Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Tenarro Banks and Michael Tate were convicted in 2004 of class 1 felonies for acts committed when they were juveniles. The Supreme Court granted review in defendants' respective cases to determine what remedy was appropriate in light of the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time (which governed offenses committed between 1990 and 2006), both Banks and Tate were given mandatory sentences to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). While both cases were pending on appeal to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court released its opinion in "Miller." The "Miller" decision rendered the Colorado statutory scheme for mandatory LWOP in place from 1990-2006 as unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Because the Colorado legislature has not acted to adopt a new sentencing scheme in light of "Miller," so the Colorado Supreme Court was tasked with "filling the gap." For Tate and Banks, the Supreme Court remanded the cases for the trial court to determine wither LWOP was an appropriate sentence under "Miller;" if the trial court determined LWOP was not warranted, life with the possibility of parole (LWPP) was the proper sentence. A third case before the Court on collateral review centered on whether "Miller" applied retroactively: Brendan Jensen was convicted in 1998 of first degree murder while he was seventeen. Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time, his sentence was LWOP. The Court held that the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive in nature, and therefore did not apply retroactively. For Jensen, the Court affirmed the trial court's order denying his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law

Petitioner Douglas Wilson was charged with first degree murder. He was appointed a public defender, but citing a conflict of interest, Wilson insisted upon new representation. The trial court determined that Wilson either had to keep the same lawyer or represent himself. Wilson opted to represent himself with assistance from advisory counsel. At a subsequent hearing, a question over Wilson's competency to stand trial became an issue. After being deemed competent as long as he was on his medications, Wilson went through two more attorneys until six days prior to trial when Wilson alleged he was no longer competent to stand trial. The trial court disagreed with Wilson's allegations, and he continued to represent himself with limited help. A jury ultimately found him guilty. Wilson appealed his conviction through counsel, and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner William Beaty was charged with assault, criminal mischief, tampering with a victim or witness, and intimidating a victim or witness. A public defender was appointed to represent Beaty, but that counsel was dismissed and Beaty elected to represent himself. After his Arguello advisement, Beaty chose not to represent himself, and accepted the help of a public defender. Beaty stated that his original decision to proceed pro se was due in part to his failing to take his medications to control bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. On the first day of trial, Beaty expressed a renewed desire to represent himself due to a conflict with his public defender. Beaty represented himself throughout the trial, and a jury found him guilty of all charges. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in Williams' and Beaty's cases to determine whether to adopt a new competency standard for mentally ill defendants in light of "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). The Court declined to create a new standard, and affirmed the court of appeals' decisions to retain the existing analytical framework. View "Wilson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant Rashaim Davis with possession and distribution of a schedule II controlled substance after Davis allegedly sold 0.372 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover detective. The State appointed a series of attorneys to represent Davis, but he refused to cooperate with any of his lawyers. He also threatened to harm at least one lawyer and wanted an investigator from the public defender's office that he might harm her if she made him uncomfortable. Several of Davis' lawyers questioned whether he was competent to proceed because at times he "exhibited a flat affect, bordering on catatonic." Prior to trial, Davis told the trial court he wanted to represent himself. Davis was taking several medications for his "bipolarism," and that he had a mistrust of lawyers resulting from paranoia that the medications did not completely control. The trial court was not convinced that Davis could proceed pro se; the case was tried with court-appointed counsel. A jury found Davis guilty of all counts. Davis appealed the trial court's denial of his requests to represent himself and his subsequent convictions to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order denying Davis' request to represent himself, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, declining to adopt a new competency standard for mentally ill defendants pursuant to "Edwards." Furthermore, the Court reversed the appellate court's failing to order the trial court to merge Davis' possession and distribution convictions during sentencing. View "Colorado v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve a split of authority between divisions of the court of appeals on whether double jeopardy barred a new habitual criminal sentencing hearing when the trial court erroneously dismissed the habitual counts before the State presented any evidence as to those counts. In 2002, Reginald Porter robbed and attempted to sexually assault a casino worker. He tried to evade capture after a police chase. Based on these events, the State charged Porter with two counts of first degree burglary and one count each of aggravated auto theft, attempted sexual assault, aggravated robbery, vehicular eluding and third degree assault. The prosecution added habitual counts later. A jury found Porter guilty of all charges. The trial court adjudicated Porter as a habitual offender. Porter appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Porter waived his right to trial by jury, and the court found him guilty of most of the substantive charges. Before the habitual phase, Porter moved to dismiss the habitual counts. The trial court was persuaded by his arguments, and the counts were dismissed. The court of appeals concluded, in pertinent part, that double jeopardy precluded a new habitual criminal sentencing hearing. The court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in "Colorado v. Quintana," (634 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1981)) to conclude that jeopardy attached during the substantive phase of trial, and carried through to the habitual phase. Since Quintana, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal constitutional double jeopardy protections do not apply to habitual criminal proceedings. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Colorado double jeopardy law did not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings. Accordingly, double jeopardy did not bar trial of defendant's habitual counts in this case. View "Colorado v. Porter" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk sought a declaration that it was prohibited from disclosing the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, the General Assembly enacted 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014) that made voted ballots subject to CORA. The Clerk thereafter produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect. The only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. After its review, the Supreme Court held that when an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure, a prevailing requestor was entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court found that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. The district court in this case found the denial was proper, therefore Marks was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law

