The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a district court's suppression order. The court suppressed a firearm that Denver Police seized from a car in which defendant Randiray Delacruz was a passenger. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the firearm was discovered during a valid protective search of the vehicle in light of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the search. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's order and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Delacruz" on Justia Law

The issue this matter presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a discovery dispute between plaintiff Stephen Rumnock and defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company. After being ordered to produce documents that Rumnock requested, American Family disclosed some and simultaneously moved for a protective order. The motion sought to preclude Rumnock from using or disclosing the documents (alleged to be trade secrets) outside of this litigation. The trial court granted in part and denied in part, ordering that the alleged trade secrets not be shared with American Family's competitors, but declining to further limit their use. American Family petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to direct the trial court to enter the protective order. The Supreme Court declined to do so, finding that American Family failed to present to the trial court evidence demonstrating the documents were trade secrets or otherwise confidential commercial information. View "In re Rumnock v. Anschutz" on Justia Law

The City of Aurora was the sole owner of the capital stock of Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc., which owned a one-half interest in water rights decreed in 1928 to the Busk-Ivanhoe System for supplemental irrigation in the Arkansas River Basin by Garfield County District Court (in Civil Action 2621, known as the "2621 Decree"). The decree contained no reference to storage of exported water on the eastern slope prior to its decreed use for supplemental irrigation in the Arkansas River Basin. Nevertheless, water decreed to the Busk-Ivanhoe System has been stored in reservoirs before put to beneficial use. In 1987, Busk-Ivanhoe began to put its water rights to use in Aurora. Busk-Ivanhoe did not file an application to change the type and place of use of these rights until 2009. The water court for Water Division 2 approved Busk-Ivanhoe's change application allow use of the rights within Aurora's municipal system. The rulings were confirmed in 2014. The issues raised in this appeal centered on the water court's quantification of the water rights to be changed under the application. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the water court erred when it concluded that storage of the Busk-Ivanhoe rights on the eastern slope prior to use was lawful; (2) because the storage of the water rights was unlawful, the water court erred in concluding the volumes of exported water paid as rental fees for storage in its historic consumptive use quantification of the water rights; and (3) the water court erred in concluding it was required to exclude the twenty-two years of undecreed use of the water rights from the representative study period. The water court's 2014 order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Grand Valley Water Users Ass'n v. Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc." on Justia Law

Alamosa County police officers applied for and received a warrant to search Lonnie Cooper’s residence and vehicles on his property for illegal drugs and other items associated with the sale of illegal drugs. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed an interlocutory appeal to answer whether an officer could reasonable and in good faith rely on a warrant when the warrant affidavit was devoid of specific dates, but established a long, ongoing pattern of drug trafficking from a home. After review of the specifics of this case, the Supreme Court concluded there was enough evidence in the warrant affidavit of an ongoing drug trafficking operation that an officer could have a reasonable, good faith belief that the warrant was proper. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Respondent Curtis Adams was found guilty by jury of assaulting a correctional officer. The presumptive sentencing range for that offense was two to six years, but because Adams committed the assault while serving a sentence for a prior felony, the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to Adams’ remaining sentence. This case arose out of the intersection between two sources of sentence enhancement: one requiring an aggravated term-of-years range; the other requiring consecutive sentencing. The appellate court concluded Adams was not subject to the term-of-years enhancement as applied by the trial court. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court was required to apply both enhancements. The Supreme Court, in its review of the plain language of the applicable statutes, concluded both enhancements applied. The Court reversed a portion of the appellate court’s judgment vacating respondent’s sentence. The case was then remanded for resentencing. View "Colorado v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioner Arnold Calderon was injured in a vehicle accident with an uninsured motorist. At the time, petitioner was insured with respondent American Family Mutual Insurance. American Family paid the policy limit to petitioner's medical providers; it denied payment with respect to his uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM), disputing the amount of petitioner's damages. A jury returned an award in petitioner's favor. The trial court offset the amount of the jury award by the amount already paid to the medical providers. Petitioner argued on appeal of that offset, that the "MedPay" coverage was separate from the UM/UIM coverage, and that the MedPay amount should not have been deducted. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the amount of UM/UIM coverage, as listed in petitioner's policy, in this case should not have been reduced by the MedPay amount. View "Calderon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic disturbance involving then 16-year-old A.L.-C., who was feuding with he mother and stepfather on the first floor of the family home. B.O., his sister, told an aunt who was in the house, that A.L.-C. had sexually assaulted her. B.O. repeated her allegations to the police. A.L.-C. was briefly detained, but then returned to his parents. The following day, A.L.-C. and his parents went to the police station for questioning about the alleged sexual assaults. A detective and Spanish interpreter advised the three of A.L.-C.'s "Miranda" rights, then the detective and interpreter stepped out of the room to allow the family to discuss whether A.L.-C. would waive his rights. A videorecorder captured their exchange. Initially, the tape showed the parents individually asking A.L.-C. whether he understood his rights. A.L.-C. replied that he was "always the liar, or the one lying" and told his mother he would rather keep quiet. Whether A.L.-C. meant this as a refusal to speak with his mother or with the police was unclear. Minutes later, the detective and interpreter re-enetered the room and A.L.-C. and his mother both signed the Miranda waiver form. A.L.-C. indicated he understood his rights and agreed to discuss his sister's allegations. A.L.-C.'s stepfather left the room before more questioning began, but his mother remained for its entirety. At issue was A.L.-C.'s statement to his mother outside of police presence. The trial court suppressed A.L.-C.'s incriminating statements, concluding that although his mother was present, she could not protect his right to remain silent because she did not share his interests. The State sought the Colorado Supreme Court's review. Finding that the plain language of section 19-2-511(1) C.R.S. (2016) required only that a parent be present during the advisement and interrogation, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "People in the Interest of A.L.-C." on Justia Law

