Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in these consolidated cases concerned the actions of the title setting board (Title Board) in setting the titles and ballot titles and submission clauses (or titles) in two groups of initiatives. In case 12SA117, Petitioner Philip Hayes challenged the Title Board's title setting for Initiatives 2011-2012, Numbers 67, 68 and 69. Respondents David Ottke and John Slota were the designated representatives for those proposed initiatives. If adopted, the initiatives would alter how the General Assembly amended or repealed citizen-initiated statutes. In Case 12SA130, Petitioners Barbara Walker and Don Childears challenged the Title Board's title setting for Initiative 201-2012 Number 94 and 95. Respondents Earl Staelin and Robert Bows were the designated representatives. If adopted, Initiative 94 would have amended the Colorado constitution to allow political subdivisions to establish and operate banks; Initiative 95 would have allowed the State to open and operate its own bank. The common threshold question before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the Title Board had authority to act on motions for rehearing to address challenges to the titles previously set, where fewer than both of the designated representatives of the initiative's proponents appeared at the rehearing. Finding no statutory authority that conferred such authority to the Title Board, the Supreme Court reversed the actions of the Title Board and returned the measures to the Title Board for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Ottke" on Justia Law

Defendant Walter Tate appealed a district court order that reversed a suppression of evidence order. In a prosecution of Defendant for Driving Under the Influence, the trial court found that he had been stopped without reasonable articulable suspicion the moment a patrol car parked behind him, hemming in his car, even though he was asleep and unaware of the officer at the time. On interlocutory appeal by the State, the district court concluded that the earliest moment at which the defendant could have been seized occurred when he awoke and became aware of his circumstances, and by that point in time the officer had acquired at least reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a person cannot be seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if his freedom of movement is actually restricted, without perceiving a show of authority as directed at him or his car. The Court affirmed the district court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tate v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Petitioner Yanick Kazadi, a legal permanent resident born in the Congo, sought post-conviction review of his felony plea leading to a deferred judgment, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to notify him of possible deportation consequences for pleading guilty to obtain a deferred judgment and sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, concluding Petitioner could not seek review of his deferred judgment and sentence under Crim. P. 35(c) while in the deferred judgment period because, in a deferred judgment situation, there has not been a judgment of conviction that makes Crim. P. 35(c) review available. View "Kazadi v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a trial court's order striking the testimony of plaintiff's rebuttal expert witness, and portions of two of plaintiff's previously disclosed expert witnesses. The underlying case centered on a medical malpractice claim brought by the parents of a minor child against a hospital, its management and the doctor that delivered the child. The minor was allegedly injured at birth after his umbilical cord wrapped around his neck, depriving his brain of oxygen. The parties disputed the cause of the child's injuries: Plaintiffs argued the child was injured by preventable intrapartum events (namely Defendants' alleged negligence); defendants argued the injuries occurred days, or possibly weeks prior to birth. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded plaintiff's expert's rebuttal testimony because her testimony properly refuted a central theory of the defendants' case. The trial court also abused its discretion when it excluded the disclosed experts' testimony because the late disclosure of their testimony did not harm the defendants, as required for sanctions under Rule 37. Accordingly, the Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Warden v. Exempla" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case came from the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "Bacheller v. General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC," and centered on the determination of the applicability of "Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court," (677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) ("POME")) to this case and the propriety of the trial court's decision to a treble and exemplary damages award. Bacheller sued General Steel, Discount Steel, and those companies' presidents for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy, based on their filing an arbitration complaint against him. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to include additional elements reflecting POME's heightened standard in the jury instruction for Bacheller's malicious prosecution claims. The court of appeals also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by trebling an exemplary damages award against General Steel and Discount Steel. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: "POME does not apply where, as here, the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint that led to a purely private dispute." View "General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller" on Justia Law

This adverse possession dispute between neighbors was appealed to the Supreme Court after a remand. The case below concerned legal interests in water and easement rights for three ditches diverting water from the Huerfano River. After conducting additional evidentiary proceedings as directed in the Court's first decision in this case, the water court found that Defendant Theodore Gomez had adversely possessed Plaintiff Ralph Archuleta's deeded legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch and Manzanares Ditch No. 1, but it also found that Gomez had not adversely possessed Archuleta's deeded legal interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2. The water court ordered payment of costs in favor of Gomez but denied Gomez's request for a partial award of attorney fees. The water court enjoined Gomez from interfering with Archuleta's interest in Manzanares Ditch No. 2, and, in an order entered after the time for amending the water court's judgment had run, the water court provided additional details for the injunction, ordering Gomez to reconstruct Manzanares Ditch No. 2 across the northern part of Gomez’s lower parcel to Archuleta's property. Upon review of the case from remand, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the water court in part, concluding that Gomez adversely possessed Archuleta's legal interests in the Archuleta Ditch and Manzanares Ditch No. 1. The Court reversed the water court's judgment in part, ordering it to enter an injunction for reconstruction of Manzanares Ditch No. 2 and an easement across the northern part of Gomez's lower parcel to Archuleta’s adjoining parcel, so that Archuleta will receive the flow of water his legal interest in this ditch entitles him to divert. View "Archuleta v. Gomez" on Justia Law

In early 2012, two uniformed Colorado Springs police officers went to Defendant Jeffrey Marshall's residence to serve a summons for his alleged indecent exposure. Defendant wasn't home at the time; the officers waited in their squad car for him in a nearby parking lot. Defendant eventually came home, parking in the same lot as the officers. He was carrying a black backpack with him at the time. The officers approached Defendant to serve the summons. Despite his apparent cooperation, one officer was concerned that Defendant might run away. Defendant was then put under arrest on the indecent exposure charge. While one officer placed Defendant in the squad car, the other officer opened the backpack and found six individual bags of marijuana weighing 7.4 grams total, an assortment of prescription pills, and a digital scale. Based on the items found in the backpack, the State charged Defendant with possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana, possession of a schedule-three controlled substance, and five habitual criminal counts. After two suppression hearings, the trial court found that Defendant's arrest was valid because the officers had a summons that required fingerprinting and processing Marshall at the Colorado Springs stationhouse. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that the subsequent search of the backpack was illegal because Defendant was handcuffed and either in, or standing next to, the police car at the time of the search. The trial court reasoned that under "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)), the search incident to arrest exception did not apply because the exigencies discussed in that case that would justify a search were absent. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State that the evidence in Defendant's backpack should not have been suppressed because the officer conducted a valid search incident to arrest. Therefore the Court reversed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence. View "Colorado v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued General Steel, Discount Steel, and those companies' presidents for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy, based on their filing an arbitration complaint against him. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by (1) refusing to include additional elements reflecting the heightened standard in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court (POME) in the jury instruction for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; and (2) trebling an exemplary damages award against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) POME does not apply where, as here, the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint that led to a purely private dispute; (2) therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to include additional elements reflecting POME's heightened standard in the jury instruction for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; and (3) the trial court did not err by trebling the exemplary damages award against Defendants. View "Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller" on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, Mother sought review of an order of the district court determining that it had jurisdiction to enter initial orders in a dispute concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities for Child. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause to decide whether the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction to make initial child custody determinations in this matter based on the parties' intent to indefinitely change their residence to Colorado rather than based on the analysis required under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding that the court applied the incorrect legal standard when it concluded that jurisdiction was proper in Colorado and, rather, should have applied the jurisdictional test required under the UCCJEA. View "In re Madrone" on Justia Law

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. Adopting its reasoning in "Neuhaus v. Colorado," (2012 CO 65, released concurrently with this opinion), the Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Escobedo v. Colorado" on Justia Law