Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The supreme court vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment after the trial court found that 71 days was not a reasonable time for purposes of relating back an amended complaint under C.R.C.P. 15(c). Pursuant to "Dillingham v. Greeley Publishing Company," (701 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1985)), the proper measure for relation back under C.R.C.P. 15(c) is the time between the filing date of the original complaint and the date when the party related back receives notice. In this case, the Supreme Court held that 116 days was reasonable because it was within the time for service of process in Colorado. View "Garcia v. Schneider Energy Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged a district court order that granted defendant Suzanne Guthrie's motion to suppress evidence of an illegal narcotic discovered during a routine inventory search of her personal effects after a judge at the El Paso County Court, in a prior proceeding, ordered a deputy sheriff to jail her for direct contempt of court. In the prosecution for Defendant's possession of illegal drugs, the district court suppressed evidence discovered during the inventory search as an ad hoc remedy for the due process violation it deemed the county court judge committed when conducting the contempt proceeding. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment: the inventory search resulted directly from the county court's order to the deputy sheriff, based on a finding of criminal contempt of court to jail Defendant. Appeal of the summary contempt conviction, which might or might not result in reversal, would be the proper recourse for the county court's alleged due process violation. Suppressing evidence of the illegal narcotic discovered as a result of the valid inventory search here would not have been an appropriate remedy even if the county court erred in convicting Defendant of direct contempt of court. View "Colorado v. Guthrie" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the court of appeals' unpublished decision in "Colorado v. Gross," (07CA2255, slip op. at 7 (Colo. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (not selected for official publication)), which reversed the defendant's convictions that arose out of a shooting at a campground. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed cumulative error by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor doctrine, which was requested by defense counsel; by allowing the prosecutor to argue that the defendant did not satisfy the duty to retreat, a requirement of the initial aggressor jury instruction; and by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider self-defense to determine whether the defendant possessed the culpable mental state required for the crime of extreme indifference murder. In so holding, the court reasoned that the attorney incompetence exception to the invited error doctrine permits plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the invited error doctrine precludes plain error review of a defense-tendered instruction. The attorney incompetence exception does not apply to deliberate, strategic acts of defense counsel but rather to inadvertent errors or oversights. Here, the invited error doctrine precluded the defendant from arguing that the trial court erred by giving the initial aggressor instruction because the defendant's trial counsel made a deliberate, strategic decision to request it. Furthermore, the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about the duty to retreat also could not be raised on appeal. In addition, the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense with respect to the crime of extreme indifference murder, but this error did not amount to plain error. View "Gross v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Surpeme Court reviewed a trial court order that suppressed statements made by Petitioner Dianeth Pittman in response to police interrogation without a prior advisement pursuant to "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that Pittman was in custody for purposes of Miranda and therefore the trial court erred by suppressing the statements. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order. View "Colorado v. Pittman" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed a court of appeals' opinion in "Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder," whereby the underlying civil action involved claims brought by Professor Ward Churchill pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 after his tenured employment was terminated by the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado. Churchill alleged that the Regents violated his constitutionally protected free speech rights by initiating an investigation into his academic integrity and by terminating his tenured employment in retaliation for his publication of a controversial essay. Churchill sought both compensatory and equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's termination claim on grounds that the Regents' quasi-judicial actions were entitled to absolute immunity. It also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Churchill's claim for equitable remedies because it concluded that such remedies were not available in a Section 1983 action against quasi-judicial officials. Lastly, based on its determination that allegedly retaliatory employment investigations are not actionable under Section 1983, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the University on Churchill's bad faith investigation claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds: (1) the Court held that the Regents' decision to terminate Churchill's employment was a quasi-judicial action functionally comparable to a judicial process, and that the Regents were entitled to absolute immunity concerning their decision; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Churchill was not entitled to the equitable remedies of reinstatement and front pay; and (3) Churchill’s bad faith investigation claim was barred by qualified immunity because the Regents' investigation into Churchill's academic record does not implicate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law. View "Churchill v. University of Colorado at Boulder" on Justia Law

The People brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011),and C.A.R. 4.1, challenging the district court's suppression of statements made by Defendant Erick Figueroa-Ortega to a police detective. Defendant was charged with burglary, criminal mischief, and theft, in connection with a break-in at the restaurant where he worked as a cook. The district court found that the statements in question were the product of custodial interrogation, without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Because the Supreme Court determined that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made the statements in question, the district court erred, and its suppression order was reversed. View "Colorado v. Figueroa-Ortega" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari on a statutory construction issue involving the definition of the word "victim" within the criminal case restitution statute, sections 18-1.3-601 to -603, C.R.S. (2011). Under that statute, the general assembly defined "victim" as "any person aggrieved by the conduct of an offender." The prosecution argued that the El Paso County Department of Human Services (DHS) was a victim entitled to restitution from Defendant Nicolette Chris Padilla-Lopez because it was required to expend funds to provide foster care for her children as a result of her guilty plea to misdemeanor child abuse. The court of appeals held that DHS could not be considered a victim for purposes of the criminal case restitution statute because the elements of the underlying crime of child abuse pertained to wrongful conduct against the child and do not include a wrong against DHS. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed: "the existing criminal case restitution statute does not classify DHS as a 'victim' for the purpose of recovering costs it has expended in the course of fulfilling its statutorily mandated duty to provide necessary care to dependent and neglected children." View "Colorado v. Padilla-Lopez" on Justia Law

With the approval of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), in 2005 the Public Service Company of Colorado (Xcel) began constructing a coal-fired electric power unit known as "Comanche 3." When Xcel sought to recover a portion of its construction costs nearly four years later in a rate proceeding, Petitioner Leslie Glustrom intervened. Petitioner sought to introduce testimony that Xcel acted improperly and, consequently, should not recover its costs. The PUC excluded most of her testimony, a ruling that Petitioner challenged. Petitioner separately challenged the depreciation rate and the possibility that Comanche 3 might not be "used and useful" at the time rates went into effect. The PUC denied her challenges, and the district court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PUC did not abuse its discretion when it struck substantial portions of Petitioner's testimony pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Further, the depreciation rate approved by the PUC was established pursuant to law and in accordance with the evidence. Lastly, the PUC was free to exercise its discretion in departing from a strict application of the "used and useful" principle. Petitioner failed to meet her burden in showing why such a departure here would result in a rate that is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. View "Glustrom v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Pierson sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed his various convictions of felony sexual assault on a child and indecent exposure. The district court denied Defendant's pre-trial motion to admit evidence of the child's similar victimization by a teenage cousin, during substantially the same time period. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, finding both that the proffered evidence of prior sexual contact did not fall within the rape shield exception for the source of semen, pregnancy, disease, or similar evidence of sexual intercourse, and that it was not relevant for any of the other purposes offered by the Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding that because the proffered evidence amounted to evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual activity, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence. View "Pierson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a trial court order that suppressed evidence seized by police following an inventory search after a traffic stop. The trial court ruled that the traffic stop was pretextual and thus invalid. The court reasoned that, pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, contraband (heroin and drug paraphernalia) seized from the car during the inventory search had to be suppressed as evