The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the “McHaffie Rule” applied even where the plaintiff chooses not to assert vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence and, instead, asserts only direct negligence claims against the employer. Here, Erica Murphy Brown and Steven Brown (collectively, “Brown”) sued Denver Center for Birth and Wellness (“DCBW”) for negligence and negligent hiring. Brown also sued Shari Long Romero, a DCBW employee and certified nurse-midwife, for wrongful death. The suit arose from the death of Brown’s child during labor at DCBW. After acknowledging vicarious liability for Long Romero’s negligence - by admitting, in its Answer, that Long Romero’s alleged acts and omissions occurred within the course and scope of her employment - DCBW moved for partial judgment on the pleadings under C.R.C.P. 12(c) on Brown’s negligent hiring claim. The trial court, citing the McHaffie Rule, granted DCBW’s motion and dismissed Brown’s negligent hiring claim—even though Brown had chosen not to assert vicarious liability for Long Romero’s negligence. The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s direct negligence claims against an employer are not barred where the plaintiff does not assert vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence. Thus, the trial court erred in granting DCBW’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Brown’s negligent hiring claim. The Court vacated the trial court's grant of partial judgment on the pleadings, and remanded with directions to reinstate Brown's negligent hiring claim. View "Brown v. Long Romero" on Justia Law

A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals, purporting to apply Colorado v. Morehead, 442 P.3d 413 (2019) announced a new two-step, multifactor test that trial courts would be required to apply when exercising discretion to entertain new arguments and evidence from either party in resolving any remaining suppression-related issues not foreclosed by appeal. In 2007, respondent Tallent spontaneously ran when he saw nearby police officers, eluded the officers in a chase through several backyards, and hid on a covered porch. After the arrest, police discovered an outstanding felony warrant for Tallent. Before trial, Tallent moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of his arrest, his interactions with police, and the various searches they had conducted. The trial court issued an oral ruling that the police lacked probable cause for the arrest. At that hearing, the court acknowledged that “perhaps [the State] would want to make additional comments in light of the actual ruling as to the arrest.” The State indicated that it might want to take an interlocutory appeal of the ruling. On July 20, 2007, however, the court, “upon further analysis,” issued a written order concluding that Tallent’s arrest was in fact constitutional. The court thus admitted the evidence at trial. Tallent was convicted as charged. On direct appeal, a division of the court of appeals reversed Tallent’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that “[b]ecause Tallent was arrested without probable cause, evidence obtained as a result of that arrest should not have been admitted at trial.” Because the trial court relied on new arguments without explicitly applying that novel test, the division reversed Tallent’s conviction and remanded for the trial court to apply the test retroactively. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the appellate division’s approach, which the Court found strayed from its decision in Morehead and imposed unnecessary constraints on trial courts. "Further, based on the existing record in Tallent’s case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in considering the State's new arguments on remand. We therefore reverse the division’s judgment and remand for consideration of Tallent’s remaining arguments on appeal." View "Colorado v. Tallent" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court enjoined Robert Francis, whether acting individually or on behalf of a trust or some other entity, from ever again proceeding pro se as a proponent of a claim (i.e., as a plaintiff, third-party claimant, cross-claimant, or counter-claimant) in any present or future litigation in the state courts of Colorado. "While the Colorado Constitution confers upon every person an undisputed right of access to our state courts, that right isn’t absolute. A party’s constitutional right of access to the courts must sometimes yield to the constitutional right of other litigants and the public to have justice administered without denial or delay. Such is the case when courts are called upon to curb the deleterious impact that duplicative and baseless pro se litigation has on finite judicial resources." Francis abused the judicial process for the purpose of harassing his adversaries "for the better part of a decade." State courts warned, reprimanded, and sanctioned Francis. Even the suspension of his law license failed to deter his "appalling conduct." Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded "the extraordinary injunction requested is amply justified. Of course, Francis may still obtain access to judicial relief—he just may not do so without legal representation." View "In re Francis v. Wegener" on Justia Law

Peggy Harvey and Eileen Manzanares were injured in separate car accidents when their cars were struck by other drivers. Each was then taken to a Centura-affiliated hospital (along with Centura Health Corporation, “Centura”) for treatment. At the time they were treated by Centura, both women’s health insurance was solely through Medicare and Medicaid. And both women’s injuries resulted in hospital stays. In addition to Medicare and Medicaid, both women had automobile insurance whose policies included medical payment ("Med Pay") coverage for medical bills incurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident. In addition, the third-party tortfeasors who caused Harvey’s and Manzanares’s injuries also had automobile insurance. Both Harvey and Manzanares advised Centura of all of the available health and automobile insurance policies. Centura then assigned the women’s accounts to a collection agency, Avectus Healthcare Solutions, for processing; Avectus submitted Centura’s medical expenses to each of the automobile insurers involved, including the automobile insurers for Harvey, Manzanares, and the third-party tortfeasors. Within two weeks after submitting these charges to the various automobile insurers (and within two months of the women’s respective discharges from their hospital stays), Centura filed hospital liens against both of the women. Centura conceded it did not bill either Medicare or Medicaid before filing their respective liens. Both Harvey and Manzanares subsequently brought suit, alleging that Centura had violated the Lien Statute by not billing Medicare for the services provided to the women prior to filing the liens. The parties disputed whether when, as here, Medicare was a person’s principal source of health coverage, Medicare could be considered a “primary medical payer of benefits” under the Lien Statute (such that a hospital must bill Medicare before asserting a lien), or if such an interpretation was barred by the Medicare Secondary Payer statute, which designated Medicare as a “secondary payer.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when Medicare was a patient’s primary health insurer, the Lien Statute required a hospital to bill Medicare for the medical services provided to the patient before asserting a lien against that patient. "Hospital liens are governed by state, not federal, law, and merely enforcing our Lien Statute does not make Medicare a primary payer of medical benefits in violation of the MSP Statute." View "Harvey v. Centura, No." on Justia Law

