The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court regarding the statute of limitations applicable to section 10-3-1116, C.R.S. (2017), which governed claims for unreasonable delay or denial of insurance benefits. Specifically, the question centered on whether a claim brought pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 10-3-1116 was subject to the one-year statute of limitations found in Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-80-103(1)(d) and applicable to “[a]ll actions for any penalty or forfeiture of any penal statutes.” The Supreme Court held the one-year statute of limitations found in section 13-80-103(1)(d), C.R.S. (2017), did not apply to an action brought under section 10-3-1116(1) because section 10-3-1116(1) was not an “action[] for any penalty or forfeiture of any penal statute[]” within the meaning of section 13-80-103(1)(d). Therefore, the Court answered the certified question in the negative. View "Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case presented the Colorado Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify whether the voluntariness of consent to a search in Colorado had to be proven by “clear and convincing evidence” or by “a preponderance of the evidence.” Thomas Delage was stopped by police when they spotted him and a companion at 3 a.m. in an alleyway that had been the scene of recent thefts from cars. Both men were carrying backpacks and flashlights and they were standing next to several parked cars. During the interaction between Delage and the officers, police searched Delage’s backpack and found methamphetamines. At a hearing about the admissibility of the drugs, Delage and the officers involved gave differing accounts of the details and duration of the stop. Applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the trial court found that “it is probably more likely true than not there was consent under the circumstances given.” On that basis, the trial court denied Delage’s motion to suppress the methamphetamines. The court of appeals agreed Delage had given consent, but the panel noted that the court had not considered whether Delage’s consent was voluntary. Because consent must be voluntary to be valid, the court of appeals vacated Delage’s conviction and remanded, instructing the trial court to consider whether the State had proven by “clear and convincing evidence” that Delage’s consent was voluntary. The State petitioned for certiorari, asking for clarification on the proper standard for the trial court to determine voluntariness. "Under federal law, the answer is clear, as the United States Supreme Court explained more than forty years ago that voluntariness need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence." The Colorado Supreme Court held that in Colorado courts the same standard applied and that the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a search was consented to voluntarily in order to overcome a motion to suppress evidence obtained in that search. View "Colorado v. Delage" on Justia Law

In 2009, a fire started in an apartment building owned by respondents Guillermo and Evelia Barriga and insured by petitioner American Family Mutual Insurance Company (“American Family”). American Family made various payments to the and on behalf of the Barrigas, totaling $209,816.43. However, after a substantial amount of repair work had been completed, the contractor revised its estimate for the cost of the repairs. The revised estimate was higher than American Family’s initial estimate, primarily because of the need for additional repairs and asbestos remediation. In response, American Family initiated a third-party appraisal process outlined in the insurance policy intended to provide an impartial assessment of the needed repair costs. The appraiser fixed the award at $322,141.79. American Family then paid that award, less the $209,816.43 that had been previously paid to the Barrigas, resulting in a payment of $122,325.36. American Family also made an additional payment of $5435.44 for emergency board-up services. The Barrigas sued American Family for breach of contract, common law bad-faith breach of insurance contract, and unreasonable delay and denial of insurance benefits under section 10-3-1116(1), C.R.S. (2017). The jury found for the Barrigas on all claims, awarding damages, as relevant here, of $9270 for breach of contract and $136,930.80 for benefits unreasonably delayed or denied. The issue raised on appeal for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether an award of damages under section 10-3-1116(1), C.R.S. (2017), had to be reduced by an insurance benefit unreasonably delayed but ultimately recovered by an insured outside of a lawsuit. The Court held that an award under section 10-3-1116(1) must not be reduced by an amount unreasonably delayed but eventually paid by an insurer because the plain text of the statute provided no basis for such a reduction. The Court also concluded that a general rule against double recovery for a single harm did not prohibit a litigant from recovering under claims for both a violation of section 10-3- 1116(1) and breach of contract. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barriga" on Justia Law

Nine days after the jury returned its verdict, but before the trial court reduced that verdict to a written and signed judgment, Michael Casper died. Consequently, the defendant, Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company (“GTL”), moved to substantially reduce the verdict, arguing that the survival statute barred certain damages under the policy that insured Casper. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court granted GTL’s petition to review the court of appeals’ decision, and concluded that the survival statute did not limit the jury’s verdict in favor of Casper. The Court also concluded that an award of attorney fees and costs under section 10-3-1116(1) was a component of the “actual damages” of a successful claim under that section. Finally, the Court concluded that although the survival statute did not limit the damages awarded by the jury, the trial court abused its discretion by entering a final judgment on October 30, 2014, nunc pro tunc to July 15, 2014. View "Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Casper" on Justia Law

