Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant The State of Colorado appealed a district court order that suppressed test results performed on blood drawn from Defendant-Appellee Joshua Smith following a car accident. Police suspected Defendant was intoxicated. A passenger extracted from the car told police that Defendant had been driving. Paramedics took Defendant to the hospital, and police asked for blood samples. Police did not have a search warrant or ask for Defendant's consent prior to taking the samples. The nurse drew one sample, after which another officer advised Defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant waived his rights and did not object to, resist, complain about, or otherwise question any of the blood draws. The trial court concluded that police had probable cause to arrest Defendant for vehicular assault at the time of the draws. Nevertheless, the court suppressed the results of the tests performed because the State's "prior consent" statute required that the police ask Defendant for his consent prior to drawing the blood. Upon consideration of the arguments and the "prior consent" statute, the Supreme Court held that officers do not have to request a driver's consent to conduct a constitutional involuntary blood draw. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court's decision that suppressed Defendant's test results. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner Timothy Gognat appealed an appellate court's decision that awarded summary judgment to Respondent Chet Ellsworth, Steven Smith and MSD Energy, Inc. In his suit, Mr. Gognat alleged that Respondents misappropriated certain trade secrets he disclosed to them. In the late 1990s, Mr. Gognat developed information relating to "probable" oil and natural gas reserves in the Western Kentucky Area. This information included technical, geographical, geological and business maps, charts, plans, interpretations, calculations, summaries, and other documents. Mr. Gognat shared this information with Mr. Ellsworth, and the two created a joint venture, MSD Energy, to eventually develop the reserves. Mr. Gognat maintained that Respondents misappropriated the trade secrets in the documents by acquiring leases in Western Kentucky without adequately compensating him pursuant to the joint venture. The district court found that the statute of limitations barred Mr. Gognat's claim, and the appellate court affirmed that decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Gognat argued that his claim against Respondents was premised solely on activities dating from 2005. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. The Court found that the undisputed facts demonstrated that all of the proprietary information alleged to have been misappropriated constituted a single trade secret and this was known to Mr. Gognat more than three years prior to filing his complaint. Therefore, Mr. Gognat's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "Gognat v. Ellsworth" on Justia Law

Colorado state law makes it a felony for a person to have unlawful sexual contact with a child while occupying a "position of trust." Petitioner Mark Pellman appealed an order of the Court of Appeals that found that he was in a position of trust at the time of the unlawful contact between himself and his child victim. Petitioner was a friend of the victim's family, and from 2000-2005, visited with the family, attended the same church, and babysat the victim. In 2005, Petitioner chaperoned a trip to an amusement park when the alleged contact took place. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he was only in a position of trust at specific times, the last of which was when he chaperoned the amusement park trip. The appellate court rejected this argument, and after review, the Supreme Court rejected it as well. The Supreme Court found that under the language of the applicable statute, a defendant might be in a position of trust through an ongoing a continuous supervisory relationship with the victim, regardless of whether or not the defendant was performing a specific supervisory task at the time of the unlawful contact. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the appellate court and affirmed its decision. View "Pellman v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Burlington Ditch, Reservoir & Land Company (Burlington) and Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company (FRICO) filed applications to change its 1885, 1908 and 1909 water rights. The changes to Burlington and FRICO's rights were precipitated by a new water supply project by the United Water & Sanitation District (United) and East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District (ECCV). Approximately fifty parties argued for their particular interests in relation to Burlington and FRICO's applications. The water court imposed conditions on Burlington and FRICO's historic water rights to prevent injury to all other interested parties' rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Burlington, FRICO, United and ECCV challenged the water court's order regarding its determination of the historical consumptive use of the water rights. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court's decision.

