Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Colorado voters Amendments Y and Z to the state constitution that vested the authority to draw congressional and legislative districts with new, independent commissions made up of ordinary voters. The Amendments laid out instructions for how the commissions should draw district maps, including criteria to be considered in determining boundaries and detailed timetables that require public feedback and judicial review of the final plans. The cascading deadlines set out in Amendments Y and Z were based on an assumption that the United States Census Bureau would release its decennial census data in a timely fashion, as required by federal law. Delays caused by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, however, mean that the Census Bureau was operating months behind schedule and did not yet to release crucial redistricting data to which the redistricting commissions expected to already have access. This delay has thrown into question the feasibility of complying with the timelines established by Amendments Y and Z. To address the resulting uncertainty, the General Assembly introduced Senate Bill 21-247 (“SB 21-247”). Among other things, the bill would amend a recently enacted statutory definition of “necessary census data” to allow the commissions’ work to move forward based on preliminary census data and any other state or federal demographic data the commissions see fit to consult. The General Assembly petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and answer two interrogatories about Amendments Y and Z. The Court determined the Amendments did not require the exclusive use of final census data as the commissions and their nonpartisan staff begin their work; the commissions wer thus free to consult other reliable sources of population data, such as preliminary census data and interim data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. However, the Court determined the General Assembly did not have the power to compel the independent commissions or their nonpartisan staff to consider a particular source of population data or take any action beyond what Amendments Y and Z already required. “The Amendments were expressly intended to remove the General Assembly from the redistricting process, instead vesting all authority to draw district maps with independent commissions. Under this new scheme, the General Assembly has a discrete and limited role in appropriating funds for the commissions and nominating a limited number of applicants for consideration as commission members.” View "In re Interrogatories on Senate Bill 21-247 Submitted by the Colorado General Assembly" on Justia Law

Aundre Moore was charged with first degree murder for the shooting death of Jamaica McClain. Moore pleaded not guilty and was awaiting trial. He claimed he acted in self-defense, and he intended to introduce evidence of his pre-existing mental illness to help show why he subjectively believed he was in imminent danger and needed to use deadly force to repel McClain. The prosecution moved to exclude evidence of Moore’s mental condition, arguing that it was inadmissible unless he plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”), an affirmative defense that Moore has said he doesn’t plan to invoke. The district court denied the prosecution’s motion, reasoning that Moore’s stated purpose in offering the mental condition evidence was to prove the subjective belief component of his self-defense claim, not to prove insanity. Therefore, the court ruled that it would allow, without an insanity plea, expert testimony by a psychologist and a forensic psychiatrist who examined Moore, so long as their testimony otherwise conformed to the rules of evidence. The prosecution petitioned for interlocutory review by the Colorado Supreme Court, which then concluded that absent an insanity plea, a trial court must exclude any evidence that is probative of insanity, as that term has been defined by the legislature, irrespective of the ostensible purpose for which it was offered. “This means that evidence of less-severe mental illness remains admissible, absent an insanity plea, if it otherwise conforms to the statutory requirements and the rules of evidence. The court must parse any proffered mental condition evidence, line by line if necessary, to distinguish what is probative of insanity under this exacting definition from what is not.” View "Colorado v. Moore" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2015, a severe three-day storm deluged an eastern Colorado area with over six inches of rain. Two inches of water fell within thirty minutes on the first day, “a once-in-a-half-century occurrence.” During the storm, a mixture of wastewater and rainwater overflowed from one of the wastewater containment ponds in a cattle feedlot operated by 5 Star Feedlot, Inc. (“5 Star”). That water crossed several miles of land and ultimately found its way to the South Fork of the Republican River, killing an estimated 15,000 fish and giving rise to this litigation. Pursuant to section 33-6-110(1), C.R.S. (2020), the State initiated a civil action against 5 Star seeking to recover the value of the deceased fish based on 5 Star’s alleged violation of three predicate statutory provisions (“taking statutory provisions”) which, with some exceptions not pertinent here, made it unlawful for any person to “take” (i.e., to kill or otherwise acquire possession of or control over) certain wildlife. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The district court denied 5 Star’s motion, granted the State’s motion, and, following a bench trial on damages, ordered 5 Star to pay the State $625,755. 5 Star then appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the taking statutory provisions required the State to prove that 5 Star acted knowingly or, at minimum, performed an unlawful voluntary act. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concurred, finding the district court erred both in entering summary judgment against 5 Star and in denying 5 Star’s cross- motion. “Since the State failed to formally allege, never mind present proof, that 5 Star’s lawful, years-long operation of wastewater containment ponds killed or otherwise acquired possession of or control over the fish, it could not satisfy the voluntary act or actus reus requirement of the taking statutory provisions.” View "Dep't of Nat. Res. v. 5 Star Feedlot, Inc." on Justia Law

Alma Vidauri was convicted of one count of theft and three counts of forgery in connection with filings she made with the Garfield County, Colorado Department of Human Services (“Department”) between 2009 and 2016 for medical assistance benefits. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution had not shown the difference in value between the total amount of certain public benefits Vidauri received and the amount for which she might have been eligible had she accurately reported her household income. Therefore, the division reversed the trial court and entered judgment for the lowest level of theft, a class 1 petty offense. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the division, finding the applicable theft statute placed no burden on the prosecution to establish that Vidauri would have been ineligible for any of the benefits she received. "Because an applicant is not entitled to, and so has no legally cognizable interest in, any benefits until she has submitted accurate information demonstrating as much, we conclude that all the benefits Vidauri received by submitting false information were obtained by deception. Therefore, the original judgment of conviction for a class 4 felony must be reinstated." View "Colorado v. Vidauri" on Justia Law

