Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Consumers brought a class action against ten automobile dealerships operating under the "Medved" name and their owner John Medved, alleging violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). Plaintiffs alleged that Medved's sales documents failed to disclose the price and existence of various dealer-added aftermarket products, injuring Plaintiffs who paid for those products. Plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: one which included customers who paid for the add-ons but that were never installed, and another class for those who paid for the add-ons but who were unaware of them due to Medved's sales documents. The trial court determined that Plaintiffs could prove causation and injury in their CCPA claims with circumstantial evidence. However, the trial court did not consider whether the individual evidence presented by Medved rebutted the class-wide inferences of causation and injury which was crucial to certification of both classes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by not rigorously analyzing the evidence presented by Medved to refute Plaintiffs' theories of liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further analysis to determine "to its satisfaction whether Plaintiffs could establish causation and injury. View "Garcia v. Medved Chevrolet, Inc" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case pertained to the standards a trial court applies when it decides whether to certify a class pursuant to C.R.C.P. 23. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' rulings: that the trial court must apply a "preponderance of the evidence" standard to C.R.C.P. 23's requirements, that the trial court must resolve factual or legal disputes dispositive of class certification regardless of any overlap with the merits, and that the trial court must resolve expert disputes regardless of any overlap with the merits. The Court also concluded that the trial court rigorously analyzed the evidence in determining that Plaintiffs in this case established an identifiable class and satisfied C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3)'s "predominance" requirement. View "Jackson v. Unocal Corp" on Justia Law

The class certification issue presented in this case arose from a dispute concerning the payment of medical bills under the Colorado Automobile Accident Reparations Act (No-Fault Act). Plaintiffs Pauline Reyher and Dr. Wallace Brucker filed suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) alleging that it failed to pay full, reasonable amounts in medical expenses in violation of the No-Fault Act and its own contracts. Plaintiffs subsequently moved to certify two classes that included all insureds and providers, respectively, who submitted medical bills to State Farm and were reimbursed for less than the full amounts. The trial court denied the motion for certification on grounds that Plaintiffs failed (among other things) to establish the "predominance" requirement. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case to enter an order certifying the class. State Farm appealed, arguing that the appellate court's finding of "predominance" was made in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and reversed the appellate court. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reyher" on Justia Law

The State petitioned the Supreme Court for review of an appellate court's judgment that affirmed two in limine evidentiary rulings in a prosecution for sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. The district court excluded testimony concerning the recantation of Defendant Mark Gabriesheski's step-daughter (the alleged victim). At trial, testimony by the victim's guardian ad litem appointed in a parallel dependency and neglect proceeding was ruled privileged under the attorney-client privilege. In addition, the trial court held that testimony by a social worker involved in the dependency and neglect proceeding could not be used without Defendant's consent (pursuant to Colorado law). The prosecutor conceded the victim's inability to go forward, and the case was dismissed. The appellate court concluded that Colorado law gave it jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal, but affirmed the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part the appellate court's decisions. The Court found the appellate court had jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal, but disapproved of its conclusions with regard to both evidentiary rulings. Because a child subject to a dependency and neglect proceeding is not a "client" of the guardian ad litem, the attorney-client privilege did not apply. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court misapplied Colorado law pertaining to the social worker's testimony, and accordingly failed to make sufficient findings to satisfy the statutory requirement that the statements at issue be made in compliance of that statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Gabriesheski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed a judge disqualification issue raised by the appellate court's decision to reverse and remand an order that terminated the parental rights of Respondent, C.M. (Mother). In its review of the termination hearing, the court of appeals held that the trial judge should have recused himself on the grounds that his clerk was the mother of a material witness in the case. Although the court of appeals held that the judge should have been disqualified, Mother’s lateness in filing the motion for disqualification prompted the court to conclude that Mother may have waived her right to move for disqualification. According to the court of appeals, the question of whether Mother had waived the disqualification issue turned on whether her counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the motion for disqualification. Reasoning that Mother could not be bound by waiver if she had in fact received ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of appeals remanded for additional findings about counsel’s performance. The court then directed the chief judge of the district to transfer the case to himself or to a senior judge for the proceedings on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the transfer: "[w]ithout deciding what is required to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the supreme court acknowledges that, at the least, an allegation of prejudice is necessary. Moreover, the court holds that when an ineffective assistance claim is premised on counsel’s failure to file a motion for disqualification, the prejudice element cannot be satisfied without an allegation that the judge was actually biased. Because the respondent’s motion for disqualification was entirely based on an appearance of impropriety, rather than a claim of actual bias, it failed to satisfy the prejudice element." The Court held that Mother's motion was untimely and should not have been granted. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado ex rel. A.G" on Justia Law

