Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In September 2007, Respondent Michael McKimmy was arrested for new offenses while on parole and was incarcerated. Respondent was charged in two separate cases, with second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, and a habitual burglary offender count. In 2008, the State filed complaints against respondent in two new cases, including charges for second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and criminal mischief. Unbeknownst to his public defender, respondent sent a pro-se letter in one of the cases to the Chief Judge of the County Court, "formally request[ing] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act." In the letter’s footer, respondent wrote, "CC: Deputy District Attorney [Prosecutor Name]." In all four cases, respondent sent pro-se letters without his attorney’s knowledge to Jefferson County’s Chief Judge formally requesting the protections of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), and all four letters included a footer purporting to copy the letter to the prosecutor of that particular case. Neither the trial court nor the prosecution, however, initially became aware of the requests in the 2007 cases. The trial court ignored the letters without reading them pursuant to its policy of refusing to acknowledge pro-se letters sent by represented parties, while the prosecution received the 2007 letters but inadvertently misfiled them. Crucially, the record was inconclusive whether the prosecution became immediately aware of the 2008 letters when respondent sent them in March 2008. On February 4, 2008, defendant pled not guilty in the 2007 cases, and insisted that he did not wish to waive his "speedy trial rights." The trial court, under the impression that respondent was referring to his rights as defined in section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. (2014), made certain that the trial dates fell within six months from the date of respondent's not-guilty pleas, and it set the trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the process for invoking one’s rights under the UMDDA. When prisoners strictly comply with the UMDDA’s procedural requirements, the Act mandates that they be brought to trial on pending charges within 182 days of their request. Even when prisoners do not strictly comply with the UMDDA’s requirements, the Court has previously determined that they nevertheless invoke their rights under the Act if: (1) their request substantially complies with the Act’s requirements; and (2) the prosecution receives “actual notice” of their request. Respondent did not strictly comply with the Act; rather, he attempted to invoke his UMDDA rights by mailing multiple letters to the prosecution and the trial court. But, while the prosecution received the defendant’s initial requests, it failed to actually become aware of them until well later in the proceedings. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution’s receipt of such a letter did not constitute "actual notice" sufficient to invoke respondent's rights under the UMDDA. View "Colorado v. McKimmy" on Justia Law

A state trooper pulled over the defendant while she was driving a rental car that she was not authorized to drive. While impounding the car at rental company’s request, the trooper who stopped her discovered three suspicious gift-wrapped packages, one on the back seat and two in trunk. At the tow yard, a K-9 police dog alerted alerted the trooper that the trunk contained drugs. The trooper used this positive dog sniff to obtain a warrant, the execution of which revealed 57 pounds of marijuana. The trial court suppressed this marijuana evidence because the packages had been detained for an unreasonable amount of time before the dog alerted and the trooper thus obtained probable cause to continue the search. The State challenged the suppression, arguing that defendant did not have standing to contest the detention and search of the packages because she was not authorized to drive the rental car. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the packages that were detained. Therefore, she had standing to challenge the search of those packages even though she was not authorized to drive the car. Consequently, the Court affirmed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Sotelo" on Justia Law

A police officer observed a traffic violation. Upon stopping the car, the officer discovered that the driver, defendant Christopher Vaughn, was driving under a suspended license. The officer decided to arrest defendant, ordered him out of the car, and began an inventory search of the vehicle prior to having the vehicle impounded. The officer found one big bag filled with smaller individual bags of crack cocaine in the glove compartment. Defendant appealed his ultimate conviction on drug trafficking charges, arguing the drug evidence should have been suppressed because the traffic stop was not enough probable cause to have defendant arrested. The Supreme Court held that the drug evidence was properly seized as the result of a valid inventory search, reversing the trial court's suppression order. View "Colorado v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped the vehicle defendant Ari Liggett was driving, and upon asking dispatch to scan the license plate, determined that it was associated with both a missing person (defendant's mother) and an armed-and-dangerous person (defendant himself). After police ordered defendant to turn off the car and place both hands through the window, defendant opted to speed off. A chase ensued. Defendant spun out and hit a concrete wall. Defendant was later chased on foot, ultimately surrendered, and was arrested. In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether statements defendant made to investigators while the investigators "were talking among themselves" and other unsolicited statements should have been suppressed at defendant's trial for murder, crime of violence and vehicular eluding. The statements defendant made were given prior to a reading of his Miranda rights. The trial court suppressed a majority of the defendant's statements, finding that they were involuntary. The Supreme Court held, however, that considering the totality of the circumstances, investigators never overbore defendant's will, and the statements were voluntary. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Liggett" on Justia Law

