Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an original proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an indigent alleged juvenile offender was entitled as of right to a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. Upon receiving an competency evaluation report, the trial court made a preliminary finding that "W.P." was competent to proceed. However, citing ongoing concerns about her client's mental health, W.P.'s public defender objected, requesting a hearing and filing a motion for a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. At the motion hearing, the public defender stated that because the juvenile code was silent, the statutory authority relied upon referred to the adult code which entitled the second evaluation at the State's expense. Concluding that the Children's Code was "specifically silent on that issue," the district court determined that the adult provisions did not apply and denied the request for a second evaluation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the public defender's request for a second evaluation. View "In re People in the Interest of W.P." on Justia Law

Antelope Development LLC was formed to develop a residential subdivision in Bennett, Colorado. The LLC took out construction loans from the bank at the start of the project; before it was finished, the LLC had exhausted its financing. The LLC entered into oral agreements with Respondent AC Excavating for work on the subdivision. AC Excavating was paid for some but not all of its work. Petitioner Donald Yale, a member of the LLC, realized that the LLC had insufficient funds to meet its obligations, so he placed some of his own money in the LLC's bank account. Yale then applied these funds to the LLC's general business expenses and some outstanding subcontractor invoices. AC Excavating still was not paid in full. AC Excavating sued Yale alleging, among other things, that the LLC had violated Colorado's construction trust fund statute by failing to hold the funds in the LLC's bank account in trust for payment to AC Excavating. AC Excavating further alleged that Yale thereby committed theft, permitting it to claim treble damages and attorney fees under the state Rights in Stolen Property statute. The trial court ruled in favor of Yale, and AC Excavating appealed. The appellate court reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the LLC member's voluntary injection of capital into the company did not constitute "funds disbursed to a contractor . . . on a construction project" under the construction trust fund statute, as that money was not required to be held in trust. The Court also concluded the appellate court erred in remanding the case for a determination of whether Yale was civilly liable for theft under the Rights in Stolen Property statute. View "Yale v. AC Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Jamie Webb, Jeffrey Hermanson, and Michaleen Jeronimus, challenged the legality of the City of Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles on certain city streets. Petitioners, a group of bicyclists, were cited and fined for riding their bikes on the only street providing access through town from the state highway to Central City. Petitioners argued that Black Hawk, as a home-rule municipality, lacked the authority to prohibit bicycles on local streets absent a suitable alternative bicycle route as provided by state statute. Both the trial and district courts ruled in favor of Black Hawk, finding the city had the authority to ban bicycles through both its home-rule and police powers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles was a matter of mixed state and local concern and conflicts with and is preempted by state law. View "Webb v. Black Hawk" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court from a personal injury case against a restaurant that ended with allegations of a party contracting a food-borne illness. THe plaintiff sought to have a small out-of-state law firm that specializes in food-borne illness claims admitted pro hac vice to help in the litigation. The defendant objected on grounds that defense counsel had previously consulted with an attorney at the the out-of-state-firm about her case and her trial strategy. The trial court denied the out-of-state firm's motion, thus disqualifying it from representing plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiff argued that Colo. RPC 1.7 applied only to situations where an attorney-client relationship was established, and that the trial court's disqualification was the trial court's abuse of discretion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order, holding that: (1) the consultation between defense counsel and out-of-state counsel concerned confidential information (which created a conflict under Colo. RPC 1.7; and, (2) the conflict was not waivable. View "In re Liebnow v. Boston Enterprises" on Justia Law

Through cold calls, defendants sold plaintiffs shares in oil and gas joint ventures in Texas, Alabama and Mississippi. Plaintiffs all signed agreements with forum selection clauses stating that courts in Dallas County, Texas would have exclusive jurisdiction should any disputes arising from the agreements arise. The ventures lost money, and plaintiffs sued in Colorado, raising violations of the Colorado Securities Act (CSA) and various other common-law claims. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims citing the forum selection clause. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the clauses were void because they were unenforceable on public policy grounds. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the forum selection clauses were valid, and that they requires the parties to litigate their claims in Texas. View "Cagle v. Mathers Family Trust" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether certain terms contained in a credit agreement between a lender and a bank was ambiguous with regard to the default interest rate. Because the Court held that the credit agreement was not ambiguous, it did not address whether Colorado's Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds allowed for the introduction of extrinsic evidence to resolve a facially ambiguous credit agreement. View "FDIC v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Colorado law recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege between a guardian ad litem and a minor child with respect to a dependency and neglect proceeding. The Court held that a guardian ad litem holds a minor child's psychotherapist-patient privilege when: (1) the child is too young or otherwise incompetent to hold the privilege; (2) the child's interests are adverse to those of his or her parent(s); and (3) section 19-3-311 C.R.S. (2012) does not abrogate the privilege. In this case, the Court found that the guardian ad litem partially waived the child's privilege when she disseminated a letter from the child's therapist to the juvenile court and to all parties. The Court remanded the case to the juvenile court for a determination of the scope of that waiver. View "L.A.N. et al. v. L.M.B." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Town of Minturn filed an application for a change of water rights. In 2007, the Town made a new application for water rights, the approval of a plan for augmentation, and conditional appropriative rights of exchange. Over thirty parties filed Statements of Opposition. After negotiations between the Town and its opposers, in 2010 the water court granted Minturn's applications and entered stipulated decrees. After the court's order, Minturn realized that the consumptive use numbers that it relied upon to calculate its monthly maximum limitations for diversion did not reflect actual monthly useage data. Minturn conferred with all of its opposers regarding its intention to correct the water court's decrees in order to conform with the newly discovered data. Each opposer agreed with the proposed corrections save one, J. Tucker, Trustee, who opposed the corrections on the ground that the parties' earlier stipulations precluded the water court from making the requested changes. The water court ultimately granted Minturn's request to correct the substantive errors, and J. Tucker appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the corrected findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decrees of the water court. View "The Town of Minturn v. J. Tucker, Trustee" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court court ordered a new trial for a man who sued after he was hit by a car that skidded across an icy patch in the road near Telluride in 2004. The jury ruled in favor of Michael Johnson, who skidded into a car driven by Richard Bedor. Bedor was injured and filed a negligence lawsuit. The Supreme Court concluded jurors may have been confused after they were told a person confronted by a sudden emergency could be expected to respond normally. The Court abolished the "sudden emergency" doctrine entirely, saying the potential to mislead a jury outweighed the benefits. View "Bedor v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason LaRosa confessed to his wife, mother, pastor, a police dispatcher and an investigating police officer that he had sexually assaulted his two year old daughter. He was charged with multiple crimes, and a jury convicted him on all charges. On appeal, an appellate panel reversed Defendant's convictions under the corpus delicti rule, reasoning that the prosecution had presented only opportunity evidence (other than the confessions) establishing that Defendant had an opportunity to commit crime, but not that the crimes in fact, occurred. The State appealed that decision. The issue before the Supreme Court required the Court to decide whether to abandon the judicially created "corroboration requirement," the corpus delicti rule, and all of the attendant precedent. After review the Court decided to abandon the corpus delicti rule because "sound reasons exist[ed] for doing so." In its place, the Court articulated "the trustworthiness standard," requiring the prosecution to present evidence that proves a confession is trustworthy or reliable. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse Defendant's convictions because having consistently applied the corpus delicti rule as substantive law for over one hundred years, Defendant did not have fair warning of the Court's decision to abandon it. Therefore the Court was constitutionally prohibited from applying the new trustworthiness standard in this case. View "Colorado v. LaRosa" on Justia Law