Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A man called "Rabbit" tried to strangle two people in a Boulder park. Witnesses identified the man to police. Plainclothes officers located "Rabbit," identified themselves as police, and asked him questions regarding the incident in the park. Petitioner Bradley Begay (a/k/a "Rabbit") was never told he was under arrest, nor was he handcuffed. Begay never tried to leave during the encounter with police, but police did not say specifically defendant was free to leave. Approximately twenty minutes into their conversation, an officer who had interviewed one of the alleged victims identified petitioner as the assailant. Officers then read defendant his Miranda rights and arrested him for assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made before his arrest as the product of a custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. The trial court granted the motion; the State appealed. Finding that the trial court conflated the standards governing seizure under the Fourth Amendment and custody under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Colorado v. Begay" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dallas Jeffrey Finney was charged with two counts of sexual assault-helpless victim and two counts of sexual assault-victim incapable. He entered into a series of plea agreements before a final agreement was accepted by the trial court. Five different trial court judges reviewed the agreements, and at several junctures, petitioner was advised of the potential penalties he faced. The prosecution filed a complaint to revoke petitioner's final plea agreement, alleging petitioner violated the terms of the agreement because he had been terminated from a sex offender treatment program. At the hearing on the revocation complaint, defense counsel informed the court that petitioner would admit to violating the conditions of the plea agreement and that the prosecutor would agree to a sentence of community corrections if petitioner were accepted into such a facility. The court accepted petitioner's admission and set the case for sentencing. Petitioner was not advised of the potential sentence he faced if not accepted into community corrections. Petitioner later learned he was not eligible for community corrections because he had been terminated from the sex offender program. Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to two years to file in the Department of Corrections. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief arguing, among other things, that the failure to advise him of the potential penalties prior to admitting violating the terms of the plea agreement violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that petitioner had been advised multiple times of potential penalties, particularly with respect to negotiating the five plea agreements. With regard to his statutory right to an advisement under 16-11-206, the Court concluded the requirements were met in this case. View "Finney v. Colorado " on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred when it suppressed evidence that the police found in defendant-appellee Lynette Webb's purse. In a visit with defendant's son, officers found spoons with methamphetamine residue under the son's bed, and a syringe that tested positive for methamphetamine in a visitor's backpack. Upon executing a search warrant of the house (and all personal property within) based on the visit with the son, officers found methamphetamine paraphernalia in defendant's purse. The trial court concluded that defendant had a heightened expectation of privacy to the purse, and that officers' search was unreasonable because it was unlikely that the son would hide contraband in his mother's purse. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied the wrong analysis: "[o]nce a lawful search warrant is issued, the scope of the search is defined by the scope of the warrant rather than an individual's expectation of privacy in any particular area or item." The Court therefore reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Webb" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Dennis Sanchez appealed the court of appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for a class 3 felony on "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse", notwithstanding the jury's verdict of "not guilty" on the charge entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child," based on a separate finding of two of six enumerated touching incidents presented on a verdict form entitled "Sexual Assault on a Child - Pattern of Abuse." A majority of the appeals court concluded defendant had been adequately charged in a single count and that the jury's instructions did not make its finding of a pattern of abuse contingent upon first finding the defendant's guilt of the separately charged crime of "Sexual Assault of a Child." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that because the verdict form the jury used never offered the jury the opportunity to find that defendant committed the elements of sexual assault on a child, and instead reflected at most, the jury's factual finding of two different incidents of sexual contact. The trial court erred in entering judgment for a class 3 felony and as such, the court of appeals' judgment affirming the trial court was error. View "Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Bristol Bay Productions, LLC brought claims against author Clive Cussler in California for fraud based on allegations that he had misrepresented his readership numbers. Bristol Bay alleged Cussler told it he had sold over 100 million books when the figure was, in fact, closer to 40 million. According to Bristol Bay, it reasonably relied on those numbers when it purchased the film rights to Cussler's books and produced an ultimately unsuccessful movie based on one of them (Sahara), with resulting damages of more than $50 million. In a special verdict, a California jury found Cussler misrepresented his readership figures and that Bristol Bay reasonably relied on those misrepresentations, but that Bristol Bay's reliance on those misrepresentations did not cause its damages. Bristol Bay also sued Cussler's literary agent and publishers for fraud in Colorado based on the same allegations asserted in the California suit. Following Bristol Bay's unsuccessful appeal of the California action, the trial court dismissed Bristol Bay's Colorado action on issue preclusion grounds for failing to state a claim. The court of appeals affirmed. Bristol Bay appealed the Colorado courts' dismissal. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded Bristol Bay's Colorado action was indeed barred on issue preclusion grounds. However, the Colorado Court held the trial court erred by dismissing Bristol Bay's Colorado action without converting the defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. View "Bristol Bay Prods., LLC v. Lampack" on Justia Law