Because the police suspected Rafael Tafoya of drug trafficking, they mounted a camera on a utility pole across the street from his house without first securing a warrant. For approximately three months, the pole camera continuously recorded footage of Tafoya’s property, which included the backyard, which was otherwise hidden by a six-foot-high privacy fence. The camera could pan, tilt and zoom: all features that police could control while viewing the footage live. Police also indefinitely stored the footage for later review. Based on activity they observed from the footage, police obtained a warrant to search Tafoya’s property. During the subsequent search pursuant to the warrant, the police found large amounts of methamphetamine and cocaine. The State charged Tafoya with two counts of possession with intent to distribute and two counts of conspiracy. Before trial, Tafoya moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the pole camera surveillance, including the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, arguing that police use of the camera violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied his motion and found that police use of the camera was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Tafoya was subsequently convicted on all counts. A division of the court of appeals reversed, finding that police use of the pole camera under the facts of this case was a warrantless search. The State appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that police use of the pole camera to continuously video surveil Tafoya’s fenced-in curtilage for three months, with the footage stored indefinitely for later review, constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

The State challenged the court of appeals decision reversing defendant Gabriel Sanchez’s convictions for two counts of possession. Specifically, the State argued that police use of a pole camera to surveil Rafael Tafoya’s property - which Sanchez routinely visited - did not violate Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Before trial, Sanchez moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the pole camera surveillance, including the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on activity police observed from the camera’s footage. The trial court found that, while Sanchez had standing to move to suppress, the use of the camera did not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals reversed, agreeing that Sanchez had standing, and held that the use of the camera constituted a warrantless search. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the use of the camera constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In this and a companion opinion, Colorado v. Tafoya, 2021 CO __, __ P.3d __, the Court held police use of the pole camera constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Colorado v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Marquis McDonald was convicted by jury of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act ("COCCA"), a class 2 felony for which McDonald ultimately received a ninety-six year sentence in prison. In challenging his conviction, McDonald has focused on COCCA’s requirement that a defendant participate in an “enterprise.” He asserted no enterprise existed: the main evidence presented against him was the theft of a van and a smash-and-grab at a jewelry store. According to McDonald, a division of the court of appeals erred when it declined to interpret "enterprise" as the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the same phrase in the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). McDonald claimed that an associated-in-fact enterprise under COCCA had to have the structural features that the Supreme Court deemed necessary under RICO. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed, and therefore reversed the judgment of the appellate division. The Supreme Court held that COCCA required an associated-in-fact enterprise to have: (1) a minimum amount of structure - namely, a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit the associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose; and (2) an ongoing organization of associates, functioning as a continuing unit, that existed separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engaged. View "McDonald v. Colorado" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Colorado Supreme Court approved the addition of paragraph (c)(4) to Crim. P. 24 (“Trial Jurors”) to permit a trial court, either upon motion of a party or on its own motion, to declare a mistrial at any time before trial on the ground that a fair jury pool cannot be safely assembled as a result of a public health crisis or limitations brought about by such crisis. The issue this case presented for the Court's review centered on how to calculate the new speedy trial deadline following a mistrial (including one declared under Rule 24(c)(4)). The Court held that a mistrial triggered a tolling, not an extension, of the speedy trial period. Further, the Court held that when a trial court declares a mistrial, section 18-1-405(6)(e) required only reasonable delays attributable to the mistrial, not to exceed three months, to be excluded from the computation of time within which a defendant must be brought to trial. In this case, the trial court believed that its March 1, 2021 mistrial declaration pursuant to Rule 24(c)(4) automatically extended the six-month statutory speedy trial period by three months from the date of the mistrial, presumably until June 1. The Supreme Court held this was error. The mistrial merely tolled the six-month speedy trial period for up to three months from the mistrial date. And, because the delay between the date of the mistrial (March 1) and the new trial date (April 26) was reasonable, attributable to the mistrial, and not in excess of three months, it had to be excluded in its entirety from the speedy trial period. View "In re Colorado v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was a district court’s order requiring the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office (“EPCSO”) to give Regina Sprinkle access to internal investigation files about two of its deputies. EPCSO asked the Supreme Court to vacate the order and remand with instructions to quash the subpoena duces tecum (“SDT”) that prompted this action. The Court declined to do so, concluding the district court properly exercised its subject matter jurisdiction in resolving this controversy through a hearing to show cause, as provided under the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (“CCJRA”), section 24-72-303, C.R.S. (2020), and correctly interpreted the CCJRA as requiring release of the records. View "In re Colorado v. Sprinkle" on Justia Law

T.B. committed two sexual offenses as a minor: the first when he was eleven years old and the second when he was fifteen. Because he was twice adjudicated delinquent for unlawful sexual behavior, the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (“CSORA”), required T.B. to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his natural life. Now an adult, T.B. sought review of the juvenile court’s denial of his petition to deregister, arguing that CSORA’s mandatory lifetime sex offender registration requirement for offenders with multiple juvenile adjudications violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed: "Mandatory lifetime sex offender registration brands juveniles as irredeemably depraved based on acts committed before reaching adulthood. But a wealth of social science and jurisprudence confirms what common sense suggests: Juveniles are different. Minors have a tremendous capacity to change and reform. As such, mandating lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles without providing a mechanism for individualized assessment or an opportunity to deregister upon a showing of rehabilitation is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment." The matter was remanded for further proceedings on T.B.'s petition to deregister. View "Colorado in Int. of T.B." on Justia Law