In two cases consolidated for review, the common issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a a criminal defendant who was unable to post bond on a class 4 felony charge was “in custody” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on that charge under section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2020), and Crim. P. 7(h)(1), even if that defendant was also in custody for separate, unrelated offenses. While serving sentences in the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for unrelated offenses, David Subjack and Darryl Lynch were each arrested and charged with possession of contraband in the first degree, which is a class 4 felony. In both cases, the court set cash-only bonds, which neither defendant posted. Subjack and Lynch each requested a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1). The district court denied their requests, reasoning that the current charges did not form the “primary basis” of their custody. The Supreme Court concluded defendants were “in custody for the offense for which the preliminary hearing is requested” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on their current charges. View "In re Colorado v. Subjack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff DIA Brewing Co., LLC contended that after the district court entered an order dismissing this action pursuant to C.R.C.P.12(b)(1), C.R.C.P. 15(a) gave DIA Brewing the right to amend its complaint as a matter of course and without leave of the court or the consent of defendants because no responsive pleading had been filed. Defendants MCE-DIA, LLC, Midfield Concessions Enterprises, Inc., Andrea Hachem, Noureddine “Dean” Hachem, Samir Mashni, Simrae Solutions LLC, Sudan I. Muhammad, Pangea Concessions Group LLC, Niven Patel, Rohit Patel, and Richard Schaden (collectively, “MCE-DIA”), contended that the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) dismissal resulted in a final judgment that cut off DIA Brewing’s right to amend as a matter of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a). Thus, MCE-DIA contended that if DIA Brewing wanted to amend, it was required to seek leave of the court or to obtain MCE-DIA’s written consent. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this dispute. Reading C.R.C.P. 15(a) harmoniously with C.R.C.P. 59 and C.R.C.P. 60, the Court concluded a final judgment cuts off a plaintiff’s right to file an amended complaint as a matter of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a). Under the facts of this case, the Court concluded, contrary to the district court, that the amended pleading was not futile but rather stated viable claims for relief. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to accept DIA Brewing's amended complaint for filing, after which MCE-DIA could respond in the ordinary course. View "Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co." on Justia Law

In 2015, Phillip Ross visited a website showing advertisements posted by individuals willing to perform sexual acts in exchange for money. Two girls under the age of eighteen, C.W. and M.O., listed varying ages in their advertisements, but consistently indicated that they were at least nineteen years old, and that any activities would be between two adults. Ross sent the girls sexually explicit text messages and negotiated the price he would pay in exchange for sexual acts. During his communications with M.O., Ross specifically inquired about her age, and she replied that she was twenty years old. Though Ross did not ask C.W. her age, her photograph appeared in the advertisements. When he was subsequently arrested, Ross admitted to texting the girls and agreeing to pay for sexual acts but maintained that he had not intended to solicit them for the purpose of child prostitution. In this appeal, the State asked the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether the phrase “for the purpose of” in two statutory provisions defining the crime of soliciting for child prostitution, sections 18-7-402(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. (2020), described a culpable mental state. A division of the court of appeals said it does and then equated the phrase with the culpable mental state of intentionally or with intent. The State contended the phrase “for the purpose of” in subsections (a) and (b) did not describe a culpable mental state or mens rea, but instead qualified the prohibited conduct or the actus reus - soliciting another or arranging (or offering to arrange) a meeting - by specifying the reason for which such conduct must have been undertaken: for the purpose of prostitution of a child or by a child. Contrary to the State's assertion, the Supreme Court determined the lower court correctly determined that neither the victim’s age nor the defendant’s knowledge of, or belief concerning, the victim’s age was an element of soliciting for child prostitution. The Supreme Court concluded that while section 18-7-407, C.R.S. (2020), precluded a defendant from raising a defense based on either his lack of knowledge of the child’s age or his reasonable belief that the child was an adult, it did not relieve the State of its burden of proof under subsections (a) and (b). "Thus, section 18-7-407 does not give the People a pass on their obligation to prove that, in soliciting another or arranging (or offering to arrange) a meeting, the defendant’s purpose was child prostitution." View "Colorado v. Ross" on Justia Law

In a case brought in the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, Governor Jared Polis sought a declaration he was not a proper named defendant in a suit challenging the implementation of Colorado law and policy by the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”), an executive agency over which he had ultimate authority. The underlying suit challenged the treatment of transgender women in CDOC custody. The named plaintiffs representing the class were seven transgender women who were confined in CDOC correctional facilities. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint named the Governor, the CDOC, the CDOC Executive Director, and multiple current and former CDOC employees as defendants. The amended complaint alleged Defendants’ policies and practices discriminated against transgender women by refusing to recognize them as women and thus subjecting them to unreasonable risks of violence, failing to provide necessary accommodations, and offering inadequate medical and mental health care. The Governor argued that after the Supreme Court's decision in Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008), he should have no longer been named as a defendant if there was an identifiable agency, official, or employee responsible for administering a challenged law. Here, he argued the CDOC and its employees were the only appropriate defendants. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed: Developmental Pathways did not alter the longstanding rule that the Governor was an appropriate defendant in cases involving “his constitutional responsibility to uphold the laws of the state and to oversee Colorado’s executive agencies.” View "In re Raven v. Polis" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Garcia was convicted of violating a protection order. On appeal, the district court concluded the county court violated Garcia’s confrontation right by admitting a notarized return of service into evidence at trial without the process server testifying. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the return of service wasn’t testimonial hearsay, and therefore its admission didn’t violate Garcia’s constitutional right to confrontation. The district court’s judgment was reversed. View "Colorado v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The water court that issued the decision at the heart of this appeal conducted a four-day trial with thousands of pages of exhibits and testimony of experts to decide the meaning of a decree finalized in April 1933. The court "seized" upon a 1936 photograph to declare the decree ambiguous. To cure the ambiguity, the court consulted additional evidence extrinsic to the original proceedings. Ultimately, the court found the water was decreed to a ditch at issue in the appeal. The parties challenged the water court's reliance on the 1936 photograph and extrinsic evidence. After review of the water court's order, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding that there existed a conflict in Colorado case law as to which materials a court could rely on to decide whether a decree of water rights was ambiguous. "While future litigation may require us to reconcile these cases . . . [e]ach method leads to the same result here: The creek water at issue is not decreed to the ditch." Since the photograph was extrinsic to the proceedings that birthed the decree, the water court erred by relying on it to characterize the decree as ambiguous. "Under any of the three interpretive approaches, evidence extrinsic to the underlying proceedings is admissible only after a finding of ambiguity, not to create the ambiguity." View "Mike & Jim Kruse P'ship v. Cotten" on Justia Law

