Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, a number of Colorado residents, local officials, voters, counties, and county commissioners, a nonprofit corporation, and a metropolitan district, contended: (1) Senate Bill 23-303 (“SB 303”) and its embedded referred measure, Proposition HH, violated the Colorado Constitution’s single subject requirement; and (2) Proposition HH violated the constitution’s clear expression requirement. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court found Colorado courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review either SB303 or Proposition HH for compliance with the state constitution’s single subject requirement unless and until those measures have been approved by Colorado voters. The Court further concluded that although the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ clear expression challenges to Proposition HH, at least to the extent that any defects in the title were amenable to reformation by the courts, petitioners did not establish Proposition HH violated the clear expression requirement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the portions of the district court’s judgment concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ single subject claims and denying petitioners’ requested relief on their clear expression claims, and vacated the portions of the district court’s judgment conditionally deciding the merits of petitioners’ single subject claims. The Court expressed no opinion on the merits of petitioners’ single subject claims. View "Ward v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Thomas Mitchell was driving when a flat tire forced him to stop in the right-hand lane of traffic. While standing behind his car and removing items from his trunk, another driver, Eli White, struck him, pinning him between the two cars and severing his legs. A blood sample consensually provided by White at the scene of the crash later revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) in an amount seven times that which, under Colorado law, gives rise to a permissible inference that a person was driving under the influence (“DUI”) of one or more drugs. White was charged with class 4 felony DUI, and class 1 misdemeanor careless driving. White sought to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing, as relevant here, that by the time the officers requested a blood sample from him, his investigatory stop had turned into an arrest that was unsupported by probable cause. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion, finding that when the officers collected the blood sample from White, they lacked any indicia of drug intoxication and had already determined that they had no more questions for him and that the cause of the collision was his distraction from the road as he attempted to adjust the car’s climate control features. Therefore, the court concluded the officers' detention of White for the purpose of obtaining his consent for a blood sample was unconstitutional. And because the court believed that White’s consent was not sufficiently attenuated from what it viewed as his illegal arrest, it found that his consent was invalid. The State then brought an interlocutory appeal. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, finding the officers asked White if he would consent to a blood draw about thirty minutes into their investigation. "Further, there were substantial delays caused by White’s requests to consult with his mother about the possibility of providing a blood sample. The officers accommodated White’s requests and allowed him to speak with his mother by phone and, once she arrived on the scene, in person." Under the circumstances present, the Supreme Court held the officers did not exceed the scope and character of the investigatory stop so as to transform it into an arrest. And because the officers did not unreasonably detain White, his consent to provide a blood sample was not rendered invalid. View "Colorado v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Rafael Garcia murdered his estranged wife’s neighbor in Palisade, Colorado. He immediately fled to Mexico. After unsuccessfully seeking his extradition back to Colorado, the District Attorney’s Office compiled a casebook on the crime and sent it to Mexican authorities. In 2009, Garcia was tried for the murder in Mexico, and was acquitted in that jurisdiction. When he returned to Colorado in 2016, he was immediately arrested, tried for murder and convicted. Garcia argued he should not have been tried for the murder in Colorado because he was acquitted in Mexico. Specifically, he argued the second prosecution violated his Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy. In the alternative, he argued Colorado statutory law limiting the “dual sovereignty” doctrine applied to bar prosecution in Colorado after acquittal in another country. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected these claims, concluding that under the United States Constitution and Colorado state law, Mesa County was entitled to prosecute Garcia despite his earlier prosecution and acquittal in Mexico. View "Garcia v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The common law prohibited anyone with a “direct pecuniary or proprietary interest” in the outcome of a case, including a party, from testifying. Given the direct-interest doctrine, courts also customarily precluded a party’s self-serving hearsay statements. The direct-interest doctrine was abrogated by statue throughout the country, however, Colorado law had no per se rule excluding a self-serving hearsay statement by a defendant. Instead, the Colorado Supreme Court held that, like any other hearsay statement, a defendant’s self-serving hearsay may be admissible if it satisfies a hearsay-rule exception in the Colorado Rules of Evidence. In this case, the district court determined that a hearsay statement by the accused, Jacob Vanderpauye, was automatically inadmissible because it was self-serving. In the alternative, it found that Vanderpauye’s hearsay statement did not meet the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. A division of the court of appeals disagreed on both fronts and reversed the judgment of conviction. To this, the Supreme Court affirmed: (1) the self-serving nature of Vanderpauye’s hearsay statement didn’t render the statement automatically inadmissible; (2) the statement, though self-serving, fit within the scope of the excited utterance exception because it was a spontaneous reaction by Vanderpauye to a startling event that rendered his normal reflective thought processes inoperative; and (3) the district court’s error in excluding the statement was not harmless. The case was returned to the district court for a new trial. View "Colorado v. Vanderpauye" on Justia Law

The State charged Jerrelle Smith with first degree, capital murder. Pertinent here, the State of Colorado statutorily abolished the death penalty for crimes charged on or after July 1, 2020. The Colorado Supreme Court determined the trial court abused its discretion when it treated Smith’s charge of first degree murder as a capital offense, then denied Smith’s request for bail. View "Colorado v. Smith" on Justia Law

