The State appealed a trial court order that suppressed statements made by Defendant Wayne Klinck during his initial interview by police. Responding to a domestic disturbance report, police arrived at Defendant's girlfriend's house. They asked Defendant to remain on the porch while the officers interviewed the girlfriend. Shortly thereafter, an officer spoke with Defendant, and when the officer determined he had probable cause, he placed Defendant under arrest. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he invoked his right to counsel. Detectives re-contacted and interviewed Defendant in jail, and at that time Defendant waived his Miranda rights and provided additional information. The trial court suppressed the statements Defendant made on the porch prior to being placed under arrest. Upon consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that Defendant was not in custody during his initial interview on the porch. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Petitioner Loretta Day was referred to Respondent Dr. Bruce Johnson, M.D., for treatment for hypothyroidism. Dr. Johnson determined that surgery was needed to remove both lobes of the thyroid. A few weeks later, Mrs. Day's vocal cords stopped working, and she suffered a permanent speaking disability that she alleged was caused by the surgery. Mrs. Day and her husband sued Dr. Johnson for negligence, asserting that the Doctor incorrectly assessed Mrs. Day's condition, recommended inappropriate treatment, and improperly removed part of her thyroid. The trial court submitted the issue of Dr. Johnson's negligence to the jury which included a jury instruction that mirrored the language of a pattern jury instruction pertaining to negligence. The Days objected to the court's use of this instruction, arguing that the instruction included a misstatement of Colorado law. The court overruled the objection. The jury found that Dr. Johnson was not negligent. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's use of the instruction. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Days argued that both the trial and appellate courts erred by using the instruction. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the portion of the pattern jury instructions accurately stated Colorado law.

Petitioner Lucht's Concrete Pumping sought to enforce a non-compete agreement signed by Respondent Tracy Horner, a former at-will employee. Because Mr. Horner was an at-will employee at the time he signed the agreement, Lucht's argued that its forbearance from terminating Mr. Horner constituted adequate consideration for the non-compete agreement. The appellate court held that continued employment did not constitute adequate consideration once an employee started working for an employer because the employee is in the same position as he was before he signed the agreement. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision. The Court found that an employer that forbears from terminating an existing at-will employee forbears from exercising a legal right, and that constitutes adequate consideration. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Terry Townsend unsuccessfully appealed his conviction on escape charges. The terms of Petitioner's probation mandated he participate in an "intensive supervision program." When he failed to participate, his probation was revoked. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that jury instructions issued by the trial court at his revocation hearing were an incorrect articulation of the law, and as such, the jury convicted him based on bad information. Furthermore, Petitioner argued that the "ISP" condition of his probation was unconstitutional. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's jury instructions correctly stated the applicable law, and that the ISP statute was not unconstitutional. The Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence.

Citizens for Responsible Growth (Citizens) challenged Elbert County's approval of RCI Development Partners, Inc.'s (RCI) land-use applications. The Board of Commissioners (Board) approved RCI's applications by an oral vote. At court, Citizens argued that holding an oral vote violated the county's own rules regarding Board hearings and approval of land-use applications. The Board's decision needed to be in writing. RCI moved to dismiss Citizens' complaint, arguing that the Board's oral approval constituted a "final agency action" and was binding. RCI further argued that Citizens brought their challenge too late for the court to consider. Without reviewing the merits of the district court's order, the appellate court found that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction by reviewing the case. The appeals court found that Citizens filed its appeal beyond the thirty days after the Board of County Commissioners' "final" decision, and dismissed the case. Citizens appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Elbert County regulations required a written ruling to finalize the Board of Commissioners' action. Because the land-use applications were approved orally, they were not "final" actions until the Board issued a written resolution to adopt them. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Respondent and former employee Andrew Blood suffered severe and permanent injuries while working on a wood utility pole owned by Petitioner Qwest Services Corporation (Qwest). Blood sued Qwest for negligence, asserting that Quest failed to implement a routine inspection program that would have detected the rotting that caused the pole to collapse on top of him. A jury awarded Respondent close to $30 million, finding Qwest 100% at fault. Qwest appealed the verdict and award, and the appeals court affirmed the trial courtâs decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Qwest argued that the âexemplary damagesâ awarded to Respondent violated its due process rights. Furthermore, Qwest challenged whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support âexemplary damagesâ and the juryâs subsequent award. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions, finding that Qwestsâs due process rights were not violated by the trial courtâs decision. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Qwestâs failure to implement an inspection program for 46-years prior to Respondentâs accident to support the exemplary damage award handed down by the trial court.

