Defendant Terrence Gibbons was charged with theft by receiving and perjury for claiming ownership over a stolen jet ski and trailer, and having signed temporary permits. At trial, his defense was that he did not know the jet ski and trailer were stolen. The trial court received a question from the jury, asking what would happen if all jurors did not reach a unanimous decision. Both parties agreed that the trial court should give the jury a modified-Allen instruction. After giving the instruction, the jury returned, finding Gibbons guilty on both counts. On appeal, Gibbons argued the trial court erred by not including along with the modified-Allen instruction, an explanation of what would happen if the jury was deadlocked. Gibbons cited "Colorado v. Raglin," (21 P.3d 419 (Colo. App. 2000)). The Supreme Court overruled "Raglin" and held that the trial court was not required to provide a mistrial advisement when giving a modified-Allen instruction. "The trial court has discretion to instruct a deadlocked jury about the possibility of a mistrial when, considering the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given, the instruction will not have a coercive effect on the jury." View "Gibbons v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed actions of the Title Board in setting title and ballot title and submission clauses for initiative 2013-2014 #89. Proponents complained that the titles did not contain one subject or that the title was not clear. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Title Board. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #89" on Justia Law

Defendant-petitioner Ricardo Sanchez appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing, inter alia, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to New Mexico police shortly after his arrest, in violation of his Miranda rights. Specifically, he objected that he was not advised of those rights, and did not understand he would not ultimately be obligated to pay for an appointed attorney. The court of appeals rejected petitioner's argument, concluding that the advisement he received concerning his right to appointed counsel was sufficient to convey that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be provided free of charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State appealed a trial court order that suppressed statements defendant-appellee N.A.S. made to police. The trial court found that N.A.S. was in custody when he made the statements, he did not waive his Miranda rights "knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently," and that the statements were involuntary. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in the totality of the circumstances of this case, N.A.S. was not in custody when he made his statements, and that he spoke voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. N.A.S." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether summary judgment was ever appropriate in dependency and neglect adjudications involving prospective harm. The Court of Appeals held a trial court could never grant summary judgment because reasonable minds could always draw differing inferences from the evidence. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that when the underlying material facts are undisputed, reasonable minds could reach one inference based on the specific facts of the case. Therefore, the Court held that trial courts must evaluate whether summary judgment is appropriate in a dependency and neglect adjudication involving prospective harm on a case-by-case basis. View "Colorado in Interest of S.N." on Justia Law

A search of respondent Joddy Carbajal's home led to the discovery of three firearms. Respondent had been previously convicted of a felony, and was charged with three counts of possession of a weapon by a previous offender (POWPO). At trial, respondent raised as an affirmative defense that he possessed the weapons to defend his home, person and property. Over respondent's objection, the trial court modified the stock jury instruction regarding that affirmative defense, and instructed the jury that respondent must have possessed the weapons to defend against what he "reasonably believed to be a threat of imminent harm." Respondent was convicted by the jury on two of the three counts. The court of appeals reversed, finding the defense did not require a "reasonable belief." The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the trial court did not err in its jury instruction. View "Colorado v. Carbajal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed actions of the Title Board in setting titles and ballot title and submission clauses for initiatives 2013-2014 90 and 93. Proponents complained that the titles did not contain one subject or fairly reflect the purpose of the proposed initiatives. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #90 and #93" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed actions of the Title Board in setting titles and ballot title and submission clauses for initiatives 2013-2014 85, 86 and 87. Proponents complained that the titles did not contain one subject or fairly reflect the purpose of the proposed initiatives. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #85, #86, and #87" on Justia Law

After the Title Board set titles and submission clauses for Proposed Initiative 2013-2014 #103, petitioners moved for a rehearing, claiming the initiative contained more than one subject and was impermissibly vague. One of the initiative's representatives was unable to attend the rehearing. The Secretary of State's office suggested that a designated representative withdraw and a substitute alternate attend the hearing. The Title Board allowed the substitution and proceeded to deny the petitioner's motion. On appeal, petitioners argued that the proposed initiative still contained too many subjects and was impermissibly vague. Furthermore, the argued the Title Board did not have authority to allow the substitute representative. The Supreme Court agreed that the Title Board's approval of the substitute was improper. Therefore, the Court reversed the Title Board's action and remanded the case back to the Board without decision on claims that the initiative addressed more than one subject or was vague. View "In re Proposed Initiative 2013-2014 #103" on Justia Law

Sir Mario Owens and Robert Ray petitioned the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction for relief from a series of discovery rulings of the district court in their respective death-penalty cases relating to post-conviction proceedings. Each moved to discover the prosecution's investigation of claims raised by Owens' motion for post-conviction review, on grounds that disclosure was required by the state rules of criminal procedure or the federal and state constitutions. The district court held that Crim. P. 16 did not impose obligations on the prosecution with respect to its preparation to meet defendants' post-conviction claims, but that the prosecution did have obligations to disclose information that was both exculpatory and constitutionally material. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in finding it inapplicable to information acquired in response to defendants' post-conviction claims. However, because the Court had not previously held that only a prosecutor's constitutional obligation to disclose extended through the appeal of a death sentence, the district court should order disclosure of some possibly exculpatory material despite being unable to find a reasonable probability that nondisclosure would change the result of the proceedings. The cases were remanded for the district court to review defendants' constitutional claims. View "In re Colorado v. Owens " on Justia Law