In 2006, respondent Ruben Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend. His girlfriend’s three children were seated in the backseat along with R.L., his girlfriend’s friend. The girlfriend and Ramos began to argue when Ramos turned his attention to R.L., where he punched R.L. in the face several times. Blood from Ramos’ hand ended up on R.L.’s jacket and baseball cap. Ramos’ theory of defense was that he had not struck R.L. and the blood stains were from waiving his hand around. This case, as in “Venalonzo v. Colorado,” presented for the Supreme Court’s review an issue of lay and expert testimony. Specifically, this case required the Court to resolve one issue: whether an ordinary person would be able to differentiate reliably between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Applying the test announced in “Venalonzo,” the Court held that an ordinary person would not be able to testify reliably about the difference between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Therefore, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by not qualifying a police detective’s blood testimony as expert testimony. View "Colorado v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The defendant in this case, Daniela Molina, used the last name and social security number (SSN) of another person, D.K., to obtain an apartment lease and employment. A jury later convicted Molina of two counts of identity theft and three counts of forgery. Molina appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove all the elements of identity theft and forgery. The court of appeals held: (1) the State was required to prove that Molina knew she had stolen the information of a real person; (2) there was insufficient evidence that Molina knew the last name and SSN she used belonged to a real person; (3) vacated her identity theft convictions; and (4) affirmed her forgery convictions. The court of appeals declined to reach Molina’s argument that the term “thing of value” in the identity theft statute only pertained to items with pecuniary value and therefore neither employment nor an apartment lease were “thing[s]of value.” The Supreme Court concluded: (1) the State needed to show that Molina knew she stole another person’s information; (2) there was sufficient evidence to show Molina knew she stole a real person’s information; and (3) an apartment lease and employment qualified as “things of value.” View "Colorado v. Molina" on Justia Law

Trooper Joseph Ynostroza stopped John Cox for driving in the left lane. During the stop, the Trooper observed several factors that led him to suspect that there might be evidence of illegal activity in the trunk of the vehicle, including the fact that his canine alerted to the odor of drugs in the trunk. The Trooper opened the trunk where he found, among other things, two white trash bags with multiple sealed packages of marijuana. The trial court granted Cox’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that it is “unreasonable for an officer to rely on the alert from a canine trained to detect any amount of marijuana, including legal amounts.” The trial court concluded that, based on the remaining factors to be considered, the Trooper did not have probable cause to search the trunk. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Trooper had probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. View "Colorado v. Cox" on Justia Law

In 2006, respondent Ruben Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend. His girlfriend’s three children were seated in the backseat along with R.L., his girlfriend’s friend. The girlfriend and Ramos began to argue when Ramos turned his attention to R.L., where he punched R.L. in the face several times. Blood from Ramos’ hand ended up on R.L.’s jacket and baseball cap. Ramos’ theory of defense was that he had not struck R.L. and the blood stains were from waiving his hand around. This case, as in “Venalonzo v. Colorado,” presented for the Supreme Court’s review an issue of lay and expert testimony. Specifically, this case required the Court to resolve one issue: whether an ordinary person would be able to differentiate reliably between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Applying the test announced in “Venalonzo,” the Court held that an ordinary person would not be able to testify reliably about the difference between blood cast-off and blood transfer. Therefore, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by not qualifying a police detective’s blood testimony as expert testimony. View "Venalonzo v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner Anthony Edwin Marsh of sexually assaulting three of his granddaughters and possessing more than twenty images depicting child pornography. Marsh appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the presence of temporary internet cache files stored on a person’s hard drive can constitute evidence of “knowing possession” as used in Colorado’s child pornography statute, section 18-6-403, C.R.S. (2016). First, the Court held that when a computer user seeks out and views child pornography on the internet, he possesses the images he views. The evidence presented at trial established that Marsh’s cache contained images that a computer user had previously viewed on the web browser. The Court therefore concluded that the internet cache images qualified as relevant evidence that Marsh had previously viewed, and thus possessed, those images. Even if the trial court improperly admitted the forensic interviewers’ testimony as lay opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that error was harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment in its entirety. View "Marsh v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Colorado medical marijuana constitutional amendment required law enforcement officers to return medical marijuana seized from individuals later acquitted of state drug charges. The federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) prohibited the distribution of marijuana, with limited exceptions. The question in this case was whether the return provision of the Colorado Constitution was preempted by the federal CSA. In a split decision, the court of appeals held the return provision was not preempted. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding that the CSA did not preempt state law on the same subject matter unless there was a positive conflict between the state and federal laws such that the two could not consistently stand together. The Colorado Court reasoned that because state law enforcement officers were returning marijuana, they were indeed “distributing” it. This constituted a “positive conflict” between the laws. The Court found that the Colorado provision was thus preempted and rendered void. View "Colorado v. Crouse" on Justia Law

