At issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. The district attorney directly filed a criminal complaint against defendant Sienna Johnson in trial court, treating her as an adult and charging her with two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant requested a reverse-transfer hearing, and the trial court granted her request. The State appealed, arguing that C.R.S. 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) (the reverse-transfer statute) required a trial court to evaluate the petitioner's mental health. The DA requested access to defendant's mental health and psychological records and requested a court-ordered mental health assessment. Defendant responded that she should not have to produce the records because she had not waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege in her request for a reverse-transfer, and the statute did not give the trial court authority to order an assessment. The trial court ruled in favor of the DA on both counts. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) nothing in the reverse-transfer statute stated that a juvenile waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, so the trial court could not order her to produce her mental records; and (2) nothing in the statute gave the trial court explicit authority to order the mental health assessment. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case's first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a suppression order by the trial court, concluding that the police lawfully stopped defendant Amadeo Chavez-Barragan for failing to drive within a single lane (weaving). Methamphetamine was discovered following the stop, and evidence of the methamphetamine was suppressed. The trial court had not ruled on other issues raised in the suppression motion, so the case was remanded. The trial court found different grounds upon which to base its suppression and again suppressed the evidence. This time, the trial court determined that the seizure that followed the initial stop was unreasonable, and defendant's consent to the search was not voluntary. After review, the Supreme Court again reversed the suppression order. Concluding that the initial stop and detention was reasonable and the consent to search was voluntary. The drugs found should not have been suppressed. View "Colorado v. Chavez-Barragan" on Justia Law

Ryan Ranch was a residential common interest community. The homeowners association filed a complaint against several low owners abutting Ryan Ranch, seeking past-due assessments, penalties and fees for maintenance and services provided by the association. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the abutting owners owed the fees and penalties when it was discovered the developer inadvertently annexed their lots. In a split decision, the court of appeals determined the lots were not validly annexed because the annexation failed to comply with the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act. The Supreme Court agreed that the annexation failed for failure to comply with the CCIOA, and affirmed. View "Ryan Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Countryside Townhome Subdivision was a residential common interest community. The homeowners association for the Subdivision filed a complaint against the developer, seeking over $400,000 in past-due assessments for maintenance of the developer's unsold properties and related common elements. The developer's liability was implicated when its properties became part of the Subdivision under the community's governing instruments and the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act. In a split decision, the court of appeals determined that the community was formed when the document containing the community's covenants and the plat were recorded, and that the developer's properties were brought into the community at that time. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, finding that the mere recordation of the covenants and plat did not create the common interest community. "Rather, the community was created when the developer first subjected the property to the covenants." Because the developer's property could not become part of the community until it was added, and the developer was not otherwise liable for the assessments. View "Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

This case centered on whether a father could use the doctrine of laches to defend against a mother's claim for interest on his child support debt. In the precedential case "Hauck v. Schuck," (353 P.3d 79 (1960)), the Colorado Supreme Court decided laches did not apply to a claim for unpaid child support that accrued within the statutory limitations period. The court of appeals determined in the present case, that laches could not apply to bar one parent's right to collect interest on arrearages owed by the other parent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this matter to address whether laches was an appropriate defense in an interest-collection action, and also to resolve "the arguable tension" in "Hauck." The Court concluded that laches could be asserted as a defense to a claim for interest on child support arrearages, and therefore reversed the court of appeals. View "In re Marriage of Johnson" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law

The Colorado State Patrol gave petitioner Gregory Hoskin a speeding ticket. Hoskin pled not guilty, and the matter went to a bench trial, which ultimately ended against Hoskin. He appealed, and the district court reversed, concluding that the county court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Hoskin when it required him to prove that his speed was reasonable and prudent, thereby violating his due process rights. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the speeding statute (C.R.S. 42-2-1101) created a mandatory rebuttable presumption that did not violate due process. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the county court's judgment that Hoskin was speeding. The Court therefore reversed the district court and remanded the case for reinstatement of the county court's judgment. View "Colorado v. Hoskin" on Justia Law

The facts of this case were similar to those in "Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co.," (2016 CO 60 (2016)). The Supreme Court remanded this case back to the trial court for reconsideration under the test it announced in that case. Here, the Court held that the "Griffith" test applied when an issue arose of whether nonresident parent companies were subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado courts based on the actions of their resident subsidiaries. Plaintiff Khalid Meeks sued ten entities and one individual alleging that the parties injured his mother, a resident of Colonial Columns Nursing Center. Four of ten entities conceded jurisdiction in Colorado; the others argued they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. The nonresident defendants were upstream parent companies of the resident nursing center and the four that conceded jurisdiction. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated the trial court hold a hearing to resolve the disputed jurisdictional facts, and apply the "Griffith" framework. View "Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christine Griffith sued nine entities and two individuals, alleging that they injured her father, who was a resident of a nursing home in Colorado. She alleged her father's injuries eventually caused his death. The individuals and four of the nine entities conceded jurisdiction and answered the complaint. The remaining five entities contested jurisdiction, arguing they were nonresident companies who were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the circumstance under which nonresident parent companies could be haled into Colorado courts based on the activities of their resident subsidiaries. The Colorado Supreme Court held that in order for a Colorado court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident parent company, the trial court will analyze: (1) whether it may pierce the corporate veil and impute the resident subsidiary's contacts to the parent; and if the veil was pierced, the trial court will analyze (2) all of the subsidiary's contacts to determine whether jurisdiction comports with due process. If the trial court cannot pierce the corporate veil, then it shall treat each entity separately and analyze only the contacts that the parent company has with the state. Because the trial court did not perform this two-step analysis when it determined petitioners were subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado, the Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to perform that analysis. View "Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co." on Justia Law

Upon obtaining information that Steven Bleck was suicidal and possibly armed, officers with the Alamosa Police Department, including petitioner Jeffrey Martinez, entered Bleck’s hotel room. Bleck did not respond to the officers’ command to show his hands and lie down on the floor. Martinez approached him, and, without holstering his weapon, attempted to subdue him. In the process, the firearm discharged, injuring Bleck. As relevant here, Bleck brought suit against Martinez in federal court, alleging excessive force and a state law battery claim. The federal court granted summary judgment and dismissed Bleck’s federal claim, concluding that there was no evidence that the shooting was intentional. After the federal district court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state law battery claim, Bleck refiled the claim in state district court. Martinez then moved to dismiss the state law claims against him, arguing he was immune from suit and that his actions were not "willful and wanton." The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Martinez should have known the situation would have been dangerous by not holstering his weapon prior to subduing Bleck. The court of appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and did not consider Martinez' claim that the trial court applied the wrong "willful and wanton" standard before deciding his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court applied the wrong standard, and that the court of appeals erred in not hearing the appeal. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred by not determining all issues relating to Martinez' immunity claim. View "Martinez v. Estate of Bleck" on Justia Law