In 2007, a man made sexual advances toward two teenaged girls in a bathroom of a horse-facing facility in which petitioner Miguel Pena-Rodriguez worked. The girls identified petitioner as the assailant at a one-on-one show-up. The State charged petitioner with one count of sexual assault on a child, one count of unlawful sexual contact, and two counts of harassment. At the start of a three-day trial, the venire received a written questionnaire. None of the jurors that were impaneled answered any question pertaining to any biases, or if they were unable to be fair on their respective questionnaires. After trial, the jury ultimately found petitioner guilty on all but the attempted sexual assault charge. Two weeks later, petitioner moved the trial court for juror contact information, alleging that some members of the jury used ethnic slurs in the course of deliberations. Defense counsel obtained affidavits from some jurors suggesting that one juror exhibited racial bias against petitioner during deliberations. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the secrecy of those deliberations and petitioner's constitutional right to an impartial jury. Specifically, the issue was whether CRE 606(b) applied to such affidavits, and if so, whether the Sixth Amendment nevertheless required their admission. The Supreme Court concluded that the affidavits fell within the broad sweep of CRE 606(b), and that they did not satisfy the rule's "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. The Court held that the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) did not violate petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. View "Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

While incarcerated, defendant Josph Diaz punched a prison guard. Less than three months later, Diaz threw a cup that hit another guard in the mouth. The district attorney charged him in two cases with second degree assault of a detention center employee. Diaz finished finishing his original sentence before he went to trial in either assault case. Trial for the second assault took place before trial for the first. A jury found Diaz guilty, and the court sentenced him to ten years for the second (cup-throwing) assault. Shortly thereafter, another jury found Diaz guilty of the first assault, and he was sentenced to ten years consecutive to the ten he was sentenced for the second assault. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by ruling that 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S. (2014) required that the sentences be served concurrently. The Supreme Court reversed: 18-3-203(1)(f) required a consecutive sentence if, at the time of sentencing, a defendant was serving any other sentence. View "Colorado v. Diaz" on Justia Law

The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's order suppressing the results of a blood draw taken from defendant-appellee Travis Ackerman. At the hearing, the trial court found that a warrant was required before the police could order a blood draw and that the police lacked exigent circumstances that would justify the involuntary, warrantless blood draw under the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed on the issue of whether the facts of the case constituted exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court held that under the specific facts of this case, exigent circumstances existed: police were still investigating the scene of the crime and were not finished preparing the affidavit for a warrant they learned that the hospital personnel were taking the unconscious and injured defendant for the medical procedures that could alter his blood-alcohol content. Under the totality of the circumstances, these exigent circumstances made it impractical for the police to obtain a search warrant and justified the blood draw. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

Defendant Zachariah Jones petitioned the Supreme Court to appeal a district court's decision to revoke his bail bond in its entirety, and ordered that he be held without bond pending resolution of charges in a different district. Defendant was arrested, charged and released on bond in connection with several felony drug offenses in Denver County. Several months later, the Denver District Attorney moved to revoke bond, alleging that while Jones was released on bond, a court in Adams County issued a warrant for his arrest, based on an assault charge. The Denver district court concluded that because another court had found probable cause to believe defendant committed another felony, it had the statutory authority to revoke bond. The Court of Appeals found it lacked jurisdiction to review the Denver district court's judgment according to an expedited procedure listed in 16-4-205 (3), C.R.S. (2014). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded after review, concluding the appellate court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. "Because section 105(3) merely empowered the district court to have Jones brought before it for purposes of modifying the conditions of his pretrial release, the district court erred in revoking his existing bond and denying him a right to pretrial release altogether." The matter was remanded to the district court with directions to reinstate defendant's bail bond. View "In re Colorado v. Jones" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged the trial court's order suppressing statements made by defendant Douglas Thames during a custodial interrogation. Investigators gave defendant an oral Miranda advisement, defendant confirmed that he understood them, and he then signed a written waiver for before making the statements the prosecution wished to use in its case-in-chief. The trial court, relying on a defense expert witness who testified that defendant had difficulty understanding spoken paragraphs concerning abstract ideas, concluded that defendant did not knowingly or intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant indeed knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order. View "Colorado v. Thames" on Justia Law