The State appealed the reversal of Respondent Jerad Pickering's conviction for reckless manslaughter. The court of appeals held that the trial court's self-defense jury instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent acted recklessly. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's instruction did not shift the State's burden, and accordingly reversed the court of appeals' judgment and overruled contrary rules announced in "People v. Lara" and "People v. Taylor." View "Colorado v. Pickering" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found that Respondent J.L.B. (Father) had abandoned A.B. (Child) and that therefore the Child was available for adoption by Petitioner D.P.H. (Stepfather). The juvenile court also determined that the fact that Father had filed parenting-time motions in the dissolution court did not outweigh overwhelming evidence of abandonment, including the fact that Father had not seen the Child in the twenty-one months prior to the filing of the adoption proceeding. Father appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed. The court determined that a finding of abandonment was precluded by the fact that Father had filed motions for parenting time in the dissolution court. The court also concluded that the juvenile court should have delayed the adoption determination until the parenting-time motions were resolved. Upon review of the case by the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the "[i]t is the trial court's responsibility to consider the totality of the circumstances and to make this factual determination, which is to be disturbed only if it is clearly erroneous. ...It was therefore error for the court of appeals to determine that a single circumstance (the father's filing of a parenting-time motion) precluded a finding of intent to abandon, essentially as a matter of law." In addition, the Court found it was unnecessary for a trial court to delay adoption proceedings until a parenting-time motion in another court is resolved, so long as the trial court adequately considered the parenting-time motion in making its abandonment determination. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.P.H. v. J.L.B" on Justia Law

Defendant Gerald Lewis appealed his convictions and sentences for a number of offenses including three counts each of kidnapping and sexually assaulting his kidnap victims. The trial court sentenced Defendant for sexual assault and separately sentenced him for the second degree kidnapping of each victim, elevated to the level of a class two felony. Among its other holdings, the court of appeals rejected Defendant's contention that "People v. Henderson" should be overruled because of subsequent United States Supreme Court case law, and it affirmed each of his separate convictions and sentences. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether "Henderson" was still good law. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, holding that the federal Court's case law "neither undermine [the Colorado Court's] prior assessment of legislative intent in 'Henderson' nor in any way diminish[es] the dispositive impact of legislative intent on Lewis's double jeopardy and merger claims." View "Lewis v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this case, the District Court for Jefferson County dismissed a condemnation petition for a private way of necessity because the developer of the allegedly landlocked parcel did not sufficiently define the scope of and necessity for the proposed condemnation. Evidence showed that the development might vary from one to thirty residential dwellings which prevented the court from entering a condemnation order that would minimize the burden to be placed upon condemnee’s property. The court of appeals ruled that the condemnation could proceed based only upon the zoning of the condemnor’s property. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, and reinstated the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, when a petitioner seeks to condemn a private way of necessity for access to property it wishes to develop in the future, it must demonstrate a purpose for the condemnation that enables the trial court to examine both the scope of and necessity for the proposed condemnation, so that the burden to be imposed upon the condemnee’s property may be ascertained and circumscribed through the trial court’s condemnation order. The record in this case supported the trial court’s dismissal of the condemnation petition. View "The Glenelk Ass'n, Inc. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted David Wood of manslaughter for fatally shooting someone in his apartment during a drug transaction. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request for immunity from prosecution under Colorado's "Make My Day" statute. Following its review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Defendant could have sought immediate review of the trial court's order by invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction before the verdict was handed down, but "Make My Day" immunity may not be reviewed on appeal after trial. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Wood v. Colorado" on Justia Law