Megan Parocha fled from New Jersey to Colorado to escape her abusive spouse. Her husband, who knew that she had come to join her family in Colorado, contacted her almost daily. When she expressed reservations about returning to New Jersey, the frequency and tone of his contact intensified. He called her, emailed her, and texted her repeatedly, and she felt threatened. When Megan sought a civil protection order, her husband claimed that Colorado courts had no jurisdiction to offer her this protection because he was an absent non-resident. This case presented the Colorado Supreme Court the first opportunity to address whether and when a civil protection order was available to a victim of alleged domestic abuse who comes to Colorado seeking refuge from a non-resident. The Court concluded an out-of-state party’s harassment of, threatening of, or attempt to coerce an individual known by the non-resident to be located in Colorado was a tortious act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the state’s long-arm statute, section 13-1-124, C.R.S. (2017). The Court also concluded such conduct created a sufficient nexus between the out-of-state party and Colorado to satisfy the requisite minimum contacts such that the exercise of jurisdiction by a Colorado court to enter a protection order comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "Parocha v. Parocha" on Justia Law

An underinsured motorist struck a car driven by Dale Fisher, causing Fisher injuries requiring over $60,000 in medical care. Fisher was not at fault, and he was covered under multiple State Farm underinsured motorist (“UIM”) insurance policies. State Farm agreed that Fisher’s medical bills were covered under the UIM policies, but it disputed other amounts Fisher sought under the policies, including lost wages. So, State Farm refused to pay Fisher’s medical bills without first resolving his entire claim. Fisher sued, alleging State Farm had unreasonably delayed paying his medical expenses. In response, State Farm argued it had no duty to make piecemeal payments, even for Fisher’s undisputed medical expenses, when it disputed the rest of Fisher’s UIM claim. A jury returned a verdict in Fisher’s favor, finding that State Farm had violated section 10-3-1115, C.R.S. (2017), which provides that an insurer “shall not unreasonably delay or deny payment of a claim for benefits owed to or on behalf of any first-party [insured] claimant.” A division of the court of appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether auto insurers have a duty to pay undisputed portions of a UIM claim (like the medical expenses at issue here) even though other portions of the claim remain disputed. The Court held that insurers have a duty not to unreasonably delay or deny payment of covered benefits, even though other components of an insured’s claim may still be reasonably in dispute. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "State Farm v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Appellee David Ehrnstein was convicted by jury of incest against L.E. He filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that one of his trial prosecutors and the victim advocate in his case had instructed L.E. to avoid a defense subpoena. Prior to holding a hearing on that motion, the trial court found that it was compelled by the rules of professional conduct to appoint a special prosecutor for purposes of the hearing. Pursuant to sections 16-12-102(2) and 20-1-107(3), C.R.S. (2017), the district attorney filed an interlocutory appeal with the Colorado Supreme Court, which was faced with deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in appointing the special prosecutor. The Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion because it misapplied the law when it concluded that Colo. RPC 3.7 required the appointment of a special prosecutor for purposes of the hearing on the new trial motion in this case. View "Colorado v. Ehrnstein" on Justia Law

The Jim Hutton Educational Foundation, a surface-water user, claimed that a statute prohibiting any challenge to a designated groundwater basin that would alter the basin’s boundaries to exclude a permitted well was unconstitutional. The water court dismissed that claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the surface-water user had to first satisfy the Colorado Groundwater Commission that the water at issue was not designated groundwater. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal, because jurisdiction vests in the water court only if the Colorado Groundwater Commission first concludes that the water at issue is designated groundwater. Therefore, the water court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Foundation's claim. View "Jim Hutton Educ. Found. v. Rein" on Justia Law

Doreen Heyboer was a passenger on a motorcycle involved in an accident with an automobile in Denver and suffered catastrophic injuries. As a result of her injuries, her conservator sued the City and County of Denver, alleging that the street’s deteriorated condition contributed to the accident. Denver responded by asserting its immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”). Heyboer argued Denver waived its immunity because the road was a dangerous condition that physically interfered with the movement of traffic, and thus, her suit fits an express exception found in the CGIA. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court determined her evidence did not establish that the road constituted an unreasonable risk of harm to the health and safety of the public, nor did her evidence establish that the road physically interfered with the movement of traffic. Accordingly, Denver retained its immunity under the CGIA; the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals which held to the contrary. View "City & Cty. of Denver v. Dennis ex. rel. Heyboer" on Justia Law

In 2011, the City of Aspen adopted an ordinance which imposed a regulatory scheme designed to meet the city council’s “duty to protect the natural environment and the health of its citizens and visitors.” Under the ordinance, grocery stores within Aspen’s city limits were prohibited from providing disposable plastic bags to customers, though they could still provide paper bags to customers, but each bag is subject to a $0.20 “waste reduction fee,” unless the customer was a participant in a “Colorado Food Assistance Program.” This case presented the question of whether Aspen’s $0.20 paper bag charge was a tax subject to voter approval under the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (“TABOR”). The trial court held that this charge was not subject to TABOR because it was not a tax, but a fee. The court of appeals concurred with this holding. The Colorado Supreme Court also agreed, finding the bag charge was not a tax subject to TABOR. View "Colorado Union of Taxpayers Found. v City of Aspen" on Justia Law