Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two detectives questioned defendant Jose Padilla about his involvement in a potential sexual assault. In response, Padilla stated that he did not have sex with the victim, J.M., and that J.M. was extremely intoxicated on the night in question. He later moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The district court agreed and granted the motion to suppress, finding that Padilla was subjected to custodial interrogation without the required warnings. The State filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s order. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Padilla was not in custody for Miranda purposes, it reversed the portion of the district court’s order suppressing the statements, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Padilla" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether uploading the text of a bill to multiple computers and using automated software to simultaneously give voice to different portions of the bill at a speed of about 650 words per minute, complied with the the Colorado Constitution, article V, section 22: “Every bill shall be read by title when introduced, and at length on two different days in each house; provided, however, any reading at length may be dispensed with upon unanimous consent of the members present.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the software solution was not constitutional: "There are unquestionably different ways by which the legislature may comply with the reading requirement. But the cacophony generated by the computers here isn’t one of them. And while we have no business dictating the specifics of how the legislature might comply with the reading requirement, it is our prerogative and responsibility to declare that the legislature did not comply with that requirement in this case." The Court concurred with the district court's determination that the "unintelligible" sounds produced by the computers did not fulfill the reading requirement. But the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part because it concluded it was not within the district court's domain to dictate the form or manner by which the legislature may comply with the reading requirement. "By prescribing how the legislature must comply with the reading requirement, the district court trespassed upon the separation-of-powers tenet so essential to our constitutional system of government." View "Markwell v. Cooke" on Justia Law

In 2019, several parole officers approached a home that they believed was the residence of Susan Damico. Damico was a parolee whose parole agreement allowed officers to search “her person, residence, and/or vehicle” without a warrant as a condition of parole. When the officers arrived at the home, they found Damico in the front yard getting into her car. The officers identified themselves, informed Damico that they were conducting a parole visit, obtained a house key from her, and asked whether there was anyone inside the home. Damico told the officers that defendant-appellant Aaron Peluso was inside in bed. While the other officers entered the home, Damico's parole officer, Brook Hathaway, remained outside with Damico for several minutes. The officers who first entered the home found Peluso in bed and informed him of the purpose of their visit. After Peluso got dressed and out of bed, officers searched the room and found methamphetamine, THC, glass pipes, rolling papers, and a digital scale. Officers arrested Peluso and then searched his wallet, which contained additional methamphetamine. During the drive to jail, Peluso told officers that he had been using methamphetamine. Peluso was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress both the evidence recovered from his home and the statements he made after his arrest, arguing that the warrantless search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. At the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Damico did not actually live at Peluso's home at the time of the search, and Hathaway could have done more to verify Damico's address. The court further found that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether Peluso might have objected to the search once the officers entered his home. The State moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court incorrectly analyzed Damico’s actual, not apparent, authority to consent to the search. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence and reversed the order. "Because parole officers reasonably believed Damico had authority to consent to a search of Peluso’s residence, her apparent authority was sufficient to validate the warrantless search, and Peluso’s motion to suppress should have been denied." View "Colorado v. Peluso" on Justia Law

The State challenged the trial court's order suppressing evidence seized from Defendant Asha Thompson's cell phone on Fourth Amendment grounds. Lakewood, Colorado police were dispatched to the Blue Sky Motel in response to a shooting. Upon their arrival, they found the victim, B.T., unresponsive in a motel room with a gunshot wound to her head. She was transported to the hospital but died a short time later. A witness to the shooting subsequently identified Thompson, who was known to Lakewood police, as the shooter, and the county court issued a warrant for Thompson’s arrest. police received an anonymous tip that Thompson was staying at a specified room in a different motel. They found and arrested Thompson there and then obtained a search warrant to allow them to search the room in which Thompson was arrested. As pertinent here, the warrant authorized the police to seize, among other things, cell phones and other electronic devices and provided that any seized cell phones “may be downloaded and examined either manually or forensically.” Based on this warrant, the police ultimately seized Thompson’s cell phone and sent it to a forensic laboratory where technicians subsequently unlocked it and downloaded all of the data on it. The State contended the independent source doctrine applied to the circumstances of this case, and therefore suppression was unwarranted. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish the applicability of the independent source doctrine, the trial court's suppression order was affirmed. View "Colorado v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After Marcus Perez led police on a "lengthy foot pursuit," officers found two live shotgun shells in Perez's pocket. Without giving Perez Miranda warnings, the officer asked him, “Where’s the gun?” Perez answered that he had thrown the gun away. At a suppression hearing, Perez argued that his answer should have been suppressed because he was not Mirandized before the officer questioned him. The trial court disagreed, finding that the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applied. A jury convicted Perez of second-degree assault on a peace officer and four counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). Perez appealed, contending that the public safety exception did not apply. The court of appeals agreed but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the convictions. Under the facts of this case, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the public safety exception applied, and the arresting officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before inquiring about the gun's location. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In two cases consolidated for review, the common issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a a criminal defendant who was unable to post bond on a class 4 felony charge was “in custody” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on that charge under section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2020), and Crim. P. 7(h)(1), even if that defendant was also in custody for separate, unrelated offenses. While serving sentences in the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for unrelated offenses, David Subjack and Darryl Lynch were each arrested and charged with possession of contraband in the first degree, which is a class 4 felony. In both cases, the court set cash-only bonds, which neither defendant posted. Subjack and Lynch each requested a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 16-5-301(1)(b)(II) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1). The district court denied their requests, reasoning that the current charges did not form the “primary basis” of their custody. The Supreme Court concluded defendants were “in custody for the offense for which the preliminary hearing is requested” and therefore entitled to a preliminary hearing on their current charges. View "In re Colorado v. Subjack" on Justia Law

