Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this case required an interpretation of the statute that provided for challenges for cause to potential jurors in criminal cases. Specifically, the issue involved the scope of the provision that directed trial courts to sustain a challenge to a potential juror who was a "compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency." Petitioner Samuel Mulberger brought a challenge to a juror who worked as a nurse for the El Paso County Jail. The nurse was paid by a governmental contractor, but was not a compensated employee of the jail. Mulberger used a peremptory challenge to dismiss the potential juror and ultimately exhausted all of his challenges. The jury found Mulberger guilty, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Mulberger argued the trial court erred in concluding the contract-employee was not an employee of the public law enforcement agency, and that the trial court erroneously denied his challenge for cause, then exhausted his challenges to remove the juror. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Mulberger v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Salvador Esquivel-Castillo appealed the court of appeals decision to affirm his conviction for felony murder. A jury acquitted him of a separate count of kidnapping, but convicted him of felony murder for a death caused during his commission or attempted commission of kidnapping the same victim, during the same charged timeframe, by a different statutorily qualifying act of kidnapping. The appellate court rejected petitioner's assertion that a more specific kidnapping charge necessarily limited the scope of the more generally-charged felony murder county to a charge of death caused in the court of or in furtherance of the commission of kidnapping by seizing and carrying the victim from one place to another, resulting in his having been convicted of a crime with which he had never been charged. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed: the crime of kidnapping alleged more generally as an element of felony murder was not limited to the specific alternative act of kidnapping alleged in the separate kidnapping count, and therefore jury instructions as to all statutory forms of kidnapping supported by the evidence did not constructively amend the felony murder charge. View "Esquivel-Castillo v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Respondent Larry Marquardt was committed to the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP) in 2013 after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon and assault on an at-risk adult. He was diagnosed with "schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, with prominent paranoia." Respondent took ten milligrams of an antipsychotic medication once daily, but refused to take more because of a fear of the side effects, namely tardive dyskinesia. The State petitioned to have the dosage increased to a maximum of twenty milligrams daily, because respondent's psychiatrist felt that ten milligrams was only partially effective. A trial court found that the increased dosage was "necessary to prevent a significant long-term deterioration in his mental condition." The court observed that because of respondent's mental illness and insanity plea, he would never be released from the institution unless his condition improved, and concluded that respondent's need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to override "any bona fide and legitimate interest of [Marquardt] in refusing treatment." The court ordered respondent to submit to the increased dose. Respondent appealed, arguing the trial court misapplied the controlling case law precedent to his case. "Colorado v. Medina," (705 P.2d 961 (1985)) outlined the rule that courts had to follow before ordering a patient to be forcibly medicated. In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the "Medina" rule applied to petitions to increase the dose of a medication over a patient's objection. Further, the Court held that if the patient was stable, a lack of improvement, without more, did not satisfy Medina's requirement that the patient be at risk of significant and likely long-term deterioration. View "Colorado v. Marquardt" on Justia Law

The State appealed a court of appeals' judgment that vacated Kenneth Childress' conviction of vehicular assault while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Though it was undisputed that Childress was not driving the vehicle at issue, the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty as a complicitor. The appellate court concluded that because vehicular assault while under the influence was a strict liability offense, no culpable mental state of the driver was required, and that the Colorado Supreme Court previously held complicitor liability inapplicable to crimes lacking a culpable mental state requirement. After review, the Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals' judgment, clarified complicitor liability. The case was remanded for a determination of whether the jury was adequately instructed in light of the Court's holding. View "Colorado v. Childress" on Justia Law

A jury found petitioner John Doubleday guilty of felony murder despite finding him not guilty (based on the affirmative defense of duress) of the charged predicate offense. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and Doubleday appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that to establish that a defendant committed a predicate offense within the meaning of the Colorado felony murder statute, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the predicate offense, including the inapplicability of any properly asserted affirmative defense to the predicate offense. View "Doubleday v. People" on Justia Law

