Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mile High Cab, Inc. appealed directly to the Supreme Court to challenge a district court denial of its application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. After a "lengthy" hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) to whom the application had been assigned found that several incumbent carriers opposing the application had adequately proved that granting the application would be detrimental to the public interest. The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) ultimately adopted the ALJ's recommendation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record did not clearly contain the finding statutorily required for a denial of Mile High's application by the PUC. As such, the Court reversed the district court, and remanded the case back to the PUC for further consideration. View "Mile High Cab, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In a case involving breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade secrets claims, the plaintiffs sought to inspect personal and business computers, smartphones, and other electronic storage devices belonging to the lead defendant and his wife, who was not a party to the case. The plaintiffs also requested discovery of approximately three years of the defendants' telephone records. After the defendants refused to permit the inspection the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel. Over the defendants' objection on privacy grounds and in a brief order concerning this and other discovery matters, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion and ordered the defendants to permit inspection of the requested items and records. The trial court also awarded attorneys' fees associated with the discovery dispute to the plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a motion to compel discovery without making findings of fact balancing defendants' asserted privacy interest with plaintiffs' need for the information sought. Accordingly, the Court vacated the portion of the trial court's order compelling the discovery, and remanded the case to the trial court. View "In re Gateway Logistics, Inc. v. Smay" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in these cases was whether a trial court could refer to prospective jurors by number instead of name in open court as a matter of routine policy. Defendant Rene Perez argued that the trial court's practice created an "anonymous jury" and as such, the jury should have been assessed under the anonymous jury framework devised by the federal courts. Defendants argued that because the trial court failed to follow that framework in this case, failing to demonstrate "good cause" for the practice, defendant's right to a fair trial was violated. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment that referring to prospective jurors by number did not invalidate defendant's conviction nor violate his constitutional rights. View "Perez v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court seeking relief from a district court order that suppressed statements of Defendant Jesus Luna-Solis as well as certain DNA evidence. Although the court found that the statements in question were voluntary and made after an effective waiver of Miranda rights, it nevertheless suppressed them on the grounds that the Sixth Amendment barred the police from questioning defendant without counsel present. The court suppressed the DNA evidence on grounds that police in the execution of a Crim. P. 41.1 order of a County Court, sought the order for the benefit of the prosecution in this case, and that after filing a motion to admit evidence of an uncharged assault, the prosecution was permitted to acquire non-testimonial identification evidence from defendant, even to verify his identity as a perpetrator in the assault, only according to Crim. P. 16 II (a)(2), governing discovery in this case. Because defendant's Miranda waiver effectively waived his right to counsel as guaranteed by not only the Fifth but also the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in suppressing statements as a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because Crim. P. 16 II imposes disclosure obligations on criminal defendants without simultaneously barring the use of evidence acquired through otherwise lawful investigation, the Court also found that the district court erred in finding a discovery violation and excluding DNA evidence. The district court's suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Luna-Solis" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal before the Supreme Court to challenge a district court's order to suppress Defendant Carlos Barraza's incriminating statements made prior to his first police interview at his home, and at a second interview at the police station after having been given his Miranda rights. Defendant was charged with retaliation against a witness or victim when he confronted residents of an apartment who called police on his friend, leading to the friend's arrest. The district court concluded that Defendant's initial statements were given while in custody, and subsequent statements were tainted by the failure to initially advise Defendant of his rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time he made the initial statements, and because statements made at the police station were not therefore fruit of the poisonous tree, the district court erred in suppressing both statements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "Colorado v. Barraza" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, petitioner Bruce Nozolino sought to vacate a trial court's order that disqualified the Office of the State Public Defender as his counsel. The trial court made the disqualification after it found that a conflict existed and was not waivable. On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner argued the trial court abused its discretion in its disqualification order. "Contrary to the trial court's ruling, our analysis of the factors critical to the determination of whether Nozolino must be allowed to waive conflict-free representation convince[d] us that the balance weigh[ed] in favor of Nozolino's preference for continued representation by [the Office of the Public Defender]." Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for an advisement on record so that Nozolino could decide whether to waive conflict-free representation. View "In re Colorado v. Nozolino" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged a district court order that granted defendant Dimitry Pleshakov's motions to suppress evidence and certain statements made to police. The district court concluded that defendant's incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The court suppressed these statements and evidence later obtained from defendant's apartment as fruit of the poisonous tree. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time he made the statements at issue, and accordingly reversed the district court's order. View "Colorado v. Pleshakov" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court stemmed from a dependency and neglect case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the father's parental rights and reversed the termination of the mother's parental rights on grounds that the trial court erred in allowing the foster parents to intervene and participate fully in the termination hearing. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court construed C.R.S. section 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the parents' due process rights are not impacted by the participation of the foster parents who properly intervene. View "A.M. v. A.C." on Justia Law

Steven Pham represented the estate of a driver of a car involved in a traffic accident. He appealed (along with the driver's parents and the five passengers in the car at the time of the accident) the court of appeals' judgment which affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer, State Farm, on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims were bound by the statute of limitations governing underinsured motorist claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs failed to file their action or demand arbitration of their underinsured motorist claims within either three years of the accrual of their cause or within two years after receiving payment of a settlement or judgment on an underlying bodily injury liability claim preserved as prescribed by the applicable statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Pham v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether foster parents who intervene in a dependency and neglect action possess limited rights to participate in a hearing on a motion to terminate parental rights. The Court construed C.R.S. 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who have properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that parents' due process rights are not impacted by the full participation of foster parents in the termination hearing. View "A.M. v. A.C." on Justia Law