In 2012, police arrested respondent Alexander Wolf after a search of his car netted various narcotics, including less than one ounce of marijuana. Respondent was ultimately charged with possession, and pertinent to this appeal, possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. Before respondent’s case was submitted to a jury, Colorado passed Amendment 64, legalizing possession of up to one ounce of marijuana for personal use. The jury found respondent guilty of possessing the marijuana, and he was sentenced to twenty-one days in jail and two years of probation. Respondent appealed, arguing that his conviction for possessing what ultimately was less than one ounce of marijuana should be vacated because Amendment 64 legalized possession of less than one ounce of marijuana before he has been convicted. A divided court of appeals vacated the marijuana possession conviction and sentence. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that Amendment 64 deprived the State of the power to continue to prosecute individuals for possession of one ounce of marijuana after the Amendment became effective. View "Colorado v. Wolf" on Justia Law

In 2010, defendant Brandi Russell and her husband brought their infant to a hospital with a broken leg. Worried that the child may have been abused, a doctor contacted a social worker, who then contacted the Department of Social Services. The social worker interviewed defendant, and worried she was on drugs. A court order was obtained requiring defendant to submit to a drug test. The results revealed defendant has used amphetamine, marijuana and methamphetamine. Police obtained a warrant, searched defendant's home, and found drug paraphernalia. The State charged defendant with child abuse resulting in serious injury, and possession of controlled substances. A jury acquitted defendant of the child abuse charge, but convicted her on possession charges. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court found that defendant would have been convicted on the methamphetamine charge with or without a police officer's testimony, so any error in admitting that testimony as lay testimony was harmless. With respect to defendant's possession of marijuana conviction, the Supreme Court found that Amendment 64 to the Colorado Constitution deprived the State of the power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana pending on direct appeal when the Amendment became effective. The Court affirmed the court of appeals as to both issues. View "Russell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Amendment 64 to the Colorado Constitution (legalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana) deprived the State the power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, and where there was a pending right to appeal (exercised by filing a notice of appeal) at the time the Amendment became effective. "In case a statute is repealed or rendered inoperative, no further proceedings can be had to enforce it in pending prosecutions." The Colorado Supreme Court found that Amendment 64 rendered inoperative the pertinent language of the statute under which the defendant in this case had been arrested, because Amendment 64 legalized what the applicable statute had prohibited. As such, the Court concluded that Amendment 64 indeed deprived the State of its power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana and where there was a pending right to appeal at the time the Amendment became effective. View "Colorado v. Boyd" on Justia Law

In 2015, Lisa Grimicko (Wife) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In it, she petitioned for spousal maintenance and an equitable division of the marital assets and debts. Wife sought information from Nickifor Gromicko's (Husband) employer, International Association of Certified Home Inspectors ( InterNACHI). Wife alleged that Husband founded the company in 2004, and served as InterNACHI's Chief Operating Officer. Although Husband initially indicated he had no objection to making certain InterNACHI records available, he subsequently refused to produce them, contending that he was merely an employee of the company, and had no authority to provide the records. Husband's counsel, who also served as InterNACHI's general counsel, filed a brief on behalf of the company regarding access to the requested records. The trial court made no ruling on the records request. In response, Wife served a subpoena, and InterNACHI moved to quash the subpoena. In its motion, InterNACHI argued that many of the documents were privileged and confidential, and irrelevant to the dissolution proceedings. Wife maintained that the records were relevant to both spousal maintenance and division of marital property. The trial court denied InterNACHI's motion, and ultimately ordered InterNACHI to produce the records. Finding that the trial court did not take an active role in managing Wife's discovery request, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for the trial court to make findings about the appropriate scope of discovery in light of the reasonable needs of the case. View "In re Marriage of Gromicko" on Justia Law