The Jim Hutton Foundation (“Foundation”) owned surface-water rights in the Republican River Basin. The Foundation believed that permitted groundwater wells that people had begun to install in the underlying groundwater basin - the Northern High Plains Basin (“NHP Basin”) - were not in fact pumping designated groundwater, and were injuring its senior surface-water rights. The Foundation sued, hoping to alter the groundwater basin's boundaries to exclude any improperly permitted designated-groundwater wells. The Foundation filed this action in water court, arguing that a legislative amendment to the statutory process to challenge the designation of a groundwater basis, prohibited any challenge to alter a designated groundwater basin's boundaries to exclude a well that already received a permit. The Foundation claimed the amendment deprived surface-water users of the ability to petition the Commission to redraw the NHP Basin’s boundaries to exclude permitted well users upon a showing that groundwater was improperly designated when the NHP Basin’s designation became final. The water court dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding the Commission must first determine whether the water at issue is designated groundwater before subject matter jurisdiction will vest in the water court, meaning the Foundation’s constitutional claim could not become ripe until it satisfied the Commission that the water was not designated groundwater. The Foundation appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water court and concluded that, because jurisdiction did not vest in the water court until the Commission first determined the water at issue was not designated groundwater, the water court properly dismissed the claim. View "Jim Hutton Educ. Found. v. Rein" on Justia Law

After pulling over Kimberlie Verigan’s car during a traffic stop, police noticed potential contraband in the car. Police then searched the car and without providing Miranda warnings. After Verigan admitted to possessing methamphetamines, the police arrested her and brought her to a police station, where she received Miranda warnings, waived her rights, and again confessed to possessing methamphetamines. Verigan ultimately moved to suppress her statements, asserting, as pertinent here, that the police had obtained her second confession through the use of the type of two-stage interrogation technique that a majority of the Supreme Court had ruled impermissible in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The trial court denied Verigan’s motion, and Verigan was subsequently convicted. She then appealed, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that because Seibert was a fractured opinion with no agreement by a majority on the principles of law to be applied, Seibert did not announce a precedential rule. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the outcome of the appellate court's judgment, joining, however, "the vast majority of courts that have addressed the issue now before us and conclude that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Seibert, which enunciated the 'narrowest grounds' on which the members of the majority concurred, is the controlling precedent to be applied." Applying Justice Kennedy’s test here, the Colorado Court concluded the officers in this case did not engage in a two-step interrogation in a deliberate attempt to undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings provided to Verigan. Accordingly, because Verigan’s pre- and post-warning statements were indisputably voluntary, the division correctly determined that Verigan’s post-warning statements were admissible. View "Verigan v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case arose from a series of transactions in which petitioners Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. and RMEI Bakken Joint Venture Group (collectively, “RMEI”) sold oil and gas assets to Lario Oil and Gas Company (“Lario”). In the transaction, Lario was acting as an agent for Tracker Resource Exploration ND, LLC and its affiliated entities (collectively, “Tracker”), which were represented by respondents Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP and Gregory Danielson (collectively, “DG&S”). Prior to RMEI’s sale to Lario, RMEI and Tracker had a business relationship related to the oil and gas assets that were ultimately the subject of the RMEI-Lario transaction. The RMEI-Tracker relationship ultimately soured; Tracker and Lario reached an understanding by which Lario would seek to purchase RMEI’s interests and then assign a majority of those interests to Tracker. Recognizing the history between Tracker and RMEI, however, Tracker and Lario agreed not to disclose Tracker’s involvement in the deal. DG&S represented Tracker throughout RMEI’s sale to Lario. In that capacity, DG&S drafted the final agreement between RMEI and Lario, worked with the escrow agent, and hosted the closing at its offices. No party disclosed to RMEI, however, that DG&S was representing Tracker, not Lario. After the sale from RMEI to Lario was finalized, Lario assigned a portion of the assets acquired to Tracker, and Tracker subsequently re-sold its purchased interests for a substantial profit. RMEI then learned of Tracker’s involvement in its sale to Lario and sued Tracker, Lario, and DG&S for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and civil conspiracy, among other claims. As pertinent here, the fiduciary breach claims were based on RMEI’s prior relationship with Tracker. The remaining claims were based on allegations that Tracker, Lario, and DG&S misrepresented Tracker’s involvement in the Lario deal, knowing that RMEI would not have dealt with Tracker because of the parties’ strained relationship. Based on these claims, RMEI sought to avoid its contract with Lario. Lario and Tracker eventually settled their claims with RMEI, and DG&S moved for summary judgment as to all of RMEI’s claims against it. The district court granted DG&S’s motion. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether: (1) Lario and DG&S created the false impression that Lario was not acting for an undisclosed principal (i.e., Tracker) with whom Lario and DG&S knew RMEI would not deal; (2) an assignment clause in the RMEI-Lario transaction agreements sufficiently notified RMEI that Lario acted on behalf of an undisclosed principal; (3) prior agreements between RMEI and Tracker negated all previous joint ventures and any fiduciary obligations between them; (4) RMEI stated a viable claim against DG&S for fraud; and (5) RMEI could avoid the Lario sale based on statements allegedly made after RMEI and Lario signed the sales agreement but prior to closing. The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. and RMEI Bakken Joint Venture" on Justia Law

