Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Joseph Lucero was convicted of crimes connected to several break-ins in August and September 2000, including three counts of theft and one count of first degree burglary. In review of this case, the Supreme Court applied several of its earlier decisions, and merged the three theft convictions into one, and vacated the first degree burglary conviction. As the Court held in "Roberts v. People," the General Assembly required all thefts committed by the same person within a six-month period prior to 2009 to be joined and prosecuted as a single theft. The court therefore corrected Defendant's sentence. Furthermore, the Court applied its holding in "Montez v. Colorado," holding that the General Assembly has provided that a firearm is not a deadly weapon per se for the purposes of the first degree burglary statute. As in "Montez," the prosecution in this case conceded that if firearms are not per se deadly weapons, Defendant's conviction could not stand. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's first degree burglary conviction. View "Lucero v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Revoal was charged with one count of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana in an amount less than five pounds after an investigatory stop and "Terry" frisk revealed marijuana and a scale containing marijuana residue. At the time of the stop, the police were aware that: (1) it was 11:30 p.m.; (2) robberies had recently occurred in the area; (3) Defendant was standing on the side of a closed sandwich shop; (4) Defendant walked to the side of an open liquor store, then walked toward the back of the liquor store, where it was dark; and (5) Defendant turned and walked away from the investigating officer when he saw the patrol vehicle. The trial court suppressed the marijuana evidence on the basis that these facts did not give the investigating officer reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that the facts and circumstances the officer knew at the time of the intrusion, viewed either individually or in conjunction with each other, did not amount under the "totality of the circumstances" to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the officer's investigatory stop. View "Colorado v. Revoal" on Justia Law

In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a magistrate's order suppressing certain statements made by the juvenile during a police interrogation. Because the magistrate's suppression order was never reviewed and adopted (with or without modification) by the district court before the appeal was filed, the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. View "Colorado v. S.X.G." on Justia Law

In an arbitration proceeding between Respondent SunOpta Grains and Foods Inc. (SunOpta) and Colorado Mills, LLC, an arbitrator, at SunOpta's request, issued subpoenas to petitioners SK Food International and Adams Vegetable Oil, Inc. SK Food and Adams were not parties to the underlying arbitration. Neither company was incorporated in Colorado, was registered as a foreign corporation in Colorado, or maintained a principal office in Colorado. The subpoenas, which requested business records, were served on SK Food and Adams at their places of business in California and North Dakota. When SK Food and Adams refused to comply with the arbitration subpoenas, SunOpta asked the district court to enforce them. The district court issued an order enforcing the subpoenas.In response, SK Food and Adams filed a petition for a rule to show cause, which the Supreme Court issued. The nonparties appealed the district court's order enforcing the subpoenas. The Supreme Court held that Colorado courts, as a matter of state sovereignty, have no authority to enforce civil subpoenas against out-of-state nonparties. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's enforcement order, and remanded case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Colorado Mills, LLC v. SunOpta Grains and Foods Inc." on Justia Law

