Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. Adopting its reasoning in "Neuhaus v. Colorado," (2012 CO 65, released concurrently with this opinion), the Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court. View "Colorado v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

In this postconviction appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant could plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. The Court held that such conditional pleas are not permitted under Colorado rules or statutes. Further, the Court declined to create an exception to allow conditional guilty pleas that reserve the right to appeal unsuccessful pretrial motions to suppress evidence because a reservation of that right is better created by statute or court rule, if at all. In this case, the Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. View "Neuhaus v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, along with "Hagos v. Colorado" (2012 CO 63), to address whether a determination on direct appeal that instructional error did not constitute plain error necessarily requires a determination in post conviction proceedings that trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction did not prejudice the defense. Upon review, the Court concluded that that a determination that an instructional error did not constitute plain error does not control a determination of prejudice under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)), because the plain error and Strickland standards are not the same. "The plain error standard requires that an error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a greater degree than the Strickland prejudice standard." Defendant Villarreal's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, nonetheless, failed under the separate, fact-specific Strickland analysis. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment but on different grounds. View "Villarreal v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this postconviction proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a determination on direct appeal that instructional error did not constitute plain error necessarily required a determination in postconviction proceedings that trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction did not prejudice the defense. The Court concluded that a determination that instructional error did not constitute plain error does not control a determination of prejudice under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)), because the two standards are not the same. The plain error standard requires that an error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a greater degree than the Strickland prejudice standard. Defendant Hagos' ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed under the separate, fact-specific Strickland analysis. The Court affirmed the appellate court but on different grounds. View "Hagos v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "People v. Gross," (07CA2255, slip op. at 7 (Colo. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (not selected for official publication)), which reversed the defendant's convictions arising out of a shooting at a campground. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed cumulative error by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor doctrine, which was requested by defense counsel; by allowing the prosecutor to argue that the defendant did not satisfy the duty to retreat, a requirement of the initial aggressor jury instruction; and by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder. In its holding, the court reasoned that the attorney incompetence exception to the invited error doctrine permitted plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the invited error doctrine precludes plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. The attorney incompetence exception does not apply to deliberate, strategic acts of defense counsel but rather to inadvertent errors or oversights. In this case, the invited error doctrine precluded the defendant from arguing that the trial court erred by giving the initial aggressor instruction because the defendant's trial counsel made a deliberate, strategic decision to request it. "Likewise, the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about the duty to retreat may not be raised on appeal." The Court held that the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder, but that this error did not amount to plain error. View "Colorado v. Gross" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, The Hannon Law Firm ("Hannon"), Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P.("Melat"), and Howarth & Smith ("Howarth") entered into a contingent fee agreement to represent multiple plaintiffs in an action against the Cotter Corporation regarding contamination from a uranium mill. The three firms entered into a fee sharing agreement to apportion the fees and costs of the litigation among themselves. Hannon withdrew mid-representation, citing a strained relationship with Howarth. Six years later, after the underlying litigation settled, Hannon filed a quantum meruit action against Melat and Howarth, seeking the reasonable value of the services it provided up to the time of withdrawal. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's judgment with regard to its interpretation of C.R.C.P. Chapter23.3 allowing a quantum meruit claim among co-counsel, but reversed the trial court's determination that the claim accrued when Hannon withdrew from the litigation, instead of when the recovery occurred that made funds available to the attorneys. The Supreme Court held that, where multiple attorneys are co-counsel in a contingent fee agreement, C.R.C.P. Chapter 23.3 does not bar a withdrawing attorney from pursuing a quantum meruit action against former co-counsel for a share of attorney fees obtained in the case, even though that attorney was barred from pursuing such an action against the former client. The claim accrues at the time the withdrawing attorney knows or should know of the occurrence of the settlement or judgment that will result in the payment of attorney fees. View "Melat, Pressman & Higbie, LLP v. Hannon Law Firm, LLC" on Justia Law

The supreme court vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment after the trial court found that 71 days was not a reasonable time for purposes of relating back an amended complaint under C.R.C.P. 15(c). Pursuant to "Dillingham v. Greeley Publishing Company," (701 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1985)), the proper measure for relation back under C.R.C.P. 15(c) is the time between the filing date of the original complaint and the date when the party related back receives notice. In this case, the Supreme Court held that 116 days was reasonable because it was within the time for service of process in Colorado. View "Garcia v. Schneider Energy Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged a district court order that granted defendant Suzanne Guthrie's motion to suppress evidence of an illegal narcotic discovered during a routine inventory search of her personal effects after a judge at the El Paso County Court, in a prior proceeding, ordered a deputy sheriff to jail her for direct contempt of court. In the prosecution for Defendant's possession of illegal drugs, the district court suppressed evidence discovered during the inventory search as an ad hoc remedy for the due process violation it deemed the county court judge committed when conducting the contempt proceeding. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment: the inventory search resulted directly from the county court's order to the deputy sheriff, based on a finding of criminal contempt of court to jail Defendant. Appeal of the summary contempt conviction, which might or might not result in reversal, would be the proper recourse for the county court's alleged due process violation. Suppressing evidence of the illegal narcotic discovered as a result of the valid inventory search here would not have been an appropriate remedy even if the county court erred in convicting Defendant of direct contempt of court. View "Colorado v. Guthrie" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "Colorado v. Gross," (07CA2255, slip op. at 7 (Colo. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (not selected for official publication)), which reversed the defendant's convictions that arose out of a shooting at a campground. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed cumulative error by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor doctrine, which was requested by defense counsel; by allowing the prosecutor to argue that the defendant did not satisfy the duty to retreat, a requirement of the initial aggressor jury instruction; and by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider self-defense to determine whether the defendant possessed the culpable mental state required for the crime of extreme indifference murder. In so holding, the court reasoned that the attorney incompetence exception to the invited error doctrine permits plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the invited error doctrine precludes plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. The attorney incompetence exception does not apply to deliberate, strategic acts of defense counsel but rather to inadvertent errors or oversights. Here, the invited error doctrine precluded the defendant from arguing that the trial court erred by giving the initial aggressor instruction because the defendant's trial counsel made a deliberate, strategic decision to request it. Furthermore, the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about the duty to retreat also could not be raised on appeal. In addition, the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder, but this error did not amount to plain error. View "Gross v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Lego admitted his wife to Porter Hospital's emergency room. She stayed there for approximately two months. The Legos' insurance provider notified Respondent in writing that it would stop covering Mrs. Lego's hospital care after six weeks. Respondent disputed the insurer's position and refused to discharge his wife from the hospital after six weeks. The hospital followed the insurer in notifying Respondent the insurance coverage for Mrs. Lego would end, and that the Legos would be responsible for any uncovered charges. In an effort to recoup those charges Respondent refused to pay, the hospital sued on the grounds of unjust enrichment with recovery in quantum meruit. Respondent moved to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred by a general statute of limitations codified in section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) C.R.S. (2011). The trial court denied the motion; the appellate court reversed, finding the trial court erred in determining the amount the insurance company did not pay was liquidated or determinable damages within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, interpreting section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) C.R.S. (2011) to mean its six-year limitations period applied in this case, particularly when the amount owed was ascertainable either by reference to the agreement, or by simple computation using extrinsic evidence. View "Portercare Adventist Health System v. Lego" on Justia Law