Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, two bail-bonds agents were charged with second-degree burglary and felony menacing in pursuit of an alleged âbail jumper.â On appeal, Defendants Jason Oram and Devon Weinstein challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against them at trial and used the common law âbonding agent privilegeâ to excuse their actions. The Supreme Court found that no common law bonding agent privilege exists in Colorado, and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the charges against Defendants. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts.

In 2009, Defendant Cirilo Gonzalez-Zamora was arrested for an open container violation in Palm Beach, Florida. A warrant check by local police revealed an outstanding arrest warrant for murder in Colorado for âCirilo Hernandez-Zamora.â Police took Defendant into custody to resolve the discrepancy between the name Defendant gave when arrested in Florida, and the name on the Colorado arrest warrant. At the station, a Spanish-fluent officer read Defendant his Miranda rights in Spanish, and gave Defendant the opportunity to ask for further explanation should anything be unclear. Instead of an audible response, Defendant gave a gesture or facial expression that there were parts of the officerâs advisement he did not understand. When the officer was finished, he received no questions. Defendant signed an advisement card. Defendant was eventually charged with first-degree murder. At trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he gave in Florida. The trial court granted the motion, asserting that there were âsignificant questionsâ as to whether Defendant waived his Miranda rights knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial courtâs order suppressing Defendantâs Miranda waiver. The Court found that the non-verbal gestures during Defendantâs advisement indicated that Defendant was aware and that he understood the rights he was waiving. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court decision.

Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Companyâs insured drove a rental car under the influence of methamphetamines, and led police on a high-sped car chase that ended when he struck a vehicle containing Petitioner Julie Bailey and her son. Her son was killed. The insured pled guilty to five felonies, including second-degree murder. The insured assigned his rights to Petitioner to collect on a $1 million excess-insurance policy issued by Lincoln General. Lincoln General denied coverage for damages caused by the insured, relying on an exclusion in the rental agreement that voided coverage if the car was used to commit a crime that could be charged as a felony. The trial court and the court of appeals held that the criminal-acts exclusion of the policy was enforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions to uphold the criminal-acts exclusion of the insurance policy, finding that Lincoln Generalâs use of the exclusion was a proper exercise of its freedom to contract and provide coverage or damages caused by fortuitous events instead of for damages caused by intentionally criminal acts.

The district court reversed the county courtâs order to vacate Petitioner Nicanor Sanchez-Martinezâs guilty plea to third degree assault as âunknowing, involuntary and unintelligent.â Petitioner appeared pro se before the county court and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to probation, and required to complete counseling sessions. Petitioner successfully complied with the terms of his probation, and subsequently the court terminated his sentence. One month following the termination, Petitioner filed a motion with the court that his sentence be set aside in light of new evidence that allegedly negated his guilt. At the hearing, the prosecution elicited testimony from Petitioner that he could not read or write Spanish or English, and was never informed of the constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty. As a result, the magistrate expressed concern that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. The magistrate informed both parties that he would set the plea aside as unconstitutional. The prosecution then appealed the magistrateâs decision to the district court. The district court reversed the county court, holding that the county court improperly addressed the constitutionality of Petitionerâs plea. The Supreme Court determined that the county court acted within its discretion and found the lower courtâs conclusion was supported by the record. The Court reversed the district courtâs decision and reinstated the county courtâs judgment vacating Petitionerâs guilty plea.

The Supreme Court reviewed the appellate courtâs decision against Plaintiffs Jack and Danette Steele. In their claim, Plaintiffs alleged that attorney Katherine Allen gave them incorrect information about a statute of limitations, which led to missing a filing deadline in a negligence suit. The trial court dismissed both their claims of negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence. Plaintiffs only appealed the dismissal of their negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs had a claim against the attorney. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Plaintiffsâ evidence was not sufficient to support their claim. The Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