Petitioner Fritz Schneider appealed when the court of appeals affirmed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault: one for sexual assault of a physically helpless victim and another for "sexual assault by causing submission of a victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will" These charges were based on evidence of a single, continuous penetration of the same victim. The court of appeals upheld the convictions against challenges of jeopardy and merger on grounds petitioner had been convicted of two separate crimes. The appellate court upheld the consecutive sentences on grounds that the sentences were mandated by statute. Petitioner again appealed, arguing the court of appeals erred in its judgment. The Supreme Court concurred in the outcome, if on slightly different grounds. View "Schneider v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christine Griffith filed a complaint against eleven entities and two individuals alleging they injured her father, who was a resident of a nursing home operated by defendant SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Company (d/b/a Belmont Lodge Health Care Center). Plaintiff alleged that her father's injuries eventually caused his death. The individuals and four of nine entities conceded jurisdiction and answered the complaint. Five entities contested jurisdiction, arguing they were nonresident companies not subject to Colorado's jurisdiction. The issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on when a nonresident parent company could be subject to jurisdiction in Colorado based on the activities of its resident subsidiary. The Court held that trial courts had to perform a two-step analysis before concluding a nonresident parent company was subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Because the trial court in this case did not perform that analysis, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co." on Justia Law

Similar to "Colorado v. Johnson," (2016 CO 69 (2016)), at issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. Defendant Brooke Higgins was a juvenile respondent before a magistrate judge. The district attorney requested, and Higgins' then-defense-counsel agreed to, a state administered mental health assessment of Higgins. Because the parties agreed, the magistrate judge ordered the assessment. Later, in front of a trial court, the DA dismissed the juvenile charges against Higgins and charged her as an adult with two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins sought, and the trial court granted, a reverse-transfer hearing to determine whether she should remain in adult court. Before that hearing, Higgins, now represented by different counsel, filed a motion to suppress the mental health assessment and disqualify the trial court judge. The trial court denied both requests, holding that the parties stipulated to the assessment, and there was independent statutory authority for the magistrate judge to order the assessment. Higgins appealed, arguing the trial court lacked authority to order a juvenile-charged-as-an-adult to undergo a mental health assessment for a reverse-transfer hearing. The Supreme Court found that based on the facts of this case, Higgins' arguments, while loosely related to those in "Johnson," were hypothetical and premature. The Court therefore vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Higgins v. Colorado" on Justia Law