Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Regional Transportation District and the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District were funded by a broad sales tax with a few exemptions. Over time, Colorado lawmakers added and removed exemptions. As the exemptions for the State and the Districts gradually diverged, tax collection became increasingly complicated for both vendors and the revenue department. To make it easier for everyone, the General Assembly passed House Bill 13-1272, adding and removing exemptions on the Districts’ taxes to realign them with the State’s, which yielded a projected net increase in the Districts’ annual tax revenue. When the Districts began collecting the altered sales tax without holding a vote, the TABOR Foundation sued, arguing the Bill created a “new tax” or effected a “tax policy change” and therefore required voter approval under Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights. The trial court granted the Districts summary judgment on stipulated facts, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed. Through this opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court clarified that legislation causing only an incidental and de minimis tax-revenue increase does not amount to a “new tax” or a “tax policy change.” The Court held H.B. 13-1272 was such a bill: serving to simplify tax collection and ease administrative burdens. The Bill “only incidentally increases the Districts’ tax revenues by a de minimis amount.” Accordingly, the Court concluded H.B. 13-1272 did not violate the Colorado Constitution, and affirmed the court of appeals. View "TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District" on Justia Law

Following a stop and inventory search of his car, Therrold Quick was charged with possession of a weapon by a previous offender, violation of a protection order, driving under restraint, and violation of a traffic control signal. He moved to suppress a gun discovered during the search as the product of an unconstitutional seizure of his car. The State brought an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order granting Quick’s motion to suppress the gun. The district court initially denied the motion, upon reconsideration in light of the court of appeals’ opinion in Colorado v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, __ P.3d __, it found that where Quick was merely cited, and not actually arrested, for driving with a suspended license, and where the only justification offered for seizing his car was instead the likelihood that he would continue to drive and thereby endanger public safety, the initial seizure of his car did not fall within the community caretaking exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Because compliance with a departmental policy or procedure is insufficient in and of itself to bring the seizure of a vehicle within an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and because seizing a vehicle to prevent the driver from continuing to drive with a suspended license does not fall within the specific community caretaking exception, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Quick" on Justia Law

Carl Brown was charged with and convicted of possession with intent to distribute a schedule II controlled substance, stemming from the discovery of crack cocaine during an inventory search of his vehicle. He was sentenced to ten years in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections. The State petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment reversing Brown’s drug-related conviction on the ground that his motion to suppress should have been granted. The district court found that the contraband in question was discovered during an inventory search of the defendant’s vehicle, the conduct of which was within the officers’ discretion according to the policies and procedures of the Aurora Police Department, even though they had already decided to issue a summons rather than arrest the defendant for driving with a suspended license. The court of appeals found that in the absence of an arrest, seizing the defendant’s vehicle so as to provoke an inventory of its contents could not be justified as an exercise of the police caretaking function, and in the absence of any other recognized exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, violated its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Colorado Supreme Court found the trial court record failed to demonstrate that seizure of the defendant’s vehicle was justified as an exercise of the police caretaking function or was otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of local ordinances or police policies and procedures broad enough to grant the officers discretion to impound the vehicle of a driver merely summoned rather than arrested for driving with a suspended license, the judgment of the court of appeals thus affirmed. View "Colorado v. Brown" on Justia Law

The State sought review of a court of appeals judgment that reversed an amended restitution order that substantially increased defendant Franck Belibi after he was convicted. Following the acceptance of Belibi’s guilty plea, the imposition of a sentence to probation, including a stipulation to $4,728 restitution, and the entry of judgment, the district court amended its restitution order to require the payment of an additional $302,022 in restitution. The court of appeals held that in the absence of anything in the court’s written or oral pronouncements reserving a final determination of the amount of restitution, the initial restitution order had become final and could not be amended. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed: because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution due, finalizes any specific amount already set, the sentencing court lacked the power to increase restitution beyond the previously set amount of $4,728. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. View "Colorado v. Belibi" on Justia Law

