Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant Christopher Pernell of several charges, including burglary, kidnapping, and sexual assault. The prosecution alleged that Pernell showed up at his ex-wife’s house uninvited; forced his way into her home; threatened her and her boyfriend at gunpoint; forced her to have sexual intercourse; and prevented her from fleeing. At trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses, including the ex-wife, the boyfriend, and a police officer who investigated the incident, as well as corroborating physical evidence. Pernell did not testify or present evidence at trial. His theory of defense was that the ex-wife and the boyfriend fabricated the story of the incident. Consistent with this theory, defense counsel told the jury during opening statements that the incident, as described by the ex-wife and the boyfriend, “didn’t happen” and that the ex-wife and the boyfriend “concoct[ed] their story to get [Pernell] out of their lives.” An officer who testified at trial recounted the ex-wife’s description of the incident to him. Pernell objected to this testimony, arguing that the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements to the officer constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court admitted these statements as excited utterances. On appeal, Pernell argued, among other things, that the trial court had reversibly erred in admitting the ex-wife’s statements. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that defense counsel’s opening statement that the ex-wife fabricated her story opened the door for the admission of her out-of-court statements. However, upon review of the trial record, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded any error in the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of these statements contributed to Pernell’s conviction. The Court declined to address whether defense counsel’s opening statement opened the door to the admission of the ex-wife’s out-of-court statements, affirming on difference grounds as the appellate court. View "Pernell v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This case arose from a grand jury investigation of petitioner M.W. and his company, I.I. The State suspected that I.I. was manufacturing and distributing a cigarette product illegally sprayed with synthetic cannabinoids. As part of the grand jury investigation, the State issued a subpoena duces tecum to I.I’s attorney Amy Brimah, ordering her to produce all materials related to any representation by her of I.I. and M.W. The State also requested a hearing, outside the presence of the grand jury and before a judge. Brimah and M.W. moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the materials were protected by the attorney–client privilege. The State asserted that the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege applied. The district court denied Brimah’s and M.W.’s motions, declining to review the documents individually, and ordered Brimah to produce the requested materials. Brimah and M.W. petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that a two-step process applies when a party seeks disclosure of attorney–client-privileged documents under the crime–fraud exception: (1) before a court may review the privileged documents in camera, it must “require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that wrongful conduct sufficient to invoke the crime or fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege has occurred;” and (2) the court may strip a communication of privilege only upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the client was committing, or attempting to commit, a crime or fraud and the communication was made in furtherance of the putative crime or fraud. Because the State failed to make such a showing here, the district court abused its discretion in stripping the documents of privilege. Brimah and M.W. also argued the district court should have required the State to disclose the applications and authorizations for the intercepts on which it premised its subpoena under Colorado’s wiretap statute, specifically section 16-15-102(9), C.R.S. (2017). On the facts of this case the Supreme Court agreed. The district court was reversed on this point too. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re 2015-2016 Jefferson County Grand Jury" on Justia Law

Respondent Isidore Griego was charged with attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault arising out of two incidents in which Griego drove drunk, but due to traffic conditions at the time of the incidents, did not ultimately put any particular persons at risk. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the requirement in the attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault statutes that a defendant place “another person” at risk of death or serious bodily injury necessitates that an actual, discernible person be placed at risk, or if “another person” can refer to the public at large. The Court concluded the statutes at issue required a showing of a risk to an actual, discernible person and that a risk to the public at large was insufficient. “Holding otherwise would leave the statutes without a clear limiting principle and would raise equal protection concerns.” Accordingly, the Court held the court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence did not support Griego’s convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault. View "Colorado v. Griego" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jane Norton sued Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. (“RMPP”), Governor John W. Hickenlooper, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, and the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (“CDPHE”), for violating section 50 of the Colorado Constitution. Prior to filing this suit as a private citizen, Norton had served as Executive Director of CDPHE. In 2001, while serving in that role, Norton hired an accounting firm to determine whether RMPP was “separately incorporated, maintain[ed] separate facilities, and maintain[ed] financial records which demonstrate[d] financial independence” from Planned Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains Services Corporation (“Services Corp.”), an organization that offered abortion services. The accounting firm determined that RMPP was “subsidizing the rent for Services Corp., an affiliate that performs abortions.” From this information, Norton concluded that whenever CDPHE provided funding to RMPP, it was violating section 50. As a result, Norton terminated the State’s contractual relationship with RMPP and ceased all taxpayer funding of that organization. In 2009, after Norton had left CDPHE, the State resumed making payments to RMPP, prompting Norton to file this lawsuit in which she sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State officials and pursued a claim of unjust enrichment against RMPP. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a complaint alleging a violation of article V, section 50 of the Colorado Constitution based solely on a theory of subsidization states a claim for relief sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). The Supreme Court held that it did not; instead, to state a claim for relief under section 50, a complaint must allege that the State made a payment to a person or entity - whether directly to that person or entity, or indirectly through an intermediary - for the purpose of compensating them for performing an abortion and that such an abortion was actually performed. View "Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury found state-prison inmate David Bueno guilty of first-degree murder and conspiracy in a case concerning a white inmate’s death. The case took more than two months to try, involved hundreds of motions, and generated tens of thousands of pages of discovery. Fifteen months after Bueno’s conviction (but before he was sentenced) the prosecution disclosed two reports that had been in its possession since the first days of the investigation. Arguing that this belated disclosure violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Bueno moved for a new trial under Crim. P. 33(c). The trial court, which had presided over the entirety of this case, found a discovery violation and determined that a new trial was warranted. A division of the court of appeals affirmed in a split opinion. The two issues this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review were: (1) whether Bueno’s Rule 33(c) motion was time-barred because he filed it more than a year after his conviction, and thus arguably more than a year after “entry of judgment;” and (2) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the prosecution violated Brady’s disclosure requirement, and specifically, whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the evidence at issue was material and that the prosecution violated Crim. P. 16. As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held that “entry of judgment” for purposes of Rule 33 occurs after delivery of a verdict of guilt and imposition of a sentence, as applied here, Bueno’s motion was not time-barred. As to the second issue, the Court found “no clear error” in the trial court’s factual findings, and therefore did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial. View "Colorado v. Bueno" on Justia Law

