In this case, the court of appeals affirmed petitioner William Pettigrew’s judgment of conviction for pandering of a child and tampering with a witness or victim. Pettigrew claimed that the trial court’s statements to the jury venire during voir dire lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of due process. Additionally, he contended the appellate erred in determining that a warrant to search his cell phone and the warrant’s supporting affidavit satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. In his view, had the courts below properly redacted from the warrant all information obtained as a result of his initial unlawful arrest, the warrant would not have sufficiently described the place to be searched. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that, although a number of the trial court’s comments during voir dire were problematic, on the facts presented here, there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood the court’s statements, in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, to lower the prosecution’s burden of proof below the reasonable doubt standard. In addition, assuming without deciding that the warrant and its supporting affidavit, when properly redacted, did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, the Supreme Court concluded any error in admitting at trial the evidence obtained from Pettigrew’s cell phone was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. "This evidence was cumulative of other evidence presented, and the evidence of Pettigrew’s guilt was overwhelming." Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, but for somewhat different reasons. View "Pettigrew v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Colorado’s "Make My Day" law, section 18-1-704.5, C.R.S. (2021), addressed the justified use of force against intruders in the home. "But the nickname is a misnomer." Though wide-ranging, the statute’s safe harbor in no way permitted an occupant of a dwelling to egg on intruders to do something so as to have an excuse to shoot them. As pertinent here, the statute provided immunity from criminal prosecution for the use of physical force (including deadly physical force) against an intruder when certain specified conditions are met. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether defendant Patrick Rau was in a dwelling when he shot and killed an intruder in the basement of a house where he and his girlfriend rented an apartment. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the basement, which was accessible to all of the building’s tenants and contained the building’s heat and water controls, was part of Rau’s dwelling, therefore, affirming the district court’s ruling that Rau was immune from prosecution for using deadly physical force against the intruder. Relying on the definition of “dwelling” in section 18-1-901(3)(g), C.R.S. (2021), the Supreme Court held that the basement was part of Rau’s dwelling because it was part of the building that he used for habitation. "And just as some of the usual uses of the garage in [Colorado v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395, 396 (Colo. 1982)] were incidental to and part of the use of the residence itself, some of the usual uses of the basement in this case were likewise incidental to and part of the use of Rau’s residence. Accordingly, we affirm the division." View "Colorado v. Rau" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's consideration was whether a trial court’s comments to a jury venire attempting to explain the concept of reasonable doubt effectively lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. Although the Court granted certiorari to consider three questions, the Court surmised there were really two issues to decide: (1) the proper test for determining whether a trial court’s comments to prospective jurors lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof; and (2) whether the example that the trial court used here to explain the concept of reasonable doubt lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. The Court concluded the proper test for determining whether a trial court’s statements to the jury lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof was one of function: an appellate court must ask whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the court’s statements, in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, to allow a conviction based on a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. "In this way, statements made to the venire during voir dire can, in context, have the effect of instructing the jury on the law to be applied, whether or not such statements can be characterized as formal 'instructions,' and other facts and circumstances of the trial may well inform the question of how the jury would reasonably have understood such statements." Applying this standard to the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court found it was "reasonably likely" that the jury understood the court’s statements to allow a conviction on a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, which constituted structural error. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the division below and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tibbels v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged Kevin Viburg with driving under the influence with three or more prior alcohol-related traffic offenses (i.e., felony DUI). Prior to trial, Viburg moved to treat his prior convictions as an element of the crime, which would require the jury to find them beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion, ruling that Viburg’s prior convictions were a sentence enhancer that needed only to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing after a trial on the merits. As a result, evidence of his prior convictions was not introduced to the jury; instead, at trial, the court instructed the jury only on the elements of misdemeanor DUI. The jury then found Viburg guilty of misdemeanor DUI. Subsequently, at a post-conviction hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Viburg had three prior alcohol-related traffic offenses, and it entered a conviction for felony DUI. The court of appeald reversed, holding that prior convictions were an element of felony DUI, meaning they had to be presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The division further stated that if the prosecution sought retrial and Viburg raised a double jeopardy defense, the trial court had to rule on the defense; it declined to express an opinion on the merits of the defense. The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this case was whether the prior convictions here were a sentence enhancer or an element of the offense. While the State's petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued Linnebur v. Colorado, 476 P.3d 734 (2020), which mirrored the Viburg appellate court's analysis deeming prior convictions to be an element of felony DUI. However, Linnbebur left open the question of whether double jeopardy barred retrial of the felony DUI charge. Here, the Supreme Court held double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the defendant was not previously acquitted of felony DUI. View "In re Viburg v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This appeal presented three issues for the Colorado Supreme Court's review: (1) At what point was defendant Weston Thomas under arrest for purposes of the crime of resisting arrest?; (2) was bodily injury to an at-risk person (a class 6 felony) a lesser included offense of third degree assault (a class 1 misdemeanor)?; and (3) was it error for the trial court to adjudicate Thomas a habitual criminal and sentence him accordingly when two of his three prior felony convictions had been reclassified from class 4 and 6 felonies to level 4 drug felonies? Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals’ analysis of each question, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In August 2016, Plaintiff Maribel Ronquillo was in an automobile collision. According to her complaint, Ronquillo was rear-ended by defendant Jesse Williams, who was operating a vehicle owned by an EcoClean employee and towing an EcoClean trailer. Ronquillo suffered serious physical injuries and incurred around $250,000 in medical expenses. At the time of the accident, Ronquillo did not have health insurance, so she entered into a medical finance lien agreement with Injury Finance. Under the terms of that agreement, Injury Finance purchased Ronquillo’s accounts receivable from her healthcare providers at a predetermined, discounted contractual rate, which allowed Ronquillo to receive prompt medical care. Ronquillo remained contractually obligated to repay Injury Finance for “all charges billed by the [medical] [p]roviders” regardless of the result of any litigation. Ronquillo and her husband filed suit alleging negligence and loss of consortium against Williams and asserting a respondeat superior claim against EcoClean. As part of discovery, Defendants subpoenaed Injury Finance, seeking information and documents pertaining to Injury Finance’s accounts receivable purchase rates, provider contracts, and business operations and methodologies. When Injury Finance did not respond to the subpoena, Defendants filed a motion to compel production, which the district court granted. Defendants also filed a “motion for determination of a question of law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) that Injury Finance . . . is not a collateral source[]” subject to the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule. This interlocutory appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court raised the narrow question of whether a medical finance company was a collateral source for purposes of the pre-verdict evidentiary component of Colorado’s collateral source rule. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Injury Finance was not a collateral source, "Collateral sources must confer a 'benefit,' as defined in section 10-1-135(2)(a), C.R.S. (2021), onto the injured party. ... Ronquillo has not received a benefit from Injury Finance for purposes of the collateral source rule because her arrangement with Injury Finance does not reduce her financial obligations." The Court expressed no opinion on whether the disputed evidence could be excluded under other evidentiary rules such as CRE 401 and 403. View "Ronquillo v. EcoClean" on Justia Law

Defendant William Hunsaker, Jr. missed the deadline for filing his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. However, his original sentence was illegal, and the district court corrected it. The Colorado Supreme Court found his late filing of a collateral attack related to the illegality in his sentence, and was justifiably excused. The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ conclusion that one of Hunsaker’s Crim. P. 35(c) arguments was related to the illegality in his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hunsaker v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged Kevin Viburg with driving under the influence with three or more prior alcohol-related traffic offenses (i.e., felony DUI). Prior to trial, Viburg moved to treat his prior convictions as an element of the crime, which would require the jury to find them beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion, ruling that Viburg’s prior convictions were a sentence enhancer that need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing after a trial on the merits. As a result, evidence of his prior convictions was not introduced to the jury; instead, at trial, the court instructed the jury only on the elements of misdemeanor DUI. The jury then found Viburg guilty of misdemeanor DUI. Subsequently, at a post-conviction hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Viburg had three prior alcohol-related traffic offenses, and it entered a conviction for felony DUI. On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that prior convictions were an element of felony DUI (meaning they must be presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). The appeals court further stated that if the prosecution sought retrial and Viburg raised a double jeopardy defense, the trial court had to rule on the defense; it declined to express an opinion on the merits of the defense. The Colorado Supreme Court held double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the defendant was not previously acquitted of felony DUI. View "In re Viburg v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Eddie Johnson died of natural causes before completing the direct appeal of his criminal convictions in this case. A division of the court of appeals applied the doctrine of abatement ab initio to vacate Johnson’s underlying convictions and a large restitution order associated with them. The prosecution claimed that certain statutory changes and policy considerations should have allowed the district court’s restitution order to survive Johnson’s death. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because the General Assembly did not clearly abrogate the doctrine as to restitution, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision in Colorado v. Johnson, 487 P.3d 1262, vacating the district court’s restitution order. View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Alexander Rudnicki suffered serious injuries when OB-GYN Peter Bianco, D.O., negligently performed an operative vaginal delivery using a vacuum extractor to assist in the delivery. Alexander suffered injuries to his brain as a result of the trauma to his scalp and skull caused by the vacuum extraction. Alexander required ongoing physical, occupational, and speech therapy; he was intellectually disabled and enrolled in special education at school; and he was not likely to be able to live independently in the future. In 2014, Alexander’s parents, Francis and Pamela Rudnicki, in both their individual capacities and as parents, filed a complaint against Dr. Bianco and the hospital where Alexander was born, alleging, among other things, professional negligence by Dr. Bianco. Dr. Bianco moved to dismiss, asserting that Alexander’s parents did not bring their individual claims against him within the applicable statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the parents' individual claims, and the case proceeded to trial with Alexander as the sole plaintiff. A jury ultimately found Dr. Bianco had acted negligently and awarded Alexander damages, including, among other things, sums for past and future medical expenses until Alexander reached the age of twenty-two. Dr. Bianco filed a post-trial motion to reduce this verdict, arguing that under Colorado common law, only Alexander’s parents could recover Alexander’s pre-majority medical expenses and, therefore, the court was required to deduct from the verdict the medical expenses incurred prior to Alexander’s eighteenth birthday. The district court ultimately agreed with Dr. Bianco and vacated the entirety of the jury’s award for past medical expenses, as well as sixty percent of the award for future medical expenses, concluding that the claim for pre-majority medical expenses belonged solely to Alexander’s parents, but their claim for such expenses had been dismissed as time-barred. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether to adhere to a common law rule under which only a minor plaintiff’s parents may recover tort damages for medical expenses incurred by their unemancipated minor child. The Supreme Court concluded the traditional rationales for the common law rule no longer applied, and that "the realities of today’s health care economy compel us to abandon that rule. Accordingly, we conclude that in cases involving an unemancipated minor child, either the child or their parents may recover the child’s pre-majority medical expenses, but double recovery is not permitted." View "Rudnicki v. Bianco" on Justia Law