Acting on a petition filed by the child's father, the Arapahoe County District Court assumed jurisdiction to modify a Maryland child custody order on the grounds that neither the child nor the child's parents "currently resided" in Maryland. Petitioner George Brandt and his child lived in Colorado, and Respondent Christine Brandt lived in Texas. Respondent sought relief from the Colorado court order. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court failed to apply the appropriate standard of review when assuming jurisdiction to modify the Maryland child custody order. The operative statutory term "presently reside" is not equivalent to "currently reside" or "physical presence." Accordingly, the Court reversed and vacated the district court's order assuming jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Brandt" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Christopher Strimple with possession of an explosive or incendiary device and other crimes after a police search of the home he shared with his common law wife. Police responded to the home when Gabriele Thompson complained of domestic abuse. When police arrived, Defendant refused to let them in, threatened to kill officers if they entered, and engaged officers in a tense stand-off for nearly forty-five minutes. He ultimately surrendered peacefully, and police took him into custody. Thompson consented to an additional search during which the police discovered knives, a pipe bomb and drug paraphernalia. The trial court suppressed this evidence on the basis that, during the stand-off, Defendant had refused consent for entry into the home. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Thompson validly gave her consent to the second warrantless search because Defendant was no longer physically present and the police did not remove him from the scene in order to avoid his objection to the search. View "Colorado v. Strimple" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Mumford challenged his conviction for possession of one gram or less of cocaine, arguing, among other things, that an incriminating statement he made to a law enforcement officer should have been suppressed because it was obtained without proper warnings under "Miranda v. Arizona" (384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of "Miranda" at the time he made the statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances at the time he made the incriminating statement, a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have felt deprived of his freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest. View "Mumford v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Riley challenged the court of appeals' affirmance of his convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter, reckless second degree assault, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer. Defendant was charged stemming from a verbal confrontation at a store in early 2006 with Nisa Peelman, after Peelman allegedly touched Defendant in an inappropriate way. Defendant left the store. Shortly thereafter, Peelman and her brother, Gabriel Velasquez, walked out. Velasquez and Defendant exchanged words and began physically wrestling when the argument became more hostile. During the tussle, Velasquez told Peelman to "grab the heat from the truck." Defendant believed that the term "heat" meant a gun. He then pulled out a small knife from his pocket and "swung it" at Velasquez, hitting Velasquez in the neck, but failing to damage any vital structures. The court of appeals, relying on its interpretation of "People v. Jones," (675 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1984)), concluded that the trial court erred when it declined to submit Defendant's suggested "multiple assailants" instruction to the jury. The court of appeals determined, however, that the error was harmless. It thus affirmed Defendant's convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err when it rejected Defendant's "multiple assailants" instruction because "Jones" did not require the instruction in this instance. View "Riley v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This appeal came from a judgment and decree of the water court and the Alamosa County District Court in two consolidated cases. The combination of the two involved an amended plan for water management adopted by Special Improvement District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District (Subdistrict). Several parties objected to the approval of the Subdistrict's plan for ground water management. After two trials, the trial court determined the Plan to be "conceptually compatible" with the legal requirements of ground water management plans and the intent of the legislature in enacting SB 04-222. Among a series of findings, it found that (1) the Plan properly sought to stabilize the storage level of the unconfined aquifer at a "sustainable" level; and (2) the strategies proposed to meet that goal were reasonable and supported by the evidence. However, the trial court sent the Plan back to the Subdistrict board of managers and District board of directors for "further consideration and amendment because it lack[ed] detail, grant[ed] discretion with no guidance, fail[ed] to acknowledge the replacement of injurious depletions as a priority, and simply is not a 'comprehensive and detailed plan'" as required by statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Plan as approved and decreed, adequately addressed the replacement of well depletions that injure adjudicated senior surface water rights, along with restoring and maintaining sustainable aquifer levels in accordance with the applicable statutes. "The Subdistrict bears the burden of going forward and the burden of proof to demonstrate that annual replacement plans prevent material injury to adjudicated senior surface water rights caused by ongoing and past well depletions that have future impact." The Court affirmed the water court and Alamosa County District Court's decisions. View "In re Subdistrict No. 1" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' determination that Thomas Banner's assignment of his voting rights and right to receive distributions to Plaintiff Elizabeth Condo was ineffective because it violated an anti-assignment clause in the "Hut at Avon, LLC’s" (Hut Group) operating agreement. Plaintiff brought a tort action against the other members of the Hut Group, Thomas Conners and George Roberts, and the attorney who allegedly assisted them in purchasing Banner's membership interest in the Hut Group. She claimed that Defendants' purchase of Banner's membership interest tortiously interfered with his prior assignment to her and that that interference amounted to civil conspiracy because it was intended to destroy the value of her assignment. The Supreme Court held that the attempted assignment of the member's right to receive distributions and effective transfer of voting rights was invalid because it was made without the consent of the other members of the LLC, in violation of the anti-assignment clause in the operating agreement. Furthermore, because the Colorado LLC statute evinced a preference for the freedom of contract, the Court held that the anti-assignment clause at issue here rendered each LLC member powerless to make an assignment without the consent of all members and therefore was without any legal effect. View "Condo v. Conners" on Justia Law