J.R. was sexually assaulted by a man who offered her a ride as she was walking home at 2:00 A.M. one winter morning in 2005. J.R. was taken to the hospital for examination; she complained of neck and jaw pain stemming from when her assailant held her mouth shut. A presence of semen later implicated Respondent Michael Jones as J.R.'s assailant. The State charged respondent with numerous offenses. Prior to trial, he moved the trial court to bar the State from introducing evidence that he allegedly sexually assaulted two other women in two other states. The trial court denied the motion, finding the evidence of the two other alleged assaults under the four-part "Spoto" admissibility test allowed the evidence's admissibility to show respondent's "common plan, scheme, or design" and to rebut respondent's defense of consent (Colorado v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (1990)). A jury ultimately convicted respondent, but the appellate court reversed, finding that evidence of the two out-of-state assaults were not sufficiently similar to the Colorado assault. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that trial courts have no obligation to determine that evidence of other acts offered under the Colorado Rules of Evidence satisfy the doctrine of chances, and to also satisfy the second and third prongs of the Spoto admissibility test. Though the doctrine of chances provides one theory pursuant to which other-act evidence may satisfy components of the Spoto analysis, trial courts have discretion to assess the relevance of other-act evidence under Spoto apart from the doctrine. The court of appeals therefore erred when it effectively held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the other-act evidence without conducting a doctrine of chances analysis.View "Colorado v. Jones" on Justia Law

Police arrested Jeffrey Knedler for allegedly assaulting two people. Days after the assault, officers contacted Knedler at a hair salon where he occasionally stayed. As they approached the salon, the officers observed Knedler drinking from what appeared to be a liquor bottle. He also took a long drink from an alcoholic beverage before officers handcuffed him and placed him in a police car. Knedler agreed to speak with an investigator, but he did not want to talk in the police car, so he was taken to police headquarters. Upon arriving at headquarters, Knedler was presented with a written Miranda advisement, and it was read aloud to him. Knedler stated he did not have his glasses with him to read the advisement and waiver, but he initialed by each of the numbered rights, signed the advisement and waiver and stated "I know my rights." After questioning, Knedler admitted to beating both victims and made numerous incriminating statements. The State sought reversal of the trial court's order that suppressed videotaped statements Knedler made after he signed the written waiver of his Miranda rights. Based on Knedler's extremely high blood alcohol contend at the time of the waiver, the trial court found the waiver was invalid. Because Knedler's waiver was nonetheless knowing and intelligent, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Knedler" on Justia Law

Ascension Baez-Lopez, Jose Soto-Lopez and Juan Cantu-Bojorquez were indicted on counts of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act, and counts of conspiracy to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance. The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter centered on he trial court’s order suppressing evidence from interceptions of oral and wire communications in these three cases. The trial court suppressed the “wiretap” recordings on grounds that they had not been sealed in compliance with state law and no satisfactory explanation for the absence of the seal given. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the suppression motions because the sealing procedure indeed complied with the applicable state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order. View "Colorado v. Baez-Lopez" on Justia Law

Prosecutors alleged defendant Ricky Hoang instigated a home invasion robbery involving three others stealing jewelry and cash at gunpoint. Defendant was restrained with leg shackles during his jury trial over his repeated objections. The issues this case presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the trial court erred by requiring defendant to be tried with the shackles without a finding of specific need; and (2) whether defendant’s claims of delays and deficiencies in producing the record violated his rights to a meaningful and speedy appeal. The Supreme Court held that “When the record does not show the restrains were plainly visible, the defendant must point to something in the record justifying an appellate court’s reasonable inference that at least one juror saw or heard them. If defendant fails to meet that burden, then the constitutional harmless error standard . . . does not apply.” Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendant’s rights to a meaningful and speedy appeal were not violated. View "Hoang v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Marquez was convicted at a single trial of attempted aggravated robbery (a statutorily designated crime of violence); second degree assault (found by the jury to have been committed as a crime of violence under the circumstances of this case); and two counts of felony menacing. Petitioner was also found to be an habitual criminal requiring sentences to triple the maximum of the presumptive range for each of his crimes. The district court sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment for his felony menacing convictions, which it also ordered to be served concurrently with his crime-of-violence sentences, but it ordered petitioner's two crime-of-violence sentences to be served consecutively. After concluding that both crimes of violence were committed as part of a single "crime spree," the district court felt compelled to impose consecutive 48-year sentences. Petitioner sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed the district court's imposition of consecutive sentences for two crime-of-violence convictions. Because the phrase "arising out of the same incident," as appearing in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S. (2013), is a reference to, and has the same meaning as, the phrase "arising from the same criminal episode," in section 18-1-408(2), C.R.S. (2013), and because the record in this case established that the crimes of violence of which petitioner was convicted were not "based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode," as previously construed in the latter statute, the Supreme Court concluded the district court was not required to impose consecutive sentences. Rather, it was not only permitted, but in fact, required to exercise its discretion concerning the imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore reversed, and the case was remanded for resentencing.View "Marquez v. Colorado" on Justia Law