Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2014, a detective from the Douglas County Sheriff's Office (DCSO) responded to a middle school's report that twelve-year-old female student J.M. had posted a picture of herself drinking what appeared to be alcohol. Officials became worried that there was more to the posting, contacted police, and spoke to the student. DCSO was contacted by J.M.'s mother, stating that J.M. wanted to talk to them. J.M. and her mother separately participated in a series of video-recorded interviews. The interviews would reveal that the mother's then-fiancee, defendant-appellee John Swietlicki allegedly had regular sexual encounters, since the child was eight. J.M. J.M. told the detective that Swietlicki sometimes showed her pornography on his computer during these encounters. The mother corroborated various details pertinent to J.M.'s allegations. Swietlicki would ultimately be extradited back to Colorado to stand charges based on J.M.'s allegations. Police seized Swietlicki's laptop without a warrant until a search warrant issued. Once issued, police found that the laptop contained child pornography. Swietlicki moved to suppress all evidence found on the laptop, and the trial court granted the motion, finding that police lacked probable cause to seize the laptop. The State appealed the suppression motion. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression order, finding that the search was justified under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement. View "Colorado v. Swietlicki" on Justia Law

The State appealed an appellate court's judgment that vacated respondent Kenneth Childress' conviction of vehicular assault while operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. It was undisputed that Childress was not driving the vehicle in question, but the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty as a complicitor. The court of appeals concluded that because vehicular assault while under the influence was a strict liability offense, and required no culpable mental state on the part of the driver. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the Colorado Supreme Court had held previously that complicitor liability was inapplicable to crimes lacking a culpable mental state requirement. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, clarifying its holding that the appellate court relied on in vacating Childress' conviction. View "Colorado v. Childress" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Chavez was convicted of a sex offense, and the trial court imposed an indeterminate, fifteen-year-to-life sentence. Chavez challenged that sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court did not understand the range of its sentencing options. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s calculation of petitioner’s sentence and affirmed it. View "Chavez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State of Colorado argued that evidence of text messages between defendant Matthew Herrera and a juvenile girl (“Faith”) was admissible under a warrant authorizing a search of his cellphone for indicia of ownership, or in the alternative, under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. Faith’s mother told police she believed defendant was involved in a sexual relationship with her daughter. A police detective started texting defendant posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. These texts eventually led to defendant’s arrest, at which time police seized the cell phone in question. After review of the evidence in the record to the point of this appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that the texts were obtained under the warrant’s authorization to search for “indicia of ownership” of the cellphone. Further, the Court concluded the texts did not fall within the plain view exception. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence. View "Colorado v. Herrera" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged an order suppressing at retrial the testimony given by defendant Ivan Quintero-Amador at his first trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in suppressing this evidence because: (1) defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights when he testified at the first trial; and (2) his trial counsel's ineffective assistance did not directly affect his prior testimony, thus precluding a finding that the admission of this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The trial court's suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Quintero-Amador" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the legality of the "negative factor," a legislative enactment that operated to reduce education funding across all Colorado school districts. Plaintiffs sued the State, the Commissioner of Education, and the Governor, arguing that the negative factor was unconstitutional because it violated Amendment 23, a state constitutional provision requiring annual increases to "statewide base per pupil funding." The trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court granted review to determine whether that denial was made in error. After review, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs' complaint misconstrued the relationship between the negative factor and the constitutional amendment: "[b]y its plain language, Amendment 23 only requires increases to statewide base per pupil funding, not to total per pupil funding." Therefore, the Court held that the negative factor did not violate Amendment 23. The trial court was reversed and instructed to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Dwyer v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 1997, Frank Vigil, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for his participation in the kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder of a 14-year-old girl. Vigil was sixteen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), because it was the statutorily-mandated sentence for crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. In 2013, Vigil filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). Finding that Miller applied retroactively to Vigil’s sentence, the trial court granted the motion. The State petitioned pursuant to C.A.R. 50, arguing that "Miller" did not apply retroactively. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that this case was governed by "Jensen v. Colorado," (2015 CO 42), which held that "Miller" did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Vigil" on Justia Law