The district court found that the initial contact with both defendants in a parked car constituted an investigatory stop for which the police lacked reasonable articulable suspicion, and it suppressed all evidence acquired after the point of initial contact as the fruit of an unlawful stop. The Colorado Supreme Court found that because the district court failed to appreciate that the officers’ initial contact with the defendants fell short of a stop, and by the point at which the contact progressed to a seizure within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment, the officers had acquired the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion, and subsequently probable cause, to justify their investigative conduct, or inevitably would have lawfully arrested the defendants and discovered the contraband. The Court reversed both suppression orders and remanded the respective cases for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Fields" on Justia Law

After Respondent-cross-petitioner Brian Rowland was cited for drunk driving, he argued at his license revocation hearing that section 42-2-126(8)(c) C.R.S. (2017) barred the hearing officer from considering an analyst’s report on his blood alcohol content (“BAC”) because the report was an affidavit and the analyst had not signed it under penalty of perjury. The court of appeals ultimately held that: (1) section 42-2-126(8)(c) required all written statements from non-law enforcement sources to be presented in affidavit form and sworn to under penalty of perjury before they can be considered as evidence in driver’s license revocation hearings; but (2) BAC test results may be admitted at a driver’s license revocation hearing through a law enforcement officer’s testimony even if the laboratory report on which the officer’s testimony is based is inadmissible. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on both issues, and reversed as to issue one and, as a result, decline to reach the second issue. The Court found that the plain language of section 42-2-126(8)(c) did not require all written statements from non-law enforcement sources to be presented in affidavit form and sworn to under penalty of perjury before they could be considered as evidence in driver’s license revocation hearings. Specifically, no section of the revocation statute expressly required all written reports to be sworn to under penalty of perjury or to meet any other affidavit requirements. However, the Court found the statute did not define the term “affidavit,” and concluded the BAC report in this case was not an affidavit. View "Dep't. of Revenue v. Rowland" on Justia Law

The District Attorney brought Joshua Epps to trial on charges related to allegations that Epps had threatened his probation officer. Shortly after a mistrial was declared, the alleged victim’s husband (who was also a witness called by the prosecution at trial) had an antagonistic encounter with Epps in the courtroom. The deputy district attorney prosecuting the case witnessed the encounter and later spoke to the alleged victim’s husband about it. Epps subsequently endorsed the deputy district attorney as a witness both to the encounter and to the statements made to him by the alleged victim’s husband. Epps then sought to disqualify the deputy district attorney on the basis of his expected testimony, which was to be offered to impeach the husband. The State opposed both the effort to call the deputy district attorney as a witness and the motion to disqualify. The district court, however, ruled that Epps would be allowed to call the deputy district attorney to testify at trial and disqualified the entire district attorney’s office, based, in large part, on the State’s alleged failure to object to that proposed action. The State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order because it found the district court relied on an erroneous understanding that the State had not objected to the disqualification. Moreover, the Supreme Court could not say the deputy district attorney’s proffered testimony would have been of sufficient consequence to deny Epps a fair trial. View "Colorado v. Epps" on Justia Law

Ervin Isom was convicted of sexual assault on a child, adjudicated a habitual sex offender against children, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of forty years to life. The Colorado Supreme Court held that to calculate the maximum permissible minimum end of an indeterminate sentence for a defendant sentenced as a habitual sex offender against children, trial courts must triple the maximum of the presumptive range for the offense and may then double the resulting figure if the court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances under section 18-3-401(6), C.R.S. (2017). Here, the Court affirmed the court of appeals and concluded the bottom end of Isom’s indeterminate sentence had to be no lower than eighteen years, and could be extended up to thirty-six years if the trial court found extraordinary aggravating circumstances. Isom’s sentence of forty years to life was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "Isom v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State of Colorado filed an interlocutory appeal of a district court order suppressing statements made by, and contraband seized from defendant-appellee Brandy Ball. Although the district court found her initial stop to be supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, it nevertheless found that before she made any inculpatory statements, the seizure of her person had exceeded the permissible scope of an investigatory stop; that she was already under arrest by the time she was interrogated without the benefit of Miranda warnings; and that her subsequent consent to search her purse and car was not voluntary. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the district court either misapprehended or misapplied the controlling legal standards governing investigatory stops, arrests, and custodial interrogations, and because the warrantless searches of the defendant’s car and purse were justified on the basis of probable cause and exigent circumstances, without regard for the voluntariness of her consent or compliance with the dictates of section 16-1-301, C.R.S. (2017), the statute governing consensual vehicle searches in this jurisdiction. View "Colorado v. Ball" on Justia Law