediate review of the trial court's order by invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction before the verdict was handed down, but "Make My Day" immunity may not be reviewed on appeal after trial. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Wood v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Court of Appeals reversed Defendant Gonzalo Santana's conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, concluding that the prosecution had violated his constitutional rights by shifting the burden of proof to him at trial. According to the appellate court, the prosecutor shifted the burden by cross-examining the defense expert about his ability to perform conclusive tests which established that the expert could have run such tests. The prosecution then emphasized that testimony in its closing argument. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The Court found that defense counsel "opened the door" by questioning the expert about his ability to conduct conclusive tests. In light of the whole record, the Court reasoned that the prosecutor's questions and comments were "likely not meant to shift the burden of proof, but to highlight the strength of the prosecution's case." View "Colorado v. Santana" on Justia Law

Both Defendant Tremaine Speer and the State challenged the Court of Appeals' judgment that reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery. The State contended that the district court erred by denying Defendant's requested jury instruction on the affirmative defense of "duress" which resulted in the reversal of his conviction. Defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that even if the Supreme Court disagreed that the omission of the instruction was "reversible error," he would nevertheless be entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in rejecting his challenges for cause on two prospective jurors who worked in “security.” Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's "duress" jury instruction. It was undisputed that Defendant had a gun and drove himself to the scene of the crime. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could consider that Defendant acted under duress. Furthermore, the Court found that technically neither of the prospective jurors worked in "security," despite their employers being the Department of Homeland Security. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "Colorado v. Speer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a child custody dispute between a divorced mother and father. The children lived in Colorado with their mother and step-father. The father, who lived in New York, filed a custody action in New York to modify the initial child custody determination. A New York Supreme Court entered its determination awarding sole custody to the father. The mother objected to New York's exercise of jurisdiction over the case and filed her own custody action in Colorado. The father asked a Colorado district court to enforce the New York court's award of custody. Upon consideration, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the New York Supreme Court failed to exercise jurisdiction consistent with New York law and with the requirements of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. 1738A, "PKPA") and as such, Colorado was not required to give that order full faith and credit. The Court remanded the case to the Colorado district court for further proceedings. View "In re the Marriage of Dedie and Springston" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a child custody dispute between a divorced mother and father. The child lived in Colorado with her mother. The father, who lived in Nebraska, filed a custody action in Nebraska. A Nebraska district court entered an initial child custody determination awarding custody to the father. The mother objected to Nebraska's exercise of jurisdiction over the case and filed her own custody action in Colorado. A Colorado district court refused to recognize the Nebraska court order and awarded custody to the mother. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the Colorado district court order, holding that though Nebraska did not have jurisdiction over the custody action, Colorado must nevertheless grant it "full faith and credit." Upon consideration, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the Nebraska district court failed to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the requirements of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. 1738A, "PKPA") and as such, Colorado was not required to give that order full faith and credit. Therefore, the Court reversed the Colorado appellate court's decision, and reinstated the Colorado trial court's order. View "In re the Parental Responsibilities of L.S" on Justia Law