At trial, a jury found that Defendant Holly Pippin was not negligent in causing an accident in which her car hit that of the Plaintiff, Cheryl Kendrick. The main issue at trial was whether the driving conditions on the day of the accident were âexpected.â Driving conditions were icy, and Ms. Pippin testified that she knew it had been raining the night before to cause potentially icy roads the next morning. Ms. Kendrick challenged Ms. Pippinâs argument that the icy roads were âunexpected,â therefore her attempt to avoid hitting Ms. Kendrickâs car was actually just negligent driving. Ms. Kendrick appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming the trial court made three mistakes: (1) the court should have instructed the jury to consider a âsudden emergency;â (2) that it should not have instructed the jury on âres ipsa loquitur;â and (3) there should have been a new trial because of alleged juror misconduct. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts' decisions, and agreed with the appellate court on two of the three issues presented. The Court held that Ms. Pippin failed to present evidence that she was confronted with a âsudden emergencyâ from the road conditions. The Court agreed with the appellate court's dismissal of the jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur. The Court did not find the allegation of juror misconduct credible. The Court therefore reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case for a new trial.

Early in the morning on October, 2009, Pueblo police received a 9-1-1 call from an unidentified caller who asked for assistance on â2143 East Thirteenth Street.â When officers arrived, they discovered there was no such address. Looking for the source of the 9-1-1 call, officers began contacting other addresses on the street. Respondent Frank Glickâs home was one of the addresses the officers checked. The officers asked if they could come inside and speak with the other occupants in the home to make sure they were safe. Respondent said the officers could speak with the other occupants, but he asked the officers to remain outside. When respondent went to find his girlfriend, he left the front door wide open. No lights were on. Without crossing the threshold, officers used flashlights to peer inside the home. They saw drug paraphernalia on a small table. When the girlfriend arrived at the door, officers noticed Respondent near the table with the suspected drugs. They entered the house believing Respondent was trying to destroy the paraphernalia on the tabletop. Officers arrested Respondent. At the hearing, Respondent disputed whether the officers conducted an illegal search of his home by using their flashlights while standing at the threshold to see inside. The trial court found the officers conducted an illegal search, and ordered evidence of the drugs suppressed. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that the arresting officers did not conduct an illegal search of Respondentâs home when they used their flashlights to observe evidence plainly visible inside Respondentâs home.

The trial court ruling at issue in this case arises out of post-conviction proceedings following the imposition of the death sentence for Robert Ray. Ray was convicted of first degree murder for killing Javad Marshall-Fields, a key prosecution witness, and his fiancée Vivian Wolfe. Leading up to Rayâs trial, his counsel provided him with discovery from which Ray and a co-defendant figured out who the key prosecution witnesses were. On several occasions, Ray tried to arrange to have those witnesses killed. Ray, through associates, made a number of threats against Marshall-Fields and even offered him money not to testify. Marshall-Fields would later die from a âdrive-byâ shooting by one of Rayâs associates. The prosecution placed a large number of witnesses into witness protection. For those witnesses who did not want protection, the prosecution promised to keep their addresses from defense counsel and the defendant to secure their cooperation at trial. The trial court issued protective orders, and set up a procedure where defense counsel could call witnesses from the prosecutionâs office without learning their phone numbers, if the witnesses were willing to be interviewed. A jury convicted Ray of murder and returned a death sentence. Ray appealed the conviction and sentence, arguing the protective order and witness interview procedure violated his constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him. Recognizing that a trial court must balance between the defendantâs right to discovery of key witnesses and the extraordinary threat to witness safety posed by defendantâs murder of another witness, the Supreme Court found that defendantâs rights were not violated in light of the circumstances of the case. The Court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it lifted the protective order and required the prosecution to disclose the addresses of the protected witnesses. The court reversed the trial courtâs disclosure order.

South Fork Water and Sanitation District (District) petitioned for a declaratory judgment to prevent the Town of South Fork (Town) from acquiring water rights and water systems to serve its residents. A significant portion of the Town overlaps the Districtâs boundaries. Between 2001 and 2003, the District began to develop a utility plan that included construction of a centralized water system. The District took preliminary steps toward the provision of water service, but failed to secure the necessary funding to build the centralized water system. With no money, the District could not purchase existing water systems in the area. The Town is authorized under its charter to provide water service to its residents, and began preparations to do so in 2006. The District filed a declaratory judgment complaint against the Town alleging the Town was furnishing water services within the Districtâs boundaries without approval. The Supreme Court found that because the District did not provide water to the Town, and could not demonstrate that it could, the District could not withhold approval to the Town to provide water service. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.