Charlotte Fischer was moved into a nursing home; after she died, her family initiated a wrongful death action against the health care facility in court. Citing a clause in the admissions agreement, the health care facility moved to compel arbitration out of court. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, determining the arbitration agreement was void because it did not strictly comply with the Health Care Availability Act ("HCAA"). In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether section 13-64-403, C.R.S. (2017) of the HCAA, the provision governing arbitration agreements, required strict or substantial compliance. The HCAA required that such agreements contain a four-paragraph notice in a certain font size and in bold-faced type. Charlotte’s agreement included the required language in a statutorily permissible font size, but it was not printed in bold. Charlotte’s daughter signed the agreement on Charlotte’s behalf. The Supreme Court held the Act demanded only substantial compliance. Furthermore, the Court concluded the agreement here substantially complied with the formatting requirements of section 13-64-403, notwithstanding its lack of bold-faced type. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer" on Justia Law

At issue before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the Office of the State Public Defender (“the P.D.”) was authorized to represent an indigent party in a civil forfeiture proceeding. The State argued that the P.D. did not have statutory authority to enter its appearance in civil forfeiture matters. Respondent Alyse Shank argued the statute that authorized the P.D. to represent indigent defendants in criminal proceedings contained a general grant of authority for the P.D. to appear in any case where the P.D. deemed such representation to be in the interest of justice. The State moved to have the the public defender disqualified. After review, the Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing public defenders to represent indigent defendants did not extend to civil forfeiture actions. Thus, the trial court erred by denying the People’s motion to disqualify. View "In re Colorado v. Shank" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado certified a question of law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The question asked for an interpretation of the meaning of the words “suicide, sane or insane,” when used in life insurance policies. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that, under Colorado law, a life insurance policy exclusion for “suicide, sane or insane” excluded coverage only if the insured, whether sane or insane at the time, committed an act of self-destruction with the intent to kill himself. View "Renfandt v. New York Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This case concerned a discovery dispute arising out of an automobile accident in which Gary Griggs, a driver insured by State Farm, injured Susan Goddard and several others. State Farm sought a declaratory judgment that Griggs breached the contractual duties set forth in his insurance policy by executing a settlement agreement pursuant to Nunn v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 244 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2010), in which he waived a jury trial, consented to arbitration, and assigned to Goddard any rights that he had against State Farm. Goddard counterclaimed, asserting, among other things, that State Farm acted in bad faith by refusing both to settle her claims against Griggs and to indemnify Griggs for the judgment entered against him after the arbitration to which Griggs had consented. The district court determined State Farm impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege protecting communications between it and its former counsel when it submitted an affidavit from that former counsel to rebut allegations of discovery misconduct. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded after review that the attorney affidavit submitted in this case did not place any privileged communications at issue. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding that State Farm impliedly waived its attorney-client privilege. View "State Farm v. Griggs" on Justia Law

Ilyias Austin petitioned for relief after a district court denied his motion for a preliminary hearing. The Colorado Supreme Court determined Austin was charged by information with a class 4 felony committed as a “crime of violence” as defined at section 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(B) and (II)(C) of the revised statutes, and as such, he was statutorily entitled to a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Austin" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's consideration centered on whether Colorado’s Independent Ethics Commission (“the IEC”) had jurisdiction pursuant to article XXIX of the state constitution to hear a complaint based on allegations that then-Secretary of State Scott Gessler (“the Secretary”) breached the public trust by using money from his statutorily-provided discretionary fund for partisan and personal purposes. The IEC investigated the complaint, held a hearing, and determined that the Secretary’s conduct breached the public trust. The Secretary sought judicial review of the IEC’s ruling, arguing that the IEC lacked jurisdiction over the case. Both the district court and the court of appeals affirmed the IEC’s ruling. The Colorado Supreme Court held that relevant jurisdictional language in article XXIX, section 5 of the state constitution authorized the IEC to hear complaints involving ethical standards of conduct relating to activities that could allow covered individuals, including elected officials, to improperly benefit financially from their public employment. Furthermore, the Court held that section 24-18-103, C.R.S. (2017), was one such ethical standard of conduct which established the holding of public office or employment was a public trust, and that a public official “shall carry out his duties for the benefit of the people of the state.” Because the allegations against the Secretary clearly implicated this standard, the Court concluded the complaint fell within the IEC’s jurisdiction and rejected the Secretary’s jurisdictional and vagueness challenges. Additionally, the Court rejected the Secretary’s procedural due process claim because he failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the alleged violation. View "Gessler v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this case, at issue was whether the petitioner was entitled to a jury trial under Rule 38 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Between 2008 and 2011, Zachary Mason (“Zach”) farmed several properties in Otero County, Colorado. During this time, Zach executed several loan agreements with Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA, and Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, FLCA (collectively, “Farm Credit”). As part of the loan agreements, Farm Credit owned a perfected security interest in some of Zach’s crops, farm equipment, and other items of personal property. In May 2012, Zach defaulted on his loans. As a result, Farm Credit sued Zach for judgment on his notes, foreclosure of real property collateral, replevin of personal property collateral, conversion of insurance proceeds, civil theft, breach of contract, and fraud. The court of appeals held that the petitioner was not entitled to a jury trial because the claims in the respondents’ original complaint were primarily equitable. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals ignored the claims in the respondents’ amended complaint. The Colorado Supreme Court found that was in error: when a plaintiff amends its complaint and a party properly requests a jury trial, the trial court should determine whether the case may be tried to a jury based on the claims in the amended complaint, not the original complaint. If the claims against a particular defendant in a plaintiff’s amended complaint entitle that defendant to a jury trial, then “all issues of fact shall be tried by a jury,” upon a proper jury demand and payment of the requisite fee. Here, the claims against the petitioner in the respondents’ amended complaint were primarily legal, as opposed to equitable, meaning the petitioner was entitled to a jury trial under Rule 38. View "Mason v. Farm Credit S. Colo., ACA" on Justia Law