Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Proponents Mike Spaulding and Natalie Menten proposed Initiative 76 which sought to repeal and replace the existing manner of triggering and conducting a recall election under article XXI of the Colorado Constitution, and to institute a new constitutional right to recall state and local non-elected officers. The Title Board set a title and submission clause for the initiative. Registered elector Philip Hayes objected to the Board's action. The Board modified the title and submission clause in response to Hayes' objections, but otherwise denied his motion for rehearing. The proponents contended that the initiative, title and submission clause addressed a single subject and were in compliance with state law. The Supreme Court disagreed, and concluded the Title Board acted unconstitutionally in setting a title for the initiative. The Board's action was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #76" on Justia Law

Proponents Peter Coulter and Lisa Brumfiel proposed Initiative 129 to amend article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution, known as the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR). The Initiative sought to amend TABOR to define the term "fee" and differentiate it from a tax. Petitioner Anthony sought to challenge the initiative, arguing it contained multiple subjects. Alternatively, he argued the initiative's title was misleading. The Supreme Court concluded the initiative contained a single subject, and that the title clearly expressed a single subject. Therefore the Court affirmed the action of the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #129" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the results of a preliminary breath test ("PBT") for blood alcohol content were admissible for impeachment purposes. When the defendant is charged with driving either while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) or while ability impaired by alcohol (DWAI), the results of the PBT may not be used as evidence of guilt at trial. Whether the results of the PBT may nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes was an issue of first impression for the Colorado Court. In this case, the county court determined that although evidence that a PBT registered a positive result for the presence of alcohol was inadmissible to prove intoxication, that evidence could nevertheless be admitted for impeachment purposes if the defendant testified that he had not been drinking. The district court affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court concluded that ruling was erroneous: "[w]hile a police officer is authorized to conduct a PBT as part of the officer's investigation, we hold that based on the plain language of section 42-4-1301(6)(i)(III), the PBT results may not be used in any court action except as specifically provided in the statute itself." Thus, because the statute did not allow for using PBT results as impeachment evidence, the Court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case to that court with instructions to return the case to the county court for further proceedings. View "Cain v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court centered on the lawfulness of Secretary of State Rule 4.1, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6:4.1 (2013). Petitioner Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler promulgated Rule 4.1 in response to "Sampson v. Buescher," (625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010)). Rule 4.1 increased the contribution and expenditure threshold that triggered issue committee status from $200 to $5000 and exempted retrospective reporting of contributions and expenditures once issue committee status is achieved. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Sampson" did not invalidate either the $200 contribution and expenditure threshold under article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(II)of the Colorado Constitution or the retrospective reporting requirement under section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2013), of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. Because Rule 4.1's $5000 threshold and its retrospective reporting exemption conflicted with these provisions, the Court held Rule 4.1 unlawful and set it aside. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals because the court of appeals properly concluded that Gessler exceeded his authority in promulgating Rule 4.1. View "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause" on Justia Law

