Robert Rainey was charged with nine criminal counts related to domestic violence in July 2016. The trial court appointed a public defender as Rainey’s counsel and set trial for January 9, 2017. The night before trial, a storm damaged the courthouse, and the trial was reset to the following day. The State was granted a number of continuances Rainey’s objection because witnesses were unavailable. Trial was ultimately continued to March 6, 2017—the day before the expiration of the speedy-trial deadline. The public defender confirmed that the date would work for trial and agreed to appear for the pretrial readiness conference set for March 3. At the conference, defense counsel raised for the first time that he would not in fact be available on March 6 for trial because of pre-existing vacation plans. Counsel's request for a continuance was denied, with the trial court observing that Rainey’s case was factually simple, and counsel would not need a substantial amount of time to prepare. Counsel conceded that he could not think of any reason why another public defender could not adequately prepare for the trial over the weekend. Trial took place on March 6 after Rainey’s two new attorneys announced that they were ready to proceed. The jury convicted Rainey on two of the nine counts—second degree kidnapping and criminal mischief—with a further finding that both crimes constituted acts of domestic violence. Rainey appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to continued representation of appointed counsel when it denied his request for a continuance and forced him to proceed with the public defenders who had a weekend to prepare his case. The Colorado Supreme Court determined a defendant did not have a right to continued representation by a particular appointed lawyer: the right to continued representation by a particular attorney flows from the right to choose that attorney, which does not apply when counsel is appointed. "Still, if a defendant represented by an appointed attorney can show that denying a continuance and replacing that appointed attorney would prejudice their case, due process requires that the defendant be given a continuance so the attorney can continue the representation." View "Colorado v. Rainey" on Justia Law

This matter arose out of disputes between Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) and Airport Land Partners, Ltd (“Airport Land”) and other royalty owners (collectively, “Royalty Owners”) over whether Antero could deduct certain post-production costs from royalty payments under the applicable leases’ royalty clauses. Royalty Owners alleged that Antero has underpaid royalties in violation of their respective lease contracts. Royalty Owners filed individual breach-of-contract suits against Antero for dates between December 2016 and April 2017. Antero moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that the claims should have been brought before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC” or “the Commission”) in the first instance. Statutorily, COGCC lacked jurisdiction under section 34-60-118.5(5), C.R.S. (2022), to engage in contract interpretation to resolve a bona fide dispute between parties under an oil and gas lease. But in 2017, without any intervening change to explain the shift, two district courts changed course, asserting that COGCC had responsibility for resolving contract disputes on the theory either that the contract terms were unambiguous or that settled law compelled a certain interpretation. The Colorado Supreme Court returned to the longstanding statutory mandate that COGCC lacked jurisdiction to resolve bona fide disputes of contract interpretation and held that such a dispute exists where the parties disagree in good faith about the meaning or application of a relevant contract term. View "Antero Resources v. Airport Land Partners" on Justia Law

In 2011, Respondent Theodore Madrid was charged with one count of first degree murder and two counts of child abuse resulting in death. During jury selection, the prosecution excused prospective juror J.T., a Black man who indicated on his juror questionnaire that he was sixty-eight years old, married with children, and a retired customer-service specialist. The court gave each side a total of five minutes to question the prospective jurors, including J.T. The prosecution asked J.T. if he had any concerns about potentially having to look at autopsy pictures in the case, to which J.T. responded, "no." The prosecution then asked J.T., "Do you have a good joke?" J.T. responded, "I'm the joke." Thereafter, the prosecution used its ninth peremptory challenge to excuse J.T. Madrid raised a Batson challenge to this, arguing the excuse was race-neutral: "the real problem is we don’t know very much about him. He has a hearing issue it appears and he’s sort of completely nonresponsive. We have very little information on him from the questionnaire and no time to really have a very detailed conversation with him." The trial court accepted this reason and excused the juror. After a nine-day trial, the jury convicted Madrid on all counts. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review on whether a party could, on remand, raise a new race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory strike made at trial. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: when a party has been provided with an adequate opportunity to present its race-neutral justifications at trial, it is barred from introducing new race-neutral justifications on remand. The Court's application of that holding to the facts here prompted the Court to affirm the court of appeals' judgment, which meant that Madrid was entitled to a new trial. View "Colorado v. Madrid" on Justia Law

Police officers interrogated defendant-appellee Brent Willoughby at his home about domestic violence allegations. After the State charged Willoughby with several offenses, he moved to suppress the statements he made during this interrogation, arguing that the officers obtained them in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The trial court granted the motion, finding that Willoughby had been subjected to a custodial interrogation without first receiving Miranda warnings. The State filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court’s suppression order. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Willoughby was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements at issue. Therefore, it reversed the portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the statements and remand the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Willougby" on Justia Law

In 2019, plaintiff John Dewey Institute, Inc. (“JDI”) submitted a charter school application to the Douglas County Colorado School Board. Section 22-30.5-108 (“section 108”) of the Charter Schools Act created a four-step procedure in which a charter school applicant may potentially twice appeal an adverse decision of a local board of education to the State Board. The parties agreed that section 108 precluded judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a second appeal under section 108(3)(d). They disagreed, however, as to whether this appeal-preclusion language also barred judicial review of final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal under section 108(3)(a)—a scenario in which the State Board has affirmed the local board’s decision to deny a charter school application, thus rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Applying the plain language of section 108 and the statutory scheme as a whole, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that section 108(3)(d)’s appeal-preclusion language applied to all final decisions of the State Board rendered under section 108, including when, as here, the State Board affirmed the local board’s denial of a charter school application during an initial appeal, thereby ending the matter and rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling declaring that final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal were subject to judicial review. This matter was remanded with instructions that the case be returned to the district court for the dismissal of JDI’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Colorado State Board of Education v. Brannberg" on Justia Law

Defendant James Justice was charged with multiple offenses in four felony cases. The State extended him a global plea bargain offer, but he rejected it. Unhappy that the State would not sweeten the offer, Justice filed a motion asking the district court to compel mediation. The court granted the motion and ordered mediation over the State's objection. As part of its order, the court required good-faith participation and threatened to impose sanctions for lack of compliance. The State then brought petitions invoking the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in two of the cases, and the Supreme Court issued rules to show cause. The Supreme Court determined the district court lacked the authority to require the parties to mediate in these criminal cases, and because the mediation order arguably involved the court in the plea bargaining process, the district court erred. View "Colorado v. Justice" on Justia Law

CO2 Committee, Inc. (“CO2”) was a nonprofit corporation whose membership was comprised of nonoperating owners of fractional interests in the McElmo Dome unit, a consolidation of working interests in a large deposit of pure carbon dioxide in Montezuma County and Dolores County, near the Four Corners area of Colorado. Kinder Morgan CO2 Company, L.P. (“Kinder Morgan”) was the operator of the unit. Following an audit for the 2008 tax year, Montezuma County determined that Kinder Morgan had underreported the value of gas produced at the unit’s leaseholds by improperly deducting certain costs that it, as the unit operator, was not entitled to deduct. The county ultimately increased its valuation of the entire unit by approximately $57 million. The Montezuma County assessor then imposed a retroactive tax assessment on the unit totaling more than $2 million based on that increased value. That prompted Kinder Morgan to challenge—ultimately unsuccessfully—the county’s authority to impose the retroactive tax. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether CO2 had standing to independently challenge the county's retroactive property tax increase. Finding that it did not, the Court dismissed its appeal. View "Colorado Property Tax Administrator v. CO2 Committee, Inc." on Justia Law

Sylvia Johnson was convicted by jury of unlawfully purchasing a firearm “for transfer to” a man she identified as her common law husband, Jaron Trujillo, who was legally prohibited from possessing a firearm. While deliberating, the jurors posed two questions to the court about the meaning of “transfer.” This became the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court: what the term “transfer” meant under section 18-12-111(1) C.R.S. (2022), the so-called “straw-purchaser” statute. The Supreme Court held that it included temporary transfers and the shared use of a firearm. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on slightly different grounds. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At the time of his appeal, defendant John Hacke was out of custody. The issue his appeal presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether Hacke was entitled to a preliminary hearing on the charge of identity theft, a class 4 felony. After Hacke was arrested, he posted bond. During a subsequent court appearance, he asserted that he was entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was facing mandatory sentencing. Since the State did not initially take a definitive position on this contention, the court scheduled a preliminary hearing. However, the court afforded the State an opportunity to object to the preliminary hearing later if warranted. When the parties appeared again, the court ruled that Hacke was not entitled to a preliminary hearing because identity theft didn't require mandatory sentencing. The district court denied Hacke’s request for a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court concurred: "The relevant inquiry isn’t whether Hacke’s criminal history subjects him to mandatory sentencing if he is convicted of identity theft. It’s whether identity theft, the class 4 felony he’s accused of committing, requires a mandatory sentence. Class 4 felony identity theft does not require a mandatory sentence. Therefore, Hacke is not entitled to a preliminary hearing." View "Colorado v. Hacke" on Justia Law

The issue presented in these cases was whether a trial court could bifurcate the elements of felony DUI during a jury trial. Specifically, the Court addressed whether a jury trial for felony DUI could be conducted piecemeal, with the element of prior convictions tried separately, only after the jury returns a guilty “verdict” on the other elements. Citing Colorado v. Fullerton, 525 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1974), the Supreme Court held that a trial court could not bifurcate the elements of the offense of felony DUI (or of any offense) during a jury trial. View "Colorado v. Kembel" on Justia Law