Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Colorado’s sexual assault statutes authorize the possibility of greater punishments for sexual crimes against children that are committed "as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse." Two cases, "Colorado v. Simon" and "Colorado v. Tillery" were consolidated for the Supreme Court's review in that they both involve interpretation of Section C.R.S. 18-3-405.3. The common issue presented by these cases was whether the statutory provisions and principles of double jeopardy permit only one class 3 felony conviction and sentence for a single "pattern" of abuse that comprises two or more incidents of sexual assault, or whether each separate act of sexual assault that composes a single "pattern" of abuse which may be elevated to a class 3 felony. In "Simon," one division of the court of appeals held that section 18-3-405.3(2)(b) and double jeopardy principles prohibit the trial court from entering multiple class 3 convictions and sentences for Simon’s ten counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, where those acts composed a single pattern of abuse against one victim. In "Tillery," a different division of the appellate court disagreed with the reasoning in "Simon." Finding no double jeopardy violation, the court upheld Tillery's class 3 convictions under 18-3-405(2)(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court held that these statutes unambiguously allow each separately charged incident of sexual assault to be elevated to a class 3 felony, where each incident is committed as part of a pattern of sexual abuse. Furthermore, the Court held that these statutes, construed according to their plain language, do not violate the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments under either the U.S. or the Colorado Constitution. View "Colorado v. Simon" on Justia Law

In this joint opinion, the Supreme Court addressed two direct appeals from the same water court proceedings. Meridian Service Metropolitan District's motion to intervene in a declaratory judgment action between Cherokee Metropolitan District and Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District (UBS) was denied by the water court. Meridian appealed the water court’s ruling to the Supreme Court. However, while Meridian’s appeal was pending, the declaratory judgment proceedings continued without Meridian’s participation, and the water court entered an order granting UBS's motion for declaratory judgment. Cherokee then appealed that order to the Supreme Court. The underlying water action began in 1998 as litigation between Cherokee and UBS over Cherokee’s water rights in the UBS basin. In 1999, Cherokee and UBS settled the litigation by entering a Stipulation and Release. In 2003, Cherokee and Meridian entered into an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) to build a new wastewater treatment facility. According to the IGA, wastewater from both Cherokee and Meridian would be treated at the facility, and the return flows would go back into the UBS basin. Upon learning of the Cherokee/Meridian Replacement Plan Application in late 2008, UBS filed a statement of objection with the Colorado Ground Water Commission and moved to dismiss the Replacement Plan Application. Meridian moved to intervene as of right in the underlying water action between UBS and Cherokee to challenge both the preliminary injunction and the motion for declaratory judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s order denying Meridian’s motion to intervene, and vacated the water court's order granting declaratory judgment. View "Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist." on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge a district court's suppression of evidence seized from the trunk of the Defendant Brittney Coates' vehicle. Upon discovering a bindle and single prescription pill in the driver's pants pocket, the police arrested the driver, placed him in their patrol car, and searched the vehicle. The district court found that the police lacked any reasonable and articulable basis to search Defendant's trunk incident to the arrest of the driver in accordance with "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)), and that they also lacked probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle's trunk pursuant to the automobile exception. The Supreme Court affirmed. It held, however, that because the evidence for which suppression was sought was not seized from the passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle, the search-incident-to-arrest exception could not justify its seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that it was able to determine from the district court's findings of fact that the police lacked probable cause to search Defendant's vehicle, whether or not they would have been justified in searching the passenger compartment on less than probable cause. View "Colorado v. Coates" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court involved orders of the District Court for Water Division No. 2 regarding the administration of water on Alvarado Creek in Custer County. Applicants-Appellants Catherine and Peter LoPresti and Opposers-Appellants City of Fountain and Widefield Water and Sanitation District claimed the water court erred in voiding a rotational no-call agreement titled the "Beardsley Decree." Opposers-Appellees John Brandenburg, Douglas and Nancy Brandon, Dilley Family Trust, James D. Hood, Ronald Keyston, Arlie Riggs, Schneider Enterprises, Inc., Dr. Charles Schneider, and Mund Shaikly argued that the Beardsley Decree was an improperly noticed change in water rights, and as such the water court correctly declared it void. The Supreme Court held that the Beardsley Decree was a valid rotational no-call agreement because, and by its plain language, it did not sanction a change in water rights. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the water court. View "LoPresti v. Brandenburg" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a claim under Colorado law for civil theft of a copyrightable work required a trial court to instruct the jury on principles of federal copyright law. Petitioner Steward Software hired Respondent Richard Kopcho to develop and market a new software program. Steward never entered into a written agreement governing the ownership of the software with Holonyx, Inc. (one of Respondent's multiple corporate entities) or Respondent. By the time the software was ready for testing, the relationship between the parties had become strained. Steward refused to make further payments and under Respondent's direction, Holonyx locked Steward out of the software code and refused to turn it over. Holonyx then filed a copyright registration for the software with the U.S. Copyright Office, listing the software's author a new corporation Respondent controlled called Ruffdogs Software, Inc. Steward sued Respondent for breach of contract and civil theft. Before trial, the parties tendered proposed jury instructions; one of Steward's proposed instructions pertained to the ownership and registration of copyrightable works. The trial court determined that copyright law did not pertain to Steward's civil theft claim and rejected the tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that ownership of the copyright in the code was irrelevant. The Court thus concluded the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the principles of copyright law. The court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's opinion. View "Steward Software Co. v. Kopcho" on Justia Law