In this case, two bail-bonds agents were charged with second-degree burglary and felony menacing in pursuit of an alleged âbail jumper.â On appeal, Defendants Jason Oram and Devon Weinstein challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against them at trial and used the common law âbonding agent privilegeâ to excuse their actions. The Supreme Court found that no common law bonding agent privilege exists in Colorado, and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the charges against Defendants. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts.

In 2009, Defendant Cirilo Gonzalez-Zamora was arrested for an open container violation in Palm Beach, Florida. A warrant check by local police revealed an outstanding arrest warrant for murder in Colorado for âCirilo Hernandez-Zamora.â Police took Defendant into custody to resolve the discrepancy between the name Defendant gave when arrested in Florida, and the name on the Colorado arrest warrant. At the station, a Spanish-fluent officer read Defendant his Miranda rights in Spanish, and gave Defendant the opportunity to ask for further explanation should anything be unclear. Instead of an audible response, Defendant gave a gesture or facial expression that there were parts of the officerâs advisement he did not understand. When the officer was finished, he received no questions. Defendant signed an advisement card. Defendant was eventually charged with first-degree murder. At trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he gave in Florida. The trial court granted the motion, asserting that there were âsignificant questionsâ as to whether Defendant waived his Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial courtâs order suppressing Defendantâs Miranda waiver. The Court found that the non-verbal gestures during Defendantâs advisement indicated that Defendant was aware and that he understood the rights he was waiving. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court decision.

Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Companyâs insured drove a rental car under the influence of methamphetamines, and led police on a high-sped car chase that ended when he struck a vehicle containing Petitioner Julie Bailey and her son. Her son was killed. The insured pled guilty to five felonies, including second-degree murder. The insured assigned his rights to Petitioner to collect on a $1 million excess-insurance policy issued by Lincoln General. Lincoln General denied coverage for damages caused by the insured, relying on an exclusion in the rental agreement that voided coverage if the car was used to commit a crime that could be charged as a felony. The trial court and the court of appeals held that the criminal-acts exclusion of the policy was enforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions to uphold the criminal-acts exclusion of the insurance policy, finding that Lincoln Generalâs use of the exclusion was a proper exercise of its freedom to contract and provide coverage or damages caused by fortuitous events instead of for damages caused by intentionally criminal acts.

The district court reversed the county courtâs order to vacate Petitioner Nicanor Sanchez-Martinezâs guilty plea to third degree assault as âunknowing, involuntary and unintelligent.â Petitioner appeared pro se before the county court and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to probation, and required to complete counseling sessions. Petitioner successfully complied with the terms of his probation, and subsequently the court terminated his sentence. One month following the termination, Petitioner filed a motion with the court that his sentence be set aside in light of new evidence that allegedly negated his guilt. At the hearing, the prosecution elicited testimony from Petitioner that he could not read or write Spanish or English, and was never informed of the constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty. As a result, the magistrate expressed concern that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. The magistrate informed both parties that he would set the plea aside as unconstitutional. The prosecution then appealed the magistrateâs decision to the district court. The district court reversed the county court, holding that the county court improperly addressed the constitutionality of Petitionerâs plea. The Supreme Court determined that the county court acted within its discretion and found the lower courtâs conclusion was supported by the record. The Court reversed the district courtâs decision and reinstated the county courtâs judgment vacating Petitionerâs guilty plea.