Three cases concerning juvenile sentencing were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purpose of this opinion. In each, the Court examined the appropriate remedies for the defendants whose sentences would otherwise be unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. CT 2455 (2012)). Under the statutory schemen in place between 1990 and 2006, all three defendants in these cases were given mandatory life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the crimes they committed as juveniles. Two of the cases, "Colorado v. Tate" and "Banks v. Colorado," came to the Supreme Court on direct review. "Miller" applied to these cases and rendered their sentences unconstitutional. "In order to preserve as much of the legislature’s work as possible, Tate and Banks should be given individualized resentencing hearings that take into account their 'youth and attendant characteristics.'" The third case, "Jensen," was a C.A.R. 50 petition that came on collateral review of a final judgment. Because this case was on collateral review, the issue was whether "Miller" applied retroactively. The Colorado Court found that because the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive, and was not a "watershed" rule of procedure, it did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of final judgment. Therefore, "Miller" did not apply to Jensen. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Wilson objected to the prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike to excuse a black veniremember, arguing that the strike violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in "Batson v. Kentucky," (476 U.S. 79 (1986)). The trial court then allowed the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for the strike. She explained that the prospective juror appeared uncomfortable with DNA evidence and the lack of eyewitness identification. Defense counsel responded that the prospective juror's responses indicated "the exact opposite," but the trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation and denied Wilson's Batson challenge. The jury later found Wilson guilty of sexual assault, second-degree kidnapping, and unlawful sexual contact. Wilson appealed, and the court of appeals held that the trial court clearly erred in denying his Batson challenge. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the appropriate resolution of a Batson challenge. After review, the Court held that a prosecutor's error in recollection did not compel a finding of purposeful discrimination in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted by Batson. "Rather, the Batson analysis requires the trial court to assess the credibility of the proponent of a peremptory strike and determine whether to believe her race-neutral explanation. Unless the opponent of the strike can prove purposeful discrimination, the trial court should deny the Batson challenge. On appeal, a reviewing court should defer to the trial court's credibility determination and reverse only for clear error." The Court concluded the trial court in this matter did not clearly err by denying Wilson's Batson challenge, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Colorado v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted William J. Hunsaker, Jr.,of sexual assault on a child (count I), a class 4 felony,and sexual assault on a child–pattern of abuse (count II), a class 3 felony. The trial court concluded that these offenses constituted "extraordinary risk crimes"under section 18-1.3-401(10), C.R.S. (2014).This resulted in indeterminate minimum sentencing ranges of two to eight years for count I and four to sixteen years for count II. In 2011, Hunsaker filed a motion to correct his sentences underCrim. P. 35(a) or, in the alternative, a motion to reduce his sentences under Crim. P. 35(b). He argued the two counts could not qualify as extraordinary risk crimes without an explicit finding of aggravating circumstances. The prosecution conceded that neither count qualified as an extraordinary risk crime but asserted only count I's sentence was illegal. The post-conviction court granted Hunsaker's Rule 35(a) motion. The prosecution appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. First, the court of appeals held that the mandatory sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-406, did not require the prosecution to establish aggravating circumstances where the defendant's conviction is for a sex offense that constitutes a crime of violence. Second, the court of appeals concluded that under section 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. (2014), the prosecution can appeal "any decision of a court in a criminal case upon any question of law." Third,the court of appeals held that if a court can correct an illegal sentence on a count merely by removing the excess time that rendered the sentence illegal, a defendant is not entitled to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences. Upon review, the Supreme Court held: (1) when a conviction for a sex offense requires sentencing in accordance with the mandatory sentencing statute, the prosecution is not required to prove aggravating circumstances to support a bottom-end sentence in the aggravated range; (2) the prosecution here was authorized to appeal the post-conviction court's ruling on the defendant's Rule 35(a) motion because it challenged the legal basis for the range the post-conviction court used to impose the sentence; (3) under Crim. P. 35(a), the illegality of a sentence on one count did not entitle a defendant to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences; and (4) if a sentence was subject to correction on one count, Crim. P. 35(b) authorized a resentencing court to reconsider and reduce the legal sentences as to all counts after it has corrected the entire sentence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Hunsaker v. Colorado" on Justia Law