Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The citizens of home-rule city Fort Collins voted in favor of a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and the storage of its waste products within city limits. The Colorado Oil and Gas Association (the Association), an industry organization, sued Fort Collins and requested: (1) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, and the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, preempted Fort Collins’s fracking moratorium; and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement of the moratorium. The Association subsequently moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim, and Fort Collins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to find that the moratorium was not preempted by state law. The Supreme Court concluded that "fracking is a matter of mixed state and local concern," Fort Collins’s fracking moratorium was subject to preemption by state law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Fort Collins’s five-year moratorium on fracking and the storage of fracking waste operationally conflicted with the effectuation of state law. Accordingly, the Court held that the moratorium was preempted by state law and was, therefore, invalid and unenforceable. The district court’s order was affirmed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2006, Colorado voters passed Amendment 41 and created Independent Ethics Commission (IEC), an independent commission tasked with investigating allegations of government officials’ misconduct. In an original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the IEC's decision to dismiss a complaint against a public officer as frivolous is subject to judicial review. The plaintiff contended that the General Assembly authorized such review when it enacted section 24-18.5-101(9), C.R.S. (2015), which provided that “[a]ny final action of the commission concerning a complaint shall be subject to judicial review.” The Supreme Court found that the Colorado Constitution forbade the General Assembly from “limit[ing] or restrict[ing]” IEC’s powers. Moreover, although the constitution provided that “penalties may be provided by law,” it also provided that IEC “may dismiss frivolous complaints without conducting a public hearing,” The Supreme Court concluded that, while the General Assembly could authorize judicial review of IEC’s enforcement decisions, it could not encroach upon IEC’s decisions not to enforce. Therefore, the Court held the General Assembly’s “judicial review” provision did not apply to frivolity dismissals. View "Colo. Ethics Watch v. Indep. Ethics Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant E.G. was convicted of two counts of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of sexual abuse. Before trial, he filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the scene of the crime, his grandmother’s basement. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to order such access and denied the motion. The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, though not its result, holding that atrial court does indeed have authority to order defense access to a third-party residence. It nevertheless affirmed the denial of the motion for access because it concluded that E.G. had “failed to demonstrate” that inspection of the crime scene was “necessary to present his defense.” The Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order access to a private residence, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals on alternate grounds. View "Colorado in the Interest of E.G." on Justia Law

Defendant Saul Chavez was charged with one count of sexual assault. The alleged victim lived in a home with other members of her family. The State alleged that Chavez, a family friend, had been allowed to stay the night at the victim’s house after drinking alcohol late into the evening. The State further alleged that Chavez entered a bedroom where the victim was asleep, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with her, without her consent, while she was physically helpless. Chavez filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the home (the scene of the alleged crime). He argued that he needed access in order to “be able to investigate and photograph the property for his defense.” Chavez cited Crim. P. 16(I)(d) in support of his motion, arguing that, under that rule, the court had “discretionary power” to order the disclosure of “relevant material and information.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court had the authority to grant a defendant’s discovery motion seeking access to the private residence of a non-party. The Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order such access, and abused its discretion by its order. View "In re Colorado v. Chavez" on Justia Law

The Cordells were the record owners of a tract of land in La Plata County (Tract1), and Mr. Cordell was also the record owner of an adjoining tract that had been deeded to him by his grandmother (Tract2). After the Cordells failed to pay the taxes owed on these properties for three successive years, Brenda Heller purchased tax liens for each tract and later assigned these liens to Bradley Klingsheim. Thereafter, Klingsheim requested deeds for the properties from the Treasurer. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review principally required the Court to determine the scope of a county treasurer’s duty of diligent inquiry, pursuant to section 39-11-128(1), C.R.S. (2015), in attempting to notify a taxpayer that his or her land may be sold to satisfy a tax lien. The Cordells contended that the deeds were void because the La Plata County Treasurer’s Office had not fulfilled its statutory duty of diligent inquiry in attempting to notify the Cordells that it would be issuing a tax deed for the Cordells’ properties. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a county treasurer had an initial duty to serve notice of a pending tax sale on every person in actual possession or occupancy of the property at issue, as well as on the person in whose name the property was taxed or specially assessed, if upon diligent inquiry, such persons can be found in the county or if their residences outside the county are known. In addition, we hold that a treasurer owed a duty of further diligent inquiry after an initial notice has been sent only when the facts known to the treasurer show that the taxpayer could not have received the notice of the pending tax sale. The Court concluded the Treasurer satisfied its duty of diligent inquiry. In addition, the Court concluded that the notice that the Treasurer provided in this case satisfied due process requirements. View "Klingsheim v. Cordell" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Amadeo Chavez-Barragan was charged with possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. After the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence, the State appealed. The Supreme Court concluded reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Chavez-Barragan" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a district court's order that concluded that the "lewd fondling or caress" provision of the Colorado public indecency statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Court found that the provision did not burden a substantial amount of protected speech or expressive conduct, so it was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Moreover, because defendant's conduct in this case met any reasonable definition of "lewd fondling or caress," the statute wasnot vague as applied to his actions. The Court reversed the trial court's order holding to the contrary. View "Colorado v. Graves" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charles Dean was convicted by jury of second degree murder, the sentence for which carried a maximum presumptive sentencing range of twenty-four years. The trial court adjudicated him a habitual criminal and sentenced him under Colorado's habitual criminal statute. Under the corresponding parole eligibility provision governing his conviction, petitioner had to serve seventy-five percent of his sentence, here, seventy-two years, before he was eligible for parole. On appeal of that sentence, petitioner contended that the interplay of the habitual criminal statute and the parole eligibility statute, as applied to his case, violated his right to equal protection because he had to serve a longer period of incarceration before he was eligible for parole than a habitual offender with a history of more serious felony convictions. After review, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing and parole eligibility scheme for habitual criminal offenders did not violate petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection. View "Colorado v. Dean" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Eduardo Perez was convicted of identity theft and criminal impersonation for using another person's Social Security Number in order to get a job. The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review involved the applicability of the culpable mental state, "knowingly," to the elements of identity theft as enumerated in 18-5-902, C.R.S. (2015). After review, the Supreme Court held that to be guilty of identity theft, an offender must have used the identifying information of another with knowledge that the information belonged to an actual person. The Court concluded that the evidence presented at respondent's trial was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that responded indeed knew the Social Security number he used belonged to actual person. View "Colorado v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this matter to determine whether the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a potential juror who was an employee of a privately owned and operated prison. The court of appeals held that because the private prison used "sovereign police powers characteristic of law enforcement in the service of the public interest," it was a "public law enforcement agency" as used by statute. The appellate court concluded the trial court should have sustained the defendant's challenge for cause. The Supreme Court found that under the plain language of 16-10-103(1)(k) C.R.S. 2015, a private company that operates a prison was not a "public law enforcement agency" because it was not a division of a state or federal government that has the authority to investigate crimes or to arrest, prosecute or detain criminals. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Bonvicini" on Justia Law