Petitioners Conley Hoskins and Jane Medicals, LLC, sought to vacate a trial court's order disqualifying the Peters Mair Wilcox (PMW) law firm as their counsel. The trial court disqualified the firm on the grounds that the firm previously represented another party, All Care Wellness, LLC, in the same matter for which PWM represented petitioners. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that All Care and petitioners had materially adverse interests. Petitioners argued on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' retained counsel of choice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court record was insufficient to support the finding that the interests of petitioners and All Care were materially adverse to one another. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court indeed abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioners' counsel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Defendants Sir Mario Owens and Robert Ray petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for relief from a series of discovery rulings by the district court relative to post-conviction proceedings in their respective death-penalty cases. Each had moved to discover the prosecution’s investigation of the claims raised by Owens’s motion for post-conviction review, on the grounds that such disclosure was required either by Crim. P. 16 or by the federal or state constitution. The district court ruled that Crim. P. 16 did not impose obligations on the prosecution with respect to its preparation to meet the defendants’ post-conviction claims, but that the prosecution continued to have obligations to disclose information that was both exculpatory and constitutionally material, without regard for the time of or impetus for its discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the district court did not err in finding Crim. P. 16 inapplicable to information acquired in response to the defendants’ post-conviction claims. Because, however, the Court has previously held not only that a prosecutor’s constitutional obligation to disclose information favorable to an accused extended through the appeal of a death sentence, but that district courts should order the disclosure of some possibly exculpatory material, despite being unable to find a reasonable probability that nondisclosure would change the result of the proceeding. The cases were remanded for the district court to apply the due process standard the Court announced in "Colorado v. Rodriguez," (786 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1989)). View "In re Colorado v. Owens" on Justia Law

Defendant Lori Martin shot her husband in the back of the head, killing him, following a dispute about her moving to another state with the couple's daughter. Martin was charged with first-degree murder and two crimes of violence. Martin claimed self-defense. The jury had trouble reaching a unanimous verdict. The court did not respond. The parties "preferred" that the trial court not intervene, but the court expressed concern that it should consider a modified-Allen jury instruction. The trial court ultimately gave the instruction; the jury returned, finding Martin guilty of second-degree murder (heat of passion). Although the foreperson signed the verdict form when polled, she said the verdict was not hers. The trial court then provided another supplemental instruction that tracked the pattern instruction directing the jury to continue deliberations after polling indicated it did not reach a unanimous verdict. Defense counsel expressed concern that the foreperson would be "beaten down by the rest of the jurors" and suggested "further instruction," but did not elaborate or provide specific language. The jury returned the same verdict it returned previously. On appeal, Martin argued the trial court erred by giving the deadlocked jury the two instructions to continue deliberations. As pertinent here, Martin contended that the trial court erred by failing to give a mistrial advisement with the modified-Allen instruction per "Colorado v. Raglin," (21 P.3d 419 (Colo. App. 2000)). The Supreme Court overruled "Raglin" and held that the trial court was not required to provide a mistrial advisement when giving a modified-Allen instruction. "The trial court has discretion to instruct a deadlocked jury about the possibility of a mistrial when, considering the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given, the instruction will not have a coercive effect on the jury." View "Martin v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrence Gibbons was charged with theft by receiving and perjury for claiming ownership over a stolen jet ski and trailer, and having signed temporary permits. At trial, his defense was that he did not know the jet ski and trailer were stolen. The trial court received a question from the jury, asking what would happen if all jurors did not reach a unanimous decision. Both parties agreed that the trial court should give the jury a modified-Allen instruction. After giving the instruction, the jury returned, finding Gibbons guilty on both counts. On appeal, Gibbons argued the trial court erred by not including along with the modified-Allen instruction, an explanation of what would happen if the jury was deadlocked. Gibbons cited "Colorado v. Raglin," (21 P.3d 419 (Colo. App. 2000)). The Supreme Court overruled "Raglin" and held that the trial court was not required to provide a mistrial advisement when giving a modified-Allen instruction. "The trial court has discretion to instruct a deadlocked jury about the possibility of a mistrial when, considering the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given, the instruction will not have a coercive effect on the jury." View "Gibbons v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Aaron Fain was charged with six counts of attempted murder, attempted first degree murder after deliberation and attempted first degree extreme indifference murder. He was also charged with drunk driving, criminal mischief and various weapons charges. At trial, Fain conceded to the mischief, DUI and weapons offenses, but contested the murder charges. After Fain presented his case, the jury began deliberations. The next morning, the court told the parties that the jury was having trouble reaching a unanimous verdict. The court told the parties it was inclined to give a modified-Allen instruction; neither party objected to this suggestion. The instruction the trial court gage the jury tracked the pattern instruction, and concluded by telling the jury that if it could not reach a unanimous verdict on any count, to then "let [the court] know." Soon after, the jury found Fain guilty of all three counts of attempted second degree murder, three counts of attempted first degree extreme indifference murder, and the conceded counts. On appeal, Fain argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury about a mistrial if it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. For support, Fain cited "Colorado v. Raglin," (21 P.3d 419 (Colo. App. 2000)). The Supreme Court overruled "Raglin" and held that the trial court was not required to provide a mistrial advisement when giving a modified-Allen instruction. "The trial court has discretion to instruct a deadlocked jury about the possibility of a mistrial when, considering the content of the instruction and the context in which it is given, the instruction will not have a coercive effect on the jury. Applying this holding, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury about a possibility of a mistrial. View "Fain v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed actions of the Title Board in setting title and ballot title and submission clauses for initiative 2013-2014 #89. Proponents complained that the titles did not contain one subject or that the title was not clear. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Title Board. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #89" on Justia Law