Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the appellate court applied the presumption of regularity when the it determined the jury did not receive correct jury forms. The trial court record reflected that the trial judge read the correct instructions and verdict forms. But when the record was certified on appeal, it was discovered that one of the verdict forms was stapled to a refused jury instruction that was not given to the jury, raising the question that the jury may not have received the correct forms. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that when the trial court reads the correct elemental instructions and verdict form to the jury, the party asserting error must overcome the presumption of regularity. In this case, the party did not overcome the presumption by pointing out that a verdict form was stapled to a refused instruction, and in relation by pointing to ambiguous statements in the trial transcript. View "LePage v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case called for an evaluation of the relationship between C.R.S. sections 17-22.5-101 and 17-22.5-403(1) (2013) of article 22.5, governing "Inmate and Parole Time Computation." Petitioner Jeffrey Nowak was convicted on two counts of aggravated motor theft and sentenced to eight years. He began serving the sentence on May 13, 2003 - the effective date of the sentence for parole eligibility purposes. The Department of Corrections calculated petitioner's parole eligibility date (PED) as July 3, 2006. Several months after reaching his PED, petitioner absconded from a halfway house while on a temporary leave. Petitioner would later be convicted of felony escape and sentenced to twelve years in prison to run consecutively to the eight-year sentence. Petitioner began serving the new sentence on July 13, 2007. Because he had already reached his PED on the original sentence when he started serving the new sentence, the DOC used the July 2007 date (rather than the May 2003 date) to calculate petitioner's new PED. Petitioner sought habeas relief, arguing the DOC should have used the PED from May 2003. The Supreme Court concluded that for the purpose of computing an inmate's PED, section 17-22.5-101 required the DOC to construe all sentences as one continuous sentence when the inmate has been committed under several convictions with separate sentences, even when doing so results in the inmate becoming parole eligible before serving at least 50% of the second sentence. View "Nowak v. Suthers" on Justia Law

Following an election recount in the Town of Center, Maurice Jones and Citizen Center filed suit seeking to set aside the results of the recount. Jones argued that voters' right to ballot secrecy had been violated. The district court set aside the results and ordered a new recall election. The three officials who had been elected in the recall petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the district court's decision. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall results and ordering a new election. As such, the Court reversed the district court and enter judgment in favor of the newly elected officials. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Grassi was involved in a single-car accident early one September morning. He suffered serious injuries, and his passenger was killed. Paramedics transported petitioner to a local hospital for treatment, where he remained unconscious for several hours. At the hospital, a trooper (part of the investigation but who had not been at the scene of the accident) detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from petitioner's mouth though he remained unconscious. The trooper ordered a blood draw. Prior to the blood draw, police knew that petitioner had been driving when it crashed, that no road conditions or other external factors appeared to have caused the crash, that petitioner's driving was consistent with that of an intoxicated driver, and that his breath smelled of alcohol. The blood draw revealed that petitioner's blood alcohol content (BAC) was well over the legal limit for driving under the influence. Petitioner was later charged with vehicular homicide, manslaughter and driving with an excessive BAC. Petitioner moved to suppress evidence of his BAC, arguing that the officer at the hospital who ordered the blood draw lacked probable cause to order blood from him while he lay unconscious in the hospital. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Colorado's express consent statute did not require police to possess probable cause in order to draw blood from an unconscious driver. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the fellow-officer rule imputed information that the police possess as a whole to individual officers who conduct searches if: (1) that officer acts pursuant to a coordinated investigation; and (2) police possess the information at the time of the search or arrest. Because the record of this case reflected those conditions, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Grassi v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mark Steen was convicted on misdemeanor offenses. He challenged ordered issued by the county and district courts denying his motions to stay execution of his sentence pending appeal of those convictions. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the county court in this case was required to enter a stay upon petitioner's request to remain in effect through the final disposition of the appeal unless modified by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Colorado v. Steen" on Justia Law

The court of appeals rejected defendant Lessell Moore's challenge to the validity of his waiver of his right to testify, and upheld his conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing defendant's claim that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and whether contemporaneous objection at trial was required to preserve the issue. The Court concluded the appellate court erred in considering defendant's challenge of his waiver. The Court reaffirmed that a defendant's challenge to his waiver to the right to testify is not subject to review on direct appeal, but only in post-conviction proceedings. Defendant need not make a contemporaneous objection to the trial court's advisement. The Court therefore vacated the court f appeals' decision regarding the validity of the waiver, but upheld the judgment of conviction. View "Moore v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court was not required to award presentence confinement credit against a jail term imposed as a condition of probation, if the trial court chose to award credit, it had to do so equal to the full amount of time served. The Supreme Court disagreed with that holding. The Supreme Court concluded that the statutory provision governing presentence confinement credit does not apply to probation, and therefore does not apply to the jail component of a probation sentence. View "Colorado v. Smith" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the defendant in this case validly waived his right to a jury trial following the trial court's advisement that failed to substantially comply with Crim. P. 23(a)(5)(II). Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant may not litigate the validity of such a waiver on direct appeal, but must do so in a post-conviction proceeding. Furthermore, the Court held that when evaluating a defendant's waiver to a jury trial, the post-conviction court must determine whether the defendant personally waived the right knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. View "Colorado v. Walker" on Justia Law

This case centered on the contested March 19, 2013 election in Center, Colorado. The district court set aside the results of the recall, ordered a new recall election, and allowed the recalled officials to continue until the new election was conducted. The recalled officials challenged the district court's decision, arguing that court erred in setting aside the recall and ordering a new election, and erred in determining that there were flaws in how the votes were counted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall and ordering a new recall election. Accordingly, the Court returned the case back to the district court with directions that judgment be entered that the replacement officials were duly elected. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court answered a question of Colorado law certified from the United States Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiffs were landowners who owned property abutting a former railroad right-of-way. The United States authorized the right-of-way to be used as a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails System Act ("Rails-to-Trails" Act). The issue before the federal court was whether the United States took property for which Plaintiffs should have received compensation. The Colorado Court determined that the centerline presumption was a common law rule of conveyance that presumed a grantor who conveyed land abutting a right-of-way intended to convey land to the center of the right-of-way and absent a contrary intent on the face of the conveyance. Therefore, while the Court held that the centerline presumption applied to railroad rights-of-way, it also held that, to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of a railroad right-of-way, an adjacent landowner must produce evidence that his or her title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. View "Asmussen v. United States" on Justia Law