Delano Medina sought review of the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition by a district court magistrate. Because a district court magistrate was authorized to rule on a habeas corpus petition only when the parties consent to proceeding before the magistrate and Medina did not so consent here, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the dismissal order was entered without authority. Accordingly, the Court reversed that order, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to assign the petition to a district court judge for further proceedings. View "Medina v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the court of appeals was correct in holding the trial court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony and, therefore, reversed Justine Murphy’s convictions for distributing methamphetamine and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and remanded the case for a new trial. Specifically, the Court considered whether the trial court properly admitted as lay opinion a police officer’s testimony regarding the conclusions he drew from his observations of a witness’s body language. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the police officer’s testimony regarding the witness’s body language constituted lay opinion testimony. Furthermore, the Court concluded the officer did not improperly comment on the credibility of another witness. Accordingly, the officer’s testimony was properly admitted, the appellate court's judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Murphy" on Justia Law

After dating for a few weeks, Vincent Compos and his ex-girlfriend ended their relationship; the ex-girlfriend obtained a protection order prohibiting Compos from contacting her. Shortly after the relationship ended, Compos appeared at a Super Bowl party that the ex-girlfriend and her children were also attending. Later that evening, Compos arrived uninvited at the ex-girlfriend’s home and let himself inside. The two began arguing, and during this argument, Compos threatened to kill the ex-girlfriend and her family. Compos then pulled out a gun and pointed it at the ex-girlfriend and her son. The ex-girlfriend called police; police were given permission to enter her house. There, police found Compos , and took him into custody. One of the officers spoke with Compos outside a patrol car. The officer asked Compos his name, to which Compos falsely responded “John Rocha” and provided a birthdate. Although the officer was aware of at least one protection order restricting Compos’s activities, and although the officer also knew that Compos was on bond, he did not provide Miranda warnings before asking Compos his name. The issues presented for the Colorado Supreme Court were: (1) whether Compos’s Miranda rights were violated when, after taking him into custody but prior to providing him with Miranda warnings, the police asked him his name; and (2) whether the division below erred in establishing a “new crime exception” to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and applying it here. The Supreme Court concluded the question as to Compos’s name amounted to a custodial interrogation, but, on the facts presented here, Compos’s response was admissible at trial because the question was akin to the type of routine booking question that has been deemed to be excepted from Miranda’s reach. For this reason, the Court affirmed the judgment of the division below, albeit on other grounds, and in light of this determination, the Court did not consider, and thus vacated, the portion of the division’s judgment establishing, sua sponte, a new crime exception to Miranda. View "Compos v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Two detectives questioned defendant Jose Padilla about his involvement in a potential sexual assault. In response, Padilla stated that he did not have sex with the victim, J.M., and that J.M. was extremely intoxicated on the night in question. He later moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The district court agreed and granted the motion to suppress, finding that Padilla was subjected to custodial interrogation without the required warnings. The State filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s order. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Padilla was not in custody for Miranda purposes, it reversed the portion of the district court’s order suppressing the statements, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Padilla" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether uploading the text of a bill to multiple computers and using automated software to simultaneously give voice to different portions of the bill at a speed of about 650 words per minute, complied with the the Colorado Constitution, article V, section 22: “Every bill shall be read by title when introduced, and at length on two different days in each house; provided, however, any reading at length may be dispensed with upon unanimous consent of the members present.” The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the software solution was not constitutional: "There are unquestionably different ways by which the legislature may comply with the reading requirement. But the cacophony generated by the computers here isn’t one of them. And while we have no business dictating the specifics of how the legislature might comply with the reading requirement, it is our prerogative and responsibility to declare that the legislature did not comply with that requirement in this case." The Court concurred with the district court's determination that the "unintelligible" sounds produced by the computers did not fulfill the reading requirement. But the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part because it concluded it was not within the district court's domain to dictate the form or manner by which the legislature may comply with the reading requirement. "By prescribing how the legislature must comply with the reading requirement, the district court trespassed upon the separation-of-powers tenet so essential to our constitutional system of government." View "Markwell v. Cooke" on Justia Law

In 2019, several parole officers approached a home that they believed was the residence of Susan Damico. Damico was a parolee whose parole agreement allowed officers to search “her person, residence, and/or vehicle” without a warrant as a condition of parole. When the officers arrived at the home, they found Damico in the front yard getting into her car. The officers identified themselves, informed Damico that they were conducting a parole visit, obtained a house key from her, and asked whether there was anyone inside the home. Damico told the officers that defendant-appellant Aaron Peluso was inside in bed. While the other officers entered the home, Damico's parole officer, Brook Hathaway, remained outside with Damico for several minutes. The officers who first entered the home found Peluso in bed and informed him of the purpose of their visit. After Peluso got dressed and out of bed, officers searched the room and found methamphetamine, THC, glass pipes, rolling papers, and a digital scale. Officers arrested Peluso and then searched his wallet, which contained additional methamphetamine. During the drive to jail, Peluso told officers that he had been using methamphetamine. Peluso was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress both the evidence recovered from his home and the statements he made after his arrest, arguing that the warrantless search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. At the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Damico did not actually live at Peluso's home at the time of the search, and Hathaway could have done more to verify Damico's address. The court further found that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether Peluso might have objected to the search once the officers entered his home. The State moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court incorrectly analyzed Damico’s actual, not apparent, authority to consent to the search. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence and reversed the order. "Because parole officers reasonably believed Damico had authority to consent to a search of Peluso’s residence, her apparent authority was sufficient to validate the warrantless search, and Peluso’s motion to suppress should have been denied." View "Colorado v. Peluso" on Justia Law