In 2015, Phillip Ross visited a website showing advertisements posted by individuals willing to perform sexual acts in exchange for money. Two girls under the age of eighteen, C.W. and M.O., listed varying ages in their advertisements, but consistently indicated that they were at least nineteen years old, and that any activities would be between two adults. Ross sent the girls sexually explicit text messages and negotiated the price he would pay in exchange for sexual acts. During his communications with M.O., Ross specifically inquired about her age, and she replied that she was twenty years old. Though Ross did not ask C.W. her age, her photograph appeared in the advertisements. When he was subsequently arrested, Ross admitted to texting the girls and agreeing to pay for sexual acts but maintained that he had not intended to solicit them for the purpose of child prostitution. In this appeal, the State asked the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether the phrase “for the purpose of” in two statutory provisions defining the crime of soliciting for child prostitution, sections 18-7-402(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. (2020), described a culpable mental state. A division of the court of appeals said it does and then equated the phrase with the culpable mental state of intentionally or with intent. The State contended the phrase “for the purpose of” in subsections (a) and (b) did not describe a culpable mental state or mens rea, but instead qualified the prohibited conduct or the actus reus - soliciting another or arranging (or offering to arrange) a meeting - by specifying the reason for which such conduct must have been undertaken: for the purpose of prostitution of a child or by a child. Contrary to the State's assertion, the Supreme Court determined the lower court correctly determined that neither the victim’s age nor the defendant’s knowledge of, or belief concerning, the victim’s age was an element of soliciting for child prostitution. The Supreme Court concluded that while section 18-7-407, C.R.S. (2020), precluded a defendant from raising a defense based on either his lack of knowledge of the child’s age or his reasonable belief that the child was an adult, it did not relieve the State of its burden of proof under subsections (a) and (b). "Thus, section 18-7-407 does not give the People a pass on their obligation to prove that, in soliciting another or arranging (or offering to arrange) a meeting, the defendant’s purpose was child prostitution." View "Colorado v. Ross" on Justia Law

In a case brought in the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, Governor Jared Polis sought a declaration he was not a proper named defendant in a suit challenging the implementation of Colorado law and policy by the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”), an executive agency over which he had ultimate authority. The underlying suit challenged the treatment of transgender women in CDOC custody. The named plaintiffs representing the class were seven transgender women who were confined in CDOC correctional facilities. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint named the Governor, the CDOC, the CDOC Executive Director, and multiple current and former CDOC employees as defendants. The amended complaint alleged Defendants’ policies and practices discriminated against transgender women by refusing to recognize them as women and thus subjecting them to unreasonable risks of violence, failing to provide necessary accommodations, and offering inadequate medical and mental health care. The Governor argued that after the Supreme Court's decision in Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008), he should have no longer been named as a defendant if there was an identifiable agency, official, or employee responsible for administering a challenged law. Here, he argued the CDOC and its employees were the only appropriate defendants. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed: Developmental Pathways did not alter the longstanding rule that the Governor was an appropriate defendant in cases involving “his constitutional responsibility to uphold the laws of the state and to oversee Colorado’s executive agencies.” View "In re Raven v. Polis" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Garcia was convicted of violating a protection order. On appeal, the district court concluded the county court violated Garcia’s confrontation right by admitting a notarized return of service into evidence at trial without the process server testifying. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the return of service wasn’t testimonial hearsay, and therefore its admission didn’t violate Garcia’s constitutional right to confrontation. The district court’s judgment was reversed. View "Colorado v. Garcia" on Justia Law

As Marcus Perez was being arrested after a lengthy foot pursuit, the arresting officer found two live shotgun shells in Perez’s pocket. Without giving Perez Miranda warnings, the officer asked him, “Where’s the gun?” Perez answered that he had thrown the gun away. At a suppression hearing, Perez argued that his answer should have been suppressed because he was not Mirandized before the officer questioned him. The trial court disagreed, finding that the public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applied. A jury convicted Perez of second-degree assault on a peace officer and four counts of possession of a dangerous weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). Perez appealed, contending that the public safety exception did not apply. The court of appeals agreed but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the convictions. Under the facts of this case, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the public safety exception applied, and the arresting officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before inquiring about the gun's location. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law