Petitioner Monica Vickery sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed a district court's reduction of exemplary damages in her defamation suit against the mother and sister of her deceased husband in "Vickery v. Vickery," (2010 WL 963204 (Colo. App. March 18, 2010)). Both the district court and court of appeals understood section 13-21-102 C.R.S. (2011) to limit Petitioner's exemplary damages to an amount equal to the compensatory damages figure returned by the jury, before any adjustment for prejudgment interest. But the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, disagreeing with its interpretation of section 13-21-102. The Supreme Court found that "the amount of the actual damages awarded," to which "reasonable exemplary damages" are statutorily limited, refers not to the jury's assessment of total compensatory damages but to the compensatory damages awarded against the defendant as the direct result of that assessment, which necessarily includes statutorily mandated prejudgment interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vickery v. Evans" on Justia Law

This case arose from a pending medical malpractice case from the Denver district court. Plaintiff Ernest Ortega sued Defendants Dr. David Lieuwen and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado (Kaiser) alleging negligent medical treatment given to him in 2007. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his request for a protective order to cover his electronic medical records encompassing a ten-year period preceding the incident underlying this case. The trial court determined that Plaintiff's electronic medical records were not protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the records were relevant to prepare a defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Plaintiff's medical records were not protected as privileged and that Defendants could use unredacted copies of all of Plaintiff's medical records. View "Ortega v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court's order that granted Defendant Wal-Mart Stores a new trial based on a purportedly untimely disclosure and a jury verdict that allegedly was not supported by the evidence and instead was the result of prejudice. In 2007 Petitioner Holly Averyt, a commercial truck driver, slipped in grease while making a delivery to a Wal-Mart Store in Greeley. As a result of her fall, Petitioner's injuries ended her career as a truck driver and left her unable to perform many daily functions. Petitioner sued Wal-Mart, alleging claims of negligence and premises liability. During discovery, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought to obtain records from Wal-Mart documenting the grease spill. Despite Wal-Mart's persistent denial of the grease spill, Petitioner's attorney continued to seek evidence to verify its existence. While Wal-Mart was making its opening statement and claiming that there had been no grease spill, Petitioner's attorney received an email on his mobile telephone containing a memorandum referencing a grease spill and a related investigation and cleanup at a different Greeley Wal-Mart. During a recess at trial, Wal-Mart's attorney asked Petitioner's attorney whether he had been reading from a document when he questioned a witness. Petitioner's attorney then gave Wal-Mart's attorney a copy of the report. After this exchange, and before Wal-Mart began cross-examining the witness, Wal-Mart objected outside the presence of the jury to Petitioner's use of the report during direct examination. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's award was supported by substantial evidence, and was not the result of prejudice, finding that the report in question was one available to both parties. The Court refused to reverse the jury's award and grant a new trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order. View "In re Averyt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that Defendant BP America Production Company (BP) improperly deducted postproduction costs from royalty payments due between January 1986 and December 1997. To toll the applicable six-year statute of limitations, Plaintiffs claimed that BP fraudulently concealed material facts which gave rise to their claims. The trial court certified the class, and the appellate court affirmed. BP then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) proof of fraudulent concealment was inherently individualized, and not amenable to resolution on a class basis; and, (2) the class time period was overly broad and as a result, includes members who had no costs deducted under the "netback" methodology. BP thus argued that the trial court erred in certifying the class. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with either of BP's arguments, and affirmed the trial court's certification of the class. View "BP America Prod. Co. v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals' ruling that the Article X, Section 20 of the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 1) required statewide voter approval each time the Colorado Department of Revenue calculated an increase in the amount of tax due per ton of coal extracted as directed by the formula codified in C.R.S. 39-29-106. After Amendment 1 went into effect, the Department suspended using the tax mechanism for calculating upward adjustments in the amount of coal severance tax owed based on inflation. Following an auditor's review in 2006, an Attorney General's opinion and a rule-making proceedings, the Department recommended applying the statute to calculate the tax due. Implementation resorted in a tax of $0.76 per ton of coal as compared to $0.56 per ton collected in 1992 when Amendment 1 first passed. The Colorado Mining Association and taxpayer coal companies filed an action challenging collection of the $0.76 per ton amount. Colorado Mining asserted that whenever the Department calculated an upward adjustment in the amount of tax due under the statute, it must obtain voter approval. The Court of Appeals agreed, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the Department's implementation of section 39-29-106 was not a tax increase, but a "non-discretionary duty required by a pre-Amendment 1 taxing statute which did not require voter approval." Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which held that the Department must implement the statute as written. View "Huber v. Colo. Mining Ass'n" on Justia Law