The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this matter to determine whether the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a potential juror who was an employee of a privately owned and operated prison. The court of appeals held that because the private prison used "sovereign police powers characteristic of law enforcement in the service of the public interest," it was a "public law enforcement agency" as used by statute. The appellate court concluded the trial court should have sustained the defendant's challenge for cause. The Supreme Court found that under the plain language of 16-10-103(1)(k) C.R.S. 2015, a private company that operates a prison was not a "public law enforcement agency" because it was not a division of a state or federal government that has the authority to investigate crimes or to arrest, prosecute or detain criminals. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Bonvicini" on Justia Law

The issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this case required an interpretation of the statute that provided for challenges for cause to potential jurors in criminal cases. Specifically, the issue involved the scope of the provision that directed trial courts to sustain a challenge to a potential juror who was a "compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency." Petitioner Samuel Mulberger brought a challenge to a juror who worked as a nurse for the El Paso County Jail. The nurse was paid by a governmental contractor, but was not a compensated employee of the jail. Mulberger used a peremptory challenge to dismiss the potential juror and ultimately exhausted all of his challenges. The jury found Mulberger guilty, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Mulberger argued the trial court erred in concluding the contract-employee was not an employee of the public law enforcement agency, and that the trial court erroneously denied his challenge for cause, then exhausted his challenges to remove the juror. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Mulberger v. Colorado" on Justia Law

During jury selection in this civil case, plaintiff challenged a juror for cause. The trial court denied the challenge, and in response, plaintiff exercised one of his peremptory challenges to excuse the juror. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's challenge, reversed and remanded for a new trial without examining whether the error was harmless. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded. As the Court detailed in "Colorado v. Novotny," (320 P.3d 1194 (2014)), the automatic reversal rule in the criminal context rested on the assumption that impairment of the ability to shape the jury through peremptory challenges affected a "substantial right," and amounted to a due process violation. Such impairment was per se reversible and not subject to harmless error review. "[H]owever, subsequent developments in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence wiped away the foundations of that assumption, suggesting that an error regarding the ability to shape the jury is not a due process violation, and would affect a substantial right only if it substantially affected the outcome of the trial." The Court overruled Colorado cases to the contrary and held that allowing a civil litigant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized, or than available to and exercised by the opposing party, does not, by itself, require automatic reversal. Reviewing courts must determine whether the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case in accordance with the civil harmless error rule. View "Newman, LLC v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The issue centered on whether the City of Englewood's Ordinance 34 (effectively barring sex offenders from residing within the city) was preempted by Colorado law. The federal district court in this case concluded that such a conflict did exist because Colorado had generally opted for a policy of individualized treatment of sex offenders, and the ordinance acted as a bar to residency. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the federal district court and found no conflict. With no conflict between state law and the ordinance, the Colorado Court concluded Ordinance 34 was not preempted. The case was returned to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings. View "Ryals v. City of Englewood" on Justia Law