Charles McLaughlin was arrested for driving under the influence after police responded to a call and located him in a parking lot near his truck. McLaughlin’s defense was that he had not been driving. At trial, the State introduced a video of the interaction between LcLaughlin and the arresting officer. The video was edited to omit statements LcLaughlin made to the officer alleging that an unidentified woman was driving the vehicle. McLaughlin sought to introduce these statements under the rule of completeness, arguing that the redacted video created a misleading impression. The trial court ruled that McLaughlin’s statements were self-serving hearsay, and therefore, inadmissible under the rule of completeness. The court further concluded that McLaughlin’s statements about the unidentified woman were not admissible unless he testified, which would subject him to impeachment with his prior felony convictions. McLaughlin declined to testify and as a result, his statements about the woman were never admitted. A jury found him guilty. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that: (1) self-serving hearsay is admissible under the rule of completeness; and (2) statements from a defendant-declarant admitted under that rule were not subject to impeachment. To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. View "Colorado v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Trevor Pellegrin and the victim began dating, moved in together shortly thereafter, and later became engaged. During the parties’ relationship, Pellegrin took private, intimate photos of the victim in various stages of undress. The relationship subsequently ended, but several months after it did, Pellegrin and the victim spent three or four days together. At about that time, Pellegrin learned that the victim had started seeing someone else. This information upset Pellegrin, and over the next few days, he repeatedly called and texted the victim. In the course of these communications, Pellegrin called the victim names, sent nude photos of her that he had taken during their relationship, and threatened to post the nude photos online and send them to her younger brother. The victim received over one hundred text messages and photos from strangers, including messages with photos of naked men, messages saying that unknown people were driving by her home, and messages soliciting sex. At some point, the victim learned that these text messages were in response to two Craigslist advertisements that Pellegrin had placed. Upon becoming aware of these advertisements, the victim contacted the police, who arrested Pellegrin at his home. The State subsequently charged Pellegrin with, as pertinent here, one count of stalking, two counts of posting a private image for harassment (one count for the Facebook posting and one for the Craigslist posting), and one count of harassment. The case ultimately proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted Pellegrin on all counts. He was sentenced to jail time, probation and participation in a domestic violence evaluation, and compliance with that evaluation's recommendations. Pellegrin appealed, arguing that harassment was a lesser included offense of stalking, so the two crimes should have merged. Pellegrin further argued that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not the trial judge, to determine whether the crimes for which he was convicted included an act of domestic violence. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Pellegrin's arguments on appeal and affirmed his sentence. View "Pellegrin v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A man was found dead in Thornton, Colorado, and police suspected homicide. Thornton detectives identified defendant Thorvyn Bullcalf Evan Smiley as the sole suspect and, after tracking him down in New Mexico, brought him to a police station there to collect certain samples from him pursuant to a court order. Seeing Smiley’s obvious concern, they repeatedly reassured him that he wasn’t in trouble and that he’d be leaving the police station that day. The detectives then advised Smiley of his Miranda rights. Smiley signed a waiver and agreed to speak with the detectives. During the subsequent interrogation, Smiley confessed to killing the alleged victim. One of the questions before the trial court was whether the prosecution had proved that Smiley voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded the answer was no, and it suppressed the statement. The Colorado Supreme Court found no reversible error in that judgment and affirmed. View "Colorado v. Smiley" on Justia Law

The State of Colorado charged Dennis Chirinos-Raudales with, among other crimes, sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust, which prohibits sexual contact with persons under eighteen, but whose penalty escalates from a class 4 felony to a class 3 felony if the victim is under fifteen. The question presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the “subject of the action” was the subsection that applied when the child is under eighteen or the subsection that applies when the child is under fifteen. To this, the Court held that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense rather than the sentence enhancer. Therefore, because the substantive offense applies when the child is under eighteen and the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute. View "Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Jose Leonel Orellana-Leon sexually abused his girlfriend’s daughter, L.V., from the time she was seven or eight years old until she was fifteen. When L.V. was fifteen years old, she told her father and stepmother about the abuse; as a result, a forensic interview was conducted. The State subsequently charged Orellana-Leon with sexual assault on a child (“SAOC”) by one in a position of trust. Before trial, the State gave notice it intended to admit statements L.V. made to her father, stepmother, and the forensic interviewer under the child hearsay statute. Over the defense’s objection, the trial court granted the State's request. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on what happens when a defendant is charged under a statute that references two different ages. In the companion case, Chirinos-Raudales v. Colorado, 2023 CO 33, ¶ 21, __ P.3d __, the Court concluded that the “subject of the action” for SAOC by one in a position of trust was the substantive offense, which applied when the child was under eighteen, rather than the sentence enhancer, which applied when the child is under fifteen. Applying that holding to this case, the Court concluded that because the victim was under eighteen at the time she made the statements in question, the trial court properly admitted them under the child hearsay statute. View "Orellana-Leon v. Colorado" on Justia Law