Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Arapahoe County Sheriff's Department received a call from R. Talent, who claimed to have spotted his stolen van in the driveway of a house that was later determined to be Defendant Lance Brunsting's residence. Talent told police that "Lance" was known to carry a gun and was associated with dangerous people who were involved in drugs and who were known to carry guns. Concerned with the report of guns at the residence, the Sheriff dispatched five deputies and a sergeant to the location. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deputies' violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, or whether their claim of exigent circumstances at the time they were called to the property applied as an exception those rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that exigent circumstances existed when the deputies entered the curtilage of Defendant's residence, the issue of officer safety. With no violation of defendant's rights, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for consideration of other issues defendant raised on appeal. View "Colorado v. Brunsting" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dina Marshall was charged with driving under the influence of drugs, careless driving, and possession of drug paraphernalia after lab urinalysis results revealed she had methamphetamine in her system when she caused a car accident. At trial, the State sought to admit the lab result showing that Marshall had methamphetamine in her urine; over Marshall's objection, the trial court admitted the lab report without the testimony of the lab technician who actually performed the test. Marshall appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the admission of the report did not violate Marshall's right to confront witnesses. The Court found that there was no evidence presented at trial that Marshall possessed drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the Court found that the trial court erroneously denied Marshall's motion for judgment of acquittal on this charge, and reversed the district court's judgment with respect to that charge.View "Marshall v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Carlos Gallegos pled guilty to attempted sexual assault on a child after admitting to sexually assaulting his live-in-girlfriend's six-year-old daughter. The trial court found that defendant met the relationship criterion of the sexually violent predator (SVP) statute because he established a relationship with the victim primarily to sexually assaulting her. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was the interpretation of "established a relationship" and "promoted a relationship" in the SVP statute. Applying the definition of these phrases to defendant's case, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse defendant's SVP designation because he had not "established a relationship" with the victim primarily for the purpose of assaulting her because he lived with her and treated her as a stepdaughter preceding the assault.View "Colorado v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

Defendant James Hunter was designated as a sexually violent predator (SVP) following his conviction of second-degree burglary, sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and a crime of violence. The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, but reversed the SVP designation, and remanded the case back to the trial court for specific findings on whether either of defendant's victims were strangers to him, or whether he had established or promoted a relationship with either. On remand, defendant argued he was not a stranger. The trial court found that he was, and designated him an SVP. The issue before the Supreme Court turns on the interpretation of "stranger" in the SVP statute. Upon review, the Court held that "stranger" meant that the offender did not know the victim, or the victim did not know the offender at the time of the offense. On application of "stranger" in the SVP statute to this case, the Court held that the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling designating defendant an SVP.View "Colorado v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Defendant David Uribe-Sanchez was charged with four felonies and two crimes-of-violence sentence enhancers for the sexual assault of a girl who referred to him as "dad." He would be sentenced to 34 years imprisonment and designated a sexually violent predator (SVP). To conclude that defendant satisfied the relationship criteria of the SVP statute, the trial court concluded defendant "promoted" his relationship with the victim primarily to victimize her. The appellate court affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts in this case erred by concluding defendant "promoted a relationship" with the victim when he assaulted her. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of whether the SVP designation was proper under the SVP statute.View "Uribe-Sanchez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The parties appealed the water court's decision that holdover directors of a water conservancy district could not continue to act on behalf of the district a year after the expiration of their term. The Supreme Court held that the holdover provision in the Water Conservancy Act allowed for a holdover director to continue to serve as a de jure officer, and did not impose a temporal limit on that director's authority to act on behalf of the district. View "Yellow Jacket Water Conservancy District v. Livingston" on Justia Law

The State challenged the trial court's suppression of evidence taken from defendant Jesse Lee Cunningham's home pursuant to warrant. The trial court ruled that pursuant to Crim. P. 41(e), defendant's motion to suppress required the State to initially go forward with evidence that the seizure was performed pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and that the warrant was legally executed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in that analysis. "Whether a search or seizure is performed pursuant to a warrant or is warrantless, defendant under Crim. P. 41(e) bears the burden of going forward to show that the search or seizure violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." View "Colorado v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Neil Roggow of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, based on his unlawful sexual contact with an eight-year-old girl. The court of appeals reversed his conviction, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Roggow was in a position of trust with respect to the victim because he was not charged with her care or supervision when the unlawful acts occurred. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that, for purposes of section 18-3-405.3, a defendant need not be expressly charged with a particular duty or responsibility over the child at the time of the unlawful act in order to occupy a position of trust. The Court concluded that the evidence in this case was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Roggow was in a position of trust with respect to the victim at the time of the unlawful acts. View "Colorado v. Roggow" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the District Court's suppression of Defendant Khaled Zadran's statements, which were obtained through a custodial interrogation. The police arrested and interrogated Zadran in the course of an investigation of a suspected drug dealer. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the police officer who interrogated Zadran engaged in coercive conduct sufficient to render Zadran's inculpatory statements involuntary. The trial court found that the interrogating officer made improper implied promises and had a generally coercive demeanor. Thus, the trial court concluded that all of Zadran's statements were involuntary and inadmissible. The Court held that under the totality of the circumstances, that the interrogation was not coercive and the statements were voluntary. View "Colorado v. Zadran" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the District Court's suppression of Jasim Ramadon's statements obtained from a custodial interrogation. Ramadon is a native of Iraq who the United States military brought to this country for his protection as a teenager. In 2012, the Colorado Springs police brought Ramadon to the police station as part of a sexual assault investigation. The police had information identifying Ramadon as one of the perpetrators in the sexual assault. The trial court found that under the totality of the circumstances, all of Ramadon's statements after minute forty-two of the interrogation tape were impermissibly coerced and involuntary. After viewing the videotape of the interrogation, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's suppression order, however disagreeing with the time of the coercive behavior. The Supreme Court held that starting at minute fifty-four, instead of minute forty-two, was when the interrogating officer told Ramadon that if he did not tell the truth, he would likely be deported to Iraq. The record supported the trial court's conclusion that coercive police conduct during the custodial interrogation played a significant role in inducing Ramadon's inculpatory statements. View "Colorado v. Ramadon" on Justia Law