Petitioner Salvador Esquivel-Castillo appealed the court of appeals decision to affirm his conviction for felony murder. A jury acquitted him of a separate count of kidnapping, but convicted him of felony murder for a death caused during his commission or attempted commission of kidnapping the same victim, during the same charged timeframe, by a different statutorily qualifying act of kidnapping. The appellate court rejected petitioner's assertion that a more specific kidnapping charge necessarily limited the scope of the more generally-charged felony murder county to a charge of death caused in the court of or in furtherance of the commission of kidnapping by seizing and carrying the victim from one place to another, resulting in his having been convicted of a crime with which he had never been charged. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed: the crime of kidnapping alleged more generally as an element of felony murder was not limited to the specific alternative act of kidnapping alleged in the separate kidnapping count, and therefore jury instructions as to all statutory forms of kidnapping supported by the evidence did not constructively amend the felony murder charge. View "Esquivel-Castillo v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review stemmed from a medical malpractice action, and whether, as a matter of law, a known suicidal patient admitted to the secure mental health unit of a hospital and place under high risk precautions, could be subject to a comparative negligence defense when the patient attempted suicide while in the hospital's custody. P.W. sued Children's Hospital both individually and as conservator of his son K.W., who was in a minimally conscious state after an unsuccessful attempt to kill himself by hanging while at the Hospital. The trial court granted P.W.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Hospital's comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses. The trial court also issued an order preventing the Hospital from obtaining K.W.'s pre-incident mental health records. The Hospital petitioned the Supreme Court to review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s mental health records; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s treating psychiatrist's records when they were a part of a continuing course of treatment that included Children's Hospital; and (3) whether the trial court erred in granting P.W. summary judgment dismissing the comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses despite evidence K.W. could think rationally and protect himself from harm during the hospitalization. The Supreme Court concluded that the Hospital could not assert comparative negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of law, and that it did not need to address the trial court's discovery order. View "P.W. v. Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether dissatisfied beneficiaries of a testator’s estate have standing to bring legal malpractice or claims against the attorney who drafted the testator’s estate planning documents. Specifically, petitioners Merridy Kay Baker and Sue Carol Kunda sought to sue respondents Wood, Ris & Hames, Professional Corporation, Donald L. Cook, and Barbara Brundin (collectively, the Attorneys), who were the attorneys retained by their father, Floyd Baker, to prepare his estate plan. Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to abandon what was known as the "strict privity rule," which precluded attorney liability to non-clients absent fraud, malicious conduct or negligent misrepresentation. The advocated instead for a "California Test" and for an extension of the third-party beneficiary theory of contract liability (also known as the Florida-Iowa Rule), both of which petitioners asserted would allow them as the alleged beneficiaries of the estate, to sue the Attorneys for legal malpractice and breach of contract. After review of this case, the Supreme Court declined to abandon the strict privity rule, and rejected petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred in affirming dismissal of their purported fraudulent concealment claims. View "Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames" on Justia Law

Respondent Larry Marquardt was committed to the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP) in 2013 after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon and assault on an at-risk adult. He was diagnosed with "schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, with prominent paranoia." Respondent took ten milligrams of an antipsychotic medication once daily, but refused to take more because of a fear of the side effects, namely tardive dyskinesia. The State petitioned to have the dosage increased to a maximum of twenty milligrams daily, because respondent's psychiatrist felt that ten milligrams was only partially effective. A trial court found that the increased dosage was "necessary to prevent a significant long-term deterioration in his mental condition." The court observed that because of respondent's mental illness and insanity plea, he would never be released from the institution unless his condition improved, and concluded that respondent's need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to override "any bona fide and legitimate interest of [Marquardt] in refusing treatment." The court ordered respondent to submit to the increased dose. Respondent appealed, arguing the trial court misapplied the controlling case law precedent to his case. "Colorado v. Medina," (705 P.2d 961 (1985)) outlined the rule that courts had to follow before ordering a patient to be forcibly medicated. In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the "Medina" rule applied to petitions to increase the dose of a medication over a patient's objection. Further, the Court held that if the patient was stable, a lack of improvement, without more, did not satisfy Medina's requirement that the patient be at risk of significant and likely long-term deterioration. View "Colorado v. Marquardt" on Justia Law

The State appealed a court of appeals' judgment that vacated Kenneth Childress' conviction of vehicular assault while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Though it was undisputed that Childress was not driving the vehicle at issue, the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty as a complicitor. The appellate court concluded that because vehicular assault while under the influence was a strict liability offense, no culpable mental state of the driver was required, and that the Colorado Supreme Court previously held complicitor liability inapplicable to crimes lacking a culpable mental state requirement. After review, the Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals' judgment, clarified complicitor liability. The case was remanded for a determination of whether the jury was adequately instructed in light of the Court's holding. View "Colorado v. Childress" on Justia Law

A jury found petitioner John Doubleday guilty of felony murder despite finding him not guilty (based on the affirmative defense of duress) of the charged predicate offense. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and Doubleday appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that to establish that a defendant committed a predicate offense within the meaning of the Colorado felony murder statute, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the predicate offense, including the inapplicability of any properly asserted affirmative defense to the predicate offense. View "Doubleday v. People" on Justia Law