Jose Leonel Orellana-Leon sexually abused his girlfriend’s daughter, L.V., from the time she was seven or eight years old until she was fifteen. When L.V. was fifteen years old, she told her father and stepmother about the abuse; as a result, a forensic interview was conducted. The State subsequently charged Orellana-Leon with sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust. Before trial, the State gave notice it intended to admit statements L.V. made to her father, stepmother, and the forensic interviewer under the child hearsay statute. Over the defense’s objection, the trial court granted the State's request. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on what happens when a defendant is charged under a statute that references two different ages. In the companion case, Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado, 2023 CO 33, ¶ 21, __ P.3d __, the Court concluded that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense, which applied when the child was under eighteen, rather than the sentence enhancer, which applied when the child is under fifteen. Applying that holding to this case, the Court concluded that because the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute. View "Orellana-Leon v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State of Colorado charged Dennis Chirinos-Raudales with, among other crimes, sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust, which prohibits sexual contact with persons under eighteen, but whose penalty escalates from a class 4 felony to a class 3 felony if the victim is under fifteen. The question presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the “subject of the action” was the subsection that applied when the child is under eighteen or the subsection that applies when the child is under fifteen. To this, the Court held that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense rather than the sentence enhancer. Therefore, because the substantive offense applies when the child is under eighteen and the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute. View "Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Noelle Kelley was taken by ambulance to the hospital after she was involved in a car accident in which another person was injured. At the hospital, an officer investigating the accident asked Kelley if she would release her medical records to the police. She refused. After Kelley was charged with vehicular assault, careless driving, and driving under the influence, she pled not guilty and endorsed the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. The State moved the trial court to conclude that Kelley’s endorsement of involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense constituted an implied waiver of her physician-patient privilege and thus the State was entitled to the disclosure of her medical records. They further asked the court to determine that Kelley’s refusal to release her medical records was admissible at trial. The trial court granted the State's motion as to both issues. Kelley then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction for review. Kelly argued: (1) when she endorsed the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, she did not impliedly waive her physician-patient privilege; and (2) even if she did waive the privilege, the trial court’s order requiring the release of her medical records was too broad. Kelley also argued that her refusal to release her medical records was inadmissible because she cannot be penalized for exercising her Fourth Amendment right to refuse a warrantless search. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) a party impliedly waives the physician-patient privilege when they assert the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, limited to those medical records related to the affirmative defense; and (2) the trial court’s disclosure order here was not overbroad because it was carefully limited to those medical records that related to Kelley’s endorsement of the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. Because the parties did not have the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of the admissibility of Kelley's refusal to release the records, the Supreme Court declined to address it. View "Colorado v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether Respondent Roger Hill had a legally protected interest that gave him standing to pursue his claim for a declaratory judgment “that a river segment was navigable for title at statehood and belongs to the State.” To this, the Court concluded he did not: Hill had no legally protected right independent of the State’s alleged ownership of the riverbed onto which he could hook his declaratory judgment claim. Hill's favorite fishing hole was on a riverbed along the Arkansas River. The record owners of the land abutting the river were Mark Warsewa and Linda Joseph, who had a home overlooking the fishing hole. Hill alleged that for several years, he repeatedly attempted to fish there and Warsewa and Joseph chased him off the property, sometimes with force. Hill asserted the riverbed was not in fact owned by Warsewa and Joseph, but instead public land owned by the State of Colorado and held in trust for the people. In both federal and state proceedings, the State argued that it alone could decide whether and when to pursue its property rights and that Hill did not have standing to bring these claims. Hill appealed, arguing that the riverbed was public land as a matter of federal law, and invoking the equal footing doctrine: that the segment of the Arkansas River that traversed the subject property was navigable at statehood, and therefore title to the riverbed transferred to the State by operation of law when Colorado achieved statehood in 1876. Because the federal government did not own the riverbed, it could not have transferred its title to Warsewa and Joseph’s predecessors in interest. A division of the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the quiet title claim, concluding that Hill could not pursue the property rights of the State because he did not himself have any claim to title. The Colorado Supreme Court concurred and affirmed dismissal. View "Colorado v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant Cristobal Garcia, was found guilty of one count of attempted extreme-indifference murder, a form of first degree murder that requires that the defendant “evidenc[e] an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally.” Garcia argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial court wasn’t required to define “universal malice” for the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. View "Garcia v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This was one of several similar cases filed in the fall of 2020 by the owners of hundreds of commercial properties in eleven different Colorado counties seeking to compel the assessors in each of the counties to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year. This matter involved the valuation of over 60 parcels of commercial property in Douglas County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Douglas County property assessors to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations. View "Educhildren v. City of Douglas" on Justia Law

This was one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property owners have sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerned the valuation of commercial real property located in the City and County of Broomfield, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the City and County of Broomfield Assessor to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. View "Hunter Douglas v. City & County of Broomfield" on Justia Law

This was one of several similar cases filed in the fall of 2020 by the owners of hundreds of commercial properties in eleven different Colorado counties seeking to compel the assessors in each of the counties to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year. This matter involved the valuation of 130 parcels of commercial property in Larimer County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Larimer County property assessors to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations. View "Larimer County v. 1303 Frontage Holdings" on Justia Law

This was one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property owners sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerned the valuation of hundreds of parcels of commercial real property located in Jefferson County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Jefferson County Assessor to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. View " MJB Motel v. County of Jefferson" on Justia Law

Jacob Woodside committed two alcohol-related offenses in relatively quick succession. First, he pled guilty to the later-committed offense, which was sentenced as his first despite having occurred second in time. Afterward, he pled guilty to the earlier-committed offense and argued that it too should be sentenced as his first. The trial court disagreed, finding that Woodside’s prior conviction subjected him to second-offense penalties because “at the time of sentencing” he had a relevant “prior conviction,” despite the order in which the offenses occurred. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the plain language of section 42-4-1307(5)(a) C.R.S. (2022) imposed second-offense penalties when a defendant has a relevant prior conviction; it did not require that conduct underlying a second-offense sentence pre-date conduct underlying the first-offense sentence. The Court concluded the trial court properly determined that Woodside’s Weld County DWAI, though based on conduct pre-dating his Grand County DWAI, was a second offense subject to the penalties laid out in section 42-4-1307(5)(a). View "Colorado v. Woodside" on Justia Law