Police arrested Levent Kutlak after he had a fight with his in-laws. A detective interviewed Kutlak at the police station. Kutlak was read his Miranda rights, after which he asked whether he could "get [his laywer] down here now, or…?" The detective responded that it might "be difficult" to get in touch with the attorney. Moments later, Kutlak stated that he was going to "take a dice roll" and talk with the detective. Kutlak signed a Miranda waiver and proceeded to make incriminating statements regarding the in-laws incident. Kutlak later moved to suppress the statements he gave the detective. The trial court denied the motion and a jury convicted Kutlak on charges of child abuse, first degree criminal trespass and two counts of third degree assault. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The State appealed, and after review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court concluded that Kutlak did not invoke his right to counsel and he otherwise validly waived his Miranda rights prior to making incriminating statements about himself. View "Colorado v. Kutlak" on Justia Law

Defendant Jarrod Rutter was convicted of multiple felonies relating to the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine. Rutter was adjudicated a habitual criminal, which quadrupled the maximum presumptive range for the class-2 convictions from twenty-four to ninety-six years. Subsequent to his sentencing, the Colorado Legislature prospectively reduced the classification of the offenses for use and possession of methamphetamine, and amended the habitual criminal statute so that certain offenses no longer qualified as underlying felonies in habitual crime adjudications. The Legislature did not, however, reduce the classification for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on these changes, Rutter challenged the proportionality of his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. The court of appeals determined the legislative changes were prospective in nature and thus should not be considered, that all of Rutter's predicate and triggering offenses were per se grave and serious, and concluded that Rutter's sentence was not grossly disproportionate. Finding no error with the appellate court's review of Rutter's sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rutter v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court violated respondent Michael Johnson's statutory and constitutional rights by increasing his sentence on the remaining conviction on remand following a successful appeal on his other convictions. The trial court initially accepted, then rejected at sentencing, a plea agreement in which Johnson would have pled guilty to an added count of possession of a controlled substance, then the original counts would have been dismissed. The trial court rejected the plea agreement, the case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, and possession of a controlled substance. Johnson was then sentenced to an aggregate sentence of twenty years to life. The court of appeals reversed and vacated the sexual assault and kidnapping convictions on double jeopardy grounds. The case was remanded for the trial court to reinstate the original plea agreement, and to resentence Johnson on the remaining possession conviction. Johnson received a twelve-year sentence (twice the length of the original six-year sentence). Johnson appealed a second time, arguing that the increased sentence violated his statutory and due process rights. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's statutory claim, but applied a presumption of vindictiveness to the trial court's resentencing and held that the sentence indeed violated Johnson's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the court of appeals correctly rejected Johnson's statutory argument, but erred in applying the presumption of vindictiveness to the new sentence on the possession of a controlled substance conviction. View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Respondent Louis Madden was convicted of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted third degree sexual assault by force. He was originally sentenced to an indeterminate sentence and ordered to pay costs, fees and restitution. He appealed his conviction. The attempt to patronize a prostituted child was reversed, leaving only the attempted sexual assault charge. The case was returned to the trial court with instructions to impose a determinate sentence. Madden was thereafter sentenced to three years with credit for time served. Madden moved for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The motion was granted, and the prosecution elected not to appeal or retry the case. Madden applied to be refunded that portion of the fees, costs and restitution he had already paid, and the trial court agreed to a partial refund; the trial court reasoned that money paid to a counseling service the victim used could not be returned. Madden appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's "refund" order, finding that the trial court did not have statutory authority to order a refund from public funds. "Madden did not pursue a refund through the procedures defined in the Exoneration Act" which provides trial courts the proper authority pursuant to which to issue refunds. View "Colorado v. Madden" on Justia Law

Respondent Shannon Nelson was convicted of five charges relating to sexual assaults allegedly committed against her children. She was sentenced to 20 years in prison, and ordered to pay court costs, fees and restitution. The court of appeals reversed the judgment against Nelson and remanded for a new trial based on the improper use of an unendorsed expert witness. In the second trial, a new jury acquitted Nelson of all charges. At issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether Nelson could get a refund of all the costs, fees and restitution she paid following her conviction after the first trial. The Supreme Court found that a trial court could not authorize a refund absent statutory authority. Because none of the statutes governing the fines, fees and restitution empowered the trial court in this case to issue a refund, it could not do so. Exonerated defendants could seek a refund of costs, fees and restitution through a separate civil proceeding (which Nelson did not pursue). View "Colroado v. Nelson" on Justia Law