Carlos Meza pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the Class A Traffic Infraction of “Limitations on backing.” Although defendant was present at the providency hearing, his guilty plea consisted merely of acknowledging his reading, understanding, and signing a standardized advisement and plea form, which was presented to the court by the prosecutor, along with an unsigned order for restitution in the amount of $150. The court accepted the plea, fined the defendant $100, ordered restitution, and signed both the completed advisement and plea form and the restitution order. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a motion for additional restitution, which was opposed by the defendant. In addition to legal argument before the trial court, both counsel made a number of further factual allegations concerning the incident, the reasons for the victim’s belief that his full damages would be, but were not, paid by defendant’s insurance company, and the plea negotiations. The county court ordered the requested additional amount of restitution, finding that the victim had suffered a loss of $936.85 that was not known to the State or the court at sentencing, when restitution was initially, but not finally, set at $150. On appeal, the district court, sitting as the court of direct appellate review (pursuant to the simplified procedure for county court convictions) found that the annotation “RR” on the form guilty plea was sufficient to reserve the final amount of restitution and that the record supported the county court’s finding of an additional loss not known at sentencing; it therefore affirmed the increase as having been sanctioned by section 18-1.3-603(3)(a) of the revised statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution, finalizes any specific amount already set, and because the court ordered no reservation in this case, it lacked the power to increase the amount of restitution it had previously set. View "Meza v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Alfred Sandoval was charged with first degree assault (a class three felony), and possession of a weapon by a previous offender (a class five felony). Sandoval entered into a plea agreement to the reduced charge of felony menacing (a class five felony) in exchange for dismissal of the original charges. The plea agreement also provided that Sandoval would not be sentenced to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). It did not include any stipulation to judicial fact-finding at sentencing. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court plainly erred when it sentenced Sandoval to an aggravated community corrections sentence based on judicial fact-finding to which Sandoval did not stipulate. The Supreme Court found that it did: in affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applied to a direct sentence to community corrections. Furthermore, the Court held it was plain error for the trial court to sentence the defendant to an aggravated sentence to community corrections without meeting Blakely’s requirements. View "Colorado v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant James Washam, III was charged by information with twelve counts of sexual assault on a child. A portion of the charged date range fell outside of the applicable statute of limitations. After trial began, the prosecution successfully moved to amend the information, narrowing the date range so that it fell completely within the statute. Ultimately, Washam was convicted on all twelve counts. He appealed, arguing that under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(e), the amendment to the date rate was a substantive amendment, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the change once trial began. A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the convictions, further ordering the charges be dismissed with prejudice. The State appealed. Upon review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because the amendment simply narrowed the date range in the information (and did not add an essential element to the offense or raise issues of inadequate notice), the amendment to the information was one of form and not substance. Furthermore, the Court found Washam’s substantial rights were not prejudiced, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the amendment after trial began. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Washam" on Justia Law

Teachers who worked for Denver Public Schools (“DPS”), and Denver Classroom Teachers Association (collectively, “the teachers”), filed this suit, alleging that DPS invoked Senate Bill 10-191, which under certain circumstances allowed a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave, to remove hundreds of teachers from their positions in violation of both due process of law and the contracts clause of the Colorado Constitution. School District No. 1 and members of the Colorado Board of Education (collectively, “the District”) moved to dismiss the suit, and the trial court granted that motion. A division of the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting predecessor statutes to the relevant (codified as the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”)) and concluded due process violations occurred under those predecessor statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the TECDA did not create a contractual relationship or vest nonprobationary teachers who were placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. View "Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Masters" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nathan Ybanez petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction of first degree murder and directing that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole be modified only to the extent of permitting the possibility of parole after forty years. The appellate court rejected Ybanez’s assertions: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel both because his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by a non-waivable conflict of interest under which that counsel labored and because he was prejudiced by a deficient performance by his counsel; and (3) that he was entitled to an individualized determination regarding the length of his sentence rather than merely the possibility of parole after forty years. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) Ybanez lacked any constitutional right to a guardian ad litem and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing one as permitted by statute; (2) Ybanez failed to demonstrate either an adverse effect resulting from an actual conflict of interest, even if his counsel actually labored under a conflict, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, even if it actually fell below the required standard of competent representation; and (3) because Ybanez was constitutionally and statutorily entitled only to an individualized determination whether life without the possibility of parole or life with the possibility of parole after forty years was the appropriate sentence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals is affirmed, and the case remanded with directions to return it to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "Ybanez v. Colorado" on Justia Law