As Marcus Perez was being arrested after a lengthy foot pursuit, the arresting officer found two live shotgun shells in Perez’s pocket. Without giving Perez Miranda warnings, the officer asked him, “Where’s the gun?” Perez answered that he had thrown the gun away. At a suppression hearing, Perez argued that his answer should have been suppressed because he was not Mirandized before the officer questioned him. The trial court disagreed, finding that the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applied. A jury convicted Perez of second-degree assault on a peace officer and four counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). Perez appealed, contending that the public safety exception did not apply. The court of appeals agreed but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the convictions. Under the facts of this case, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the public safety exception applied, and the arresting officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before inquiring about the gun's location. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Plaintiff DIA Brewing Co., LLC contended that after the district court entered an order dismissing this action pursuant to C.R.C.P.12(b)(1), C.R.C.P. 15(a) gave DIA Brewing the right to amend its complaint as a matter of course and without leave of the court or the consent of defendants because no responsive pleading had been filed. Defendants MCE-DIA, LLC and Richard Schaden (collectively, “MCE-DIA”), in contrast, contended that the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) dismissal resulted in a final judgment that cut off DIA Brewing’s right to amend as a matter of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a). Thus: if DIA Brewing wanted to amend, it was required to seek leave of the court or to obtain MCE-DIA’s written consent. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this dispute, and concluded a final judgment cuts off a plaintiff’s right to file an amended complaint as a matter of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a), and the dismissal order here was a final judgment. Therefore, DIA Brewing did not have the right to amend its complaint as a matter of course, but obligated to request the trial court for leave to amend, or indicate MCE-DIA had consented in writing to the filing of an amended complaint. In this case, the Supreme Court determined the amended pleading was not futile, stating viable claims for relief. The Court thus affirmed the appellate court, though on different grounds, and remanded this case with directions that this case be returned to the district court to accept DIA Brewing’s amended complaint for filing, after which MCE-DIA could respond in the ordinary course. View "Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2018, Respondent Timothy Pyfer filed a dissolution of marriage petition, alleging that he had entered into a common law marriage with his same-sex partner, Petitioner Dean LaFleur, when they held a ceremony before family and friends in 2003, and exchanged vows and rings. LaFleur countered that Pyfer’s claim was legally impossible because at the time of the 2003 ceremony, Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages. In the interim, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that same-sex couples could exercise the fundamental right to marry and struck down state laws that excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage as unconstitutional. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address whether, in light of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), a same-sex couple could prove a common law marriage entered in Colorado before the state recognized same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry. The Court indeed held a court could recognize a common law same-sex marriage entered in Colorado before the state recognized same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry, "state law restrictions held unconstitutional in Obergefell cannot serve as an impediment to the recognition of a same-sex marriage predating that decision." The Colorado Court held that to the extent Obergefell did not merely recognize an existing fundamental right to marry but announced a new rule of federal law, that decision applied retroactively to marriages (including common law marriages) predating that decision. View "In re Marriage of LaFleur & Pyfer" on Justia Law

When Viacheslav Yudkin died intestate, his ex-wife, Petitioner Svetlana Shtutman, was appointed personal representative of his estate. Respondent Tatsiana Dareuskaya sought Shtutman’s removal, asserting that she (Dareuskaya) should have had priority for that appointment as Yudkin’s common law wife. A probate court magistrate found that although Yudkin and Dareuskaya cohabitated and held themselves out to their community as married, other factors weighed against a finding of common law marriage, including that the couple did not file joint tax returns, own joint property or accounts, or share a last name. The court of appeals reversed the magistrate’s order, concluding that the magistrate abused his discretion by misapplying the test for a common law marriage set out in Colorado v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1987). Shtutman petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court was unclear whether the magistrate found Yudkin and Dareuskaya mutually agreed to enter into a marital relationship. Further, the magistrate’s treatment of certain evidence, such as the fact that the parties maintained separate finances and property, and that Dareuskaya never took Yudkin’s name, may have been appropriate under Lucero, but did not necessarily account for the legal and social changes to marriage acknowledged in In re Marriage of Hogsett & Neale, 2021 CO 1 __ P.3d ___. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed and the matter ordered remanded to the probate court to reconsider whether the parties entered into a common law marriage under Hogsett. View "In re Estate of Yudkin" on Justia Law