The State appealed a trial court order that suppressed statements made by Defendant Wayne Klinck during his initial interview by police. Responding to a domestic disturbance report, police arrived at Defendant's girlfriend's house. They asked Defendant to remain on the porch while the officers interviewed the girlfriend. Shortly thereafter, an officer spoke with Defendant, and when the officer determined he had probable cause, he placed Defendant under arrest. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he invoked his right to counsel. Detectives re-contacted and interviewed Defendant in jail, and at that time Defendant waived his Miranda rights and provided additional information. The trial court suppressed the statements Defendant made on the porch prior to being placed under arrest. Upon consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that Defendant was not in custody during his initial interview on the porch. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Petitioner Loretta Day was referred to Respondent Dr. Bruce Johnson, M.D., for treatment for hypothyroidism. Dr. Johnson determined that surgery was needed to remove both lobes of the thyroid. A few weeks later, Mrs. Day's vocal cords stopped working, and she suffered a permanent speaking disability that she alleged was caused by the surgery. Mrs. Day and her husband sued Dr. Johnson for negligence, asserting that the Doctor incorrectly assessed Mrs. Day's condition, recommended inappropriate treatment, and improperly removed part of her thyroid. The trial court submitted the issue of Dr. Johnson's negligence to the jury which included a jury instruction that mirrored the language of a pattern jury instruction pertaining to negligence. The Days objected to the court's use of this instruction, arguing that the instruction included a misstatement of Colorado law. The court overruled the objection. The jury found that Dr. Johnson was not negligent. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's use of the instruction. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Days argued that both the trial and appellate courts erred by using the instruction. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the portion of the pattern jury instructions accurately stated Colorado law.

Petitioner Lucht's Concrete Pumping sought to enforce a non-compete agreement signed by Respondent Tracy Horner, a former at-will employee. Because Mr. Horner was an at-will employee at the time he signed the agreement, Lucht's argued that its forbearance from terminating Mr. Horner constituted adequate consideration for the non-compete agreement. The appellate court held that continued employment did not constitute adequate consideration once an employee started working for an employer because the employee is in the same position as he was before he signed the agreement. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision. The Court found that an employer that forbears from terminating an existing at-will employee forbears from exercising a legal right, and that constitutes adequate consideration. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Terry Townsend unsuccessfully appealed his conviction on escape charges. The terms of Petitioner's probation mandated he participate in an "intensive supervision program." When he failed to participate, his probation was revoked. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that jury instructions issued by the trial court at his revocation hearing were an incorrect articulation of the law, and as such, the jury convicted him based on bad information. Furthermore, Petitioner argued that the "ISP" condition of his probation was unconstitutional. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's jury instructions correctly stated the applicable law, and that the ISP statute was not unconstitutional. The Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence.

Citizens for Responsible Growth (Citizens) challenged Elbert County's approval of RCI Development Partners, Inc.'s (RCI) land-use applications. The Board of Commissioners (Board) approved RCI's applications by an oral vote. At court, Citizens argued that holding an oral vote violated the county's own rules regarding Board hearings and approval of land-use applications. The Board's decision needed to be in writing. RCI moved to dismiss Citizens' complaint, arguing that the Board's oral approval constituted a "final agency action" and was binding. RCI further argued that Citizens brought their challenge too late for the court to consider. Without reviewing the merits of the district court's order, the appellate court found that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction by reviewing the case. The appeals court found that Citizens filed its appeal beyond the thirty days after the Board of County Commissioners' "final" decision, and dismissed the case. Citizens appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Elbert County regulations required a written ruling to finalize the Board of Commissioners' action. Because the land-use applications were approved orally, they were not "final" actions until the Board issued a written resolution to adopt them. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Respondent and former employee Andrew Blood suffered severe and permanent injuries while working on a wood utility pole owned by Petitioner Qwest Services Corporation (Qwest). Blood sued Qwest for negligence, asserting that Quest failed to implement a routine inspection program that would have detected the rotting that caused the pole to collapse on top of him. A jury awarded Respondent close to $30 million, finding Qwest 100% at fault. Qwest appealed the verdict and award, and the appeals court affirmed the trial courtâs decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Qwest argued that the âexemplary damagesâ awarded to Respondent violated its due process rights. Furthermore, Qwest challenged whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support âexemplary damagesâ and the juryâs subsequent award. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions, finding that Qwestsâs due process rights were not violated by the trial courtâs decision. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Qwestâs failure to implement an inspection program for 46-years prior to Respondentâs accident to support the exemplary damage award handed down by the trial court.