In October 2010, the prosecution charged Alan DeAtley, a Washington State resident, with twenty-five counts of white-collar criminal activity involving alleged fraudulent tax credits for land conservation easements in Colorado. In July 2011, the trial court allowed DeAtley's first retained counsel to withdraw based on irreconcilable conflicts. It granted DeAtley a continuance to retain his then-current defense counsel, Martin Stuart and Jolie Masterson. In November 2012, DeAtley informed the court of his intention to discharge defense counsel. They promptly filed a motion to withdraw. In November 2012, instead of granting the motion to withdraw, the trial court granted DeAtley a relatively short continuance to retain yet a third defense attorney. DeAtley did not retain another attorney. Instead, he commenced a lawsuit against defense counsel for malpractice and breach of contract, reinforcing the discharge of them and causing defense counsel to renew their motion to withdraw. The trial court unreasonably and unfairly determined that the attorneys in this case could effectively represent DeAtley despite his discharge of them and the trial court's previous finding that a conflict of interest existed between defense counsel and DeAtley due to the malpractice and breach of contract suit. The trial court concluded that DeAtley was engaging in trial-delaying conduct. The Supreme Court concluded that the court subsequently chose the wrong remedy and thereby abused its discretion. The trial court's finding that defense counsel could "balance their personal interests implicated by the Defendant's actions with their obligation to represent him such that they can effectively do so" was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair given the trial court's first finding that a conflict existed. The trial court "should have granted the motion to withdraw and proceeded in accordance with Crim.P. 44(a), advising DeAtley that he had the obligation to hire other counsel, request the appointment of counsel by the court, or elect to represent himself." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw. View "In re Colorado v. DeAtley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision to vacate Carey Griffin's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. After the Court granted certiorari review, Griffin died. Griffin's counsel filed a notice of death and moved to dismiss. The State appealed, arguing that the proceedings should have abated ab initio. The Supreme Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss but later vacated that order to allow the State to respond to the motion. Griffin's counsel argued that the doctrine of abatement ab initio applied here because Griffin died while his case was pending on direct appellate review of his conviction. The State argued Griffin's appeal should have been resolved despite his death because the State had an interest in obtaining resolution of the court of appeals' interpretation of the sex offender registration laws and this issue was likely to evade future review. The State also noted that other courts have questioned the continuing validity of the abatement ab initio doctrine in light of other interests, including the rights of crime victims. Consistent with cases from the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, the Colorado Court declined to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio to matters pending on certiorari review. In light of Griffin's death, the Court vacated its order granting the writ of certiorari and dismissed the State's petition, but did not abate the proceedings ab initio. View "Colorado v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Storlie argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the district attorney's motion under Crim. P. 48(a) to dismiss the charges against him. In response, the respondent trial court, through a brief filed on its behalf by the Attorney General's office, argued that a criminal defendant such as Storlie had no standing to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss. Respondent further argued that even if Storlie had standing, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. First, the Supreme Court concluded that it need not decide whether Storlie had standing to challenge the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss because the district attorney, who joined in Storlie's request for relief before the Supreme Court, had standing to challenge such a denial. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss because there was no evidence that the prosecution acted in bad faith in seeking the dismissal, nor did the trial court make any findings suggesting bad faith. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Storlie" on Justia Law

Jack Schaufele was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in injuries to himself and others. While he lay unresponsive at the hospital, a police officer asked a nurse to draw Schaufele's blood for an alcohol analysis. The State later sought to use evidence from that blood draw to prosecute Schaufele for vehicular assault, driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, and careless driving. In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court applied the proper legal test when it suppressed evidence stemming from the blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's analysis in suppressing the evidence. The Court declined the State's invitation to disregard the majority opinion in "Missouri v. McNeely" (which instructed a trial court to consider the totality of the circumstances and adopt Chief Justice Roberts' concurring and dissenting opinion that a "warrantless blood draw may ensue" if an officer could reasonably conclude that there was not sufficient time to seek and receive a warrant"). View "Colorado v. Schaufele" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Town of Dillon enacted two municipal ordinances: one authorized a local road improvement project, and another concerning parking enforcement on a public right-of-way. Owners of the Yacht Club Condominiums challenged the ordinances, arguing, among other things, that the ordinances were an unreasonable exercise of the Town's police power because they eliminated the ability of the owners' guests to use the Town's rights-of-way as overflow parking. The trial court concluded the Town's exercise of its police power was unreasonable. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Town appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the ordinances were within the Town's police power to regulate matters of public health, safety and welfare, and reasonably related to the Town's objectives of improving traffic safety and improving water drainage. View "Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condominiums Home Owners Association" on Justia Law

Defendant Jay McIntyre's then ten-year-old niece accused him of sexually assaulting her on two separate occasions. In an interlocutory appeal, the State sought review of a trial court's order suppressing defendant's inculpatory statements. The trial court found defendant did not make the statements voluntarily. Upon review of the State's petition, the Supreme Court held that when considering the totality of the circumstances, police did not improperly coerce defendant into making his statements, but that he instead spoke voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. McIntyre" on Justia Law