Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's suppression of evidence obtained following an investigatory stop of Defendant Adolph Funez-Paiagua. Defendant was standing on the property of a closed auto-body shop at 1:15 in the morning. One of two responding officers approached where Defendant had been standing. After hearing a loud crash and seeing Defendant fleeing the property with "some large bags," the officer ordered Defendant to stop. The trial court found the officer's testimony credible, but concluded that the evidence did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Specifically, the trial court determined that the seizure occurred "at the time the [first] officer contacted [Funez-Paiagua]." The trial court found that, at that time, the officer knew that Defendant was standing on private property late at night. The trial court concluded that these facts did not support reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop and therefore the trial court suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop created reasonable suspicion. The investigatory stop was therefore not an unreasonable seizure, and the trial court incorrectly suppressed evidence resulting from the stop. View "Colorado v. Funez-Paiagua" on Justia Law

The two appeals consolidated for resolution in this case both arose from an attempt by John C. Harrison, acting as personal representative for the estate of Nolan G. Thorsteinson and trustee of The Margie (Dotts) M. Thorsteinson Trust, to avoid an order declaring abandoned a disputed 1.04 c.f.s. interest in the Mexican Ditch. Harrison appealed directly to the Supreme Court adverse rulings of the Water Court in the two cases. With regard to Harrison's Application for a Change of Water Right, the water court granted the Engineers' motion to dismiss at the close of Harrison's case, finding that he was required but failed, to establish the historic use of the right as to which he sought a change in the point of diversion. With regard to Harrison's protest to the inclusion of the interests he claimed in the Mexican Ditch on the Division Engineer's decennial abandonment list, the water court granted the Engineer's motion for abandonment, as a stipulated remedy for Harrison's failure to succeed in his change application. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Harrison neither proved historic use of the right for which he sought a change nor was excepted from the requirement that he do so as a precondition of changing its point of diversion; and because denying a change of water right for failing to prove the historic use of the right did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of property, the water court's dismissal of Harrison's application was affirmed. But because, Harrison did not stipulate to an order of abandonment as the consequence of failing to succeed in his change application, only as the consequence of failing to timely file an application reflecting historic use, the water court's order granting the Engineers' motion for abandonment was reversed. View "Thorsteinson v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Respondent Colorado Public Utilities Commission challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court of Routt County to consider changing the venue in regard to a petition for judicial review, arguing that the petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 40-6-115(1) and (5), C.R.S. (2011). Holding that section 40-6-115(5) pertained to venue, not jurisdiction, the Routt County District Court allowed a transfer of the case to the District Court for the City and County of Denver. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court: section 40-6-115(5) mandated venue and did not limit jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court discharged the rule. On remand, the Routt County District Court could transfer this case to the Denver District Court. View "In re Associated Gov'ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

In its order, the trial court in this case ruled that the prosecutorial work product doctrine under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) was limited to work product prepared in anticipation of the case before the court, and did not extend to work product prepared in anticipation of a different but related criminal prosecution. Prior to disclosing the contested materials, the State petitioned the Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21 to reverse the trial court arguing the prosecutorial work product protection under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) extended to all work product and was not limited to materials prepared in anticipation of prosecuting the case immediately before the court. Resolving this issue in accordance with the intent of Crim.P. 16(I)(e)(1) to protect the professional judgment and mental impressions of prosecutors from disclosure so that they may candidly analyze the merits of a case and plan their litigation strategy, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and made the rule absolute: the Court held that the protection of prosecutorial work product, under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1),extends to opinion work product prepared by the prosecution in anticipation of any criminal prosecution. Because the trial court did not inspect the contested materials nor decide whether they constituted opinion work product prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution, the Court remanded the case matter to the trial court to make this determination through an ex parte, in camera review. View "Colorado v. Angel" on Justia Law

An overhead garage door struck Respondent Larry Crossgrove in the head while he made a delivery to a Wal-Mart store in Trinidad. Respondent required medical treatment for injuries suffered in the accident. His healthcare providers billed almost $250,000 for their services. Respondent's insurer however, paid the providers $40,000 in full satisfaction of the bills. Respondent subsequently filed suit against Wal-Mart. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court erred when it held that the trial court incorrectly admitted evidence of the amount paid by the insurer for Respondent's medical expenses as a result of Wal-Mart's negligence. Upon review, the Court held that the court of appeal correctly held that the trial court correctly held that the trial court should have excluded evidence of the amounts paid because of the common law evidentiary component of the collateral source doctrine required the exclusion. View "Wal-Mart v. Crossgrove" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed an unpublished appeallate court decision to determine whether: the court of appeals erred under Colorado's collateral source doctrine when it admitted evidence of the amounts paid by Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for medical expenses that Petitioner Jack Sunahara incurred as a result of a car accident; and whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that portions of State Farm's claim file and information used by the company to generate reserves and settlement authority were not discoverable. The Court held that the appellate court erred in affirming the admission of evidence of the amounts paid for Petitioner's medical expenses because the pre-verdict evidentiary component of Colorado's collateral source rule prohibits the admission. The Court affirmed the appellate court in excluding portions of State Farm's claim file from admission. View "Sunahara v. State Farm" on Justia Law

Qwest Corporation and the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) appealed a district court's judgment in favor of the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel (OCC) that reversed the PUC's decision setting the maximum rate for certain telephone services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the PUC regularly pursued its authority because it considered all of the statutorily-mandated factors and its decision is supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Ofc. of Consumer Counsel v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case arose from the negligence action Plaintiff Donald Smith filed against Defendant Michael Jeppsen after the parties were involved in a car accident. Plaintiff sought to recover, among other things, the cost of past and future medical expenses resulting from the crash. Defendant admitted liability, and the parties agreed that the proper measure of Plaintiff's medical expense damages should be the necessary and reasonable value of the medical services rendered. However the parties disagreed as to whether the trial court, in determining reasonable value, could consider evidence of the amounts billed to and paid by Plaintiff's insurance company (a collateral source). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was correct in applying 10-1-135 C.R.S. (2011) in this case because the statute pertained to cases pending recovery as of August 11, 2010. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court correctly excluded from evidence the amount of the insurance company's payments because section 10-1-135(10)(a) codifies the common law pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule and unambiguously required the exclusion. View "In re Smith v. Jeppsen" on Justia Law

Respondent Colorado Public Utilities Commission challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court of Routt County to consider changing the venue in regard to a petition for judicial review, arguing that Petitioner Associated Governments of Northwestern Colorado failed to meet the requirements of section 40-6-115(1) and (5), C.R.S. (2011). Holding that section 40-6-115(5) pertained to venue and not jurisdiction, the Routt County District Court allowed a transfer of the case to the District Court for the City and County of Denver. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court, and held that section 40-6-115(5) mandated venue and did not limit jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court discharged the rule. On remand, the Routt County District Court may transfer this case to the Denver District Court. View "In re Associated Gov'ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's order that quashed service on Defendant Paulo Rodriguez-Cera. Defendant resided in Mexico but was served by substituted service in Colorado. After previously granting substituted service, the trial court determined that C.R.C.P. 4(d) mandated that service on a defendant located in a foreign country be made according to international agreement, if any. Because Mexico and the United States are parties to the Convention on Service Arboad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (20 U.S.T. 361), the trial court concluded that Plaintiff Rex Willhite must serve Defendant via the Convention. As a result, the trial court quashed the substituted service. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that C.R.C.P. 4(d) did not establish service according to international agreement as the exclusive means of serving a defendant in a foreign country. The Court held that substituted service under Colorado law provides a valid alternative to service abroad. The Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Willhite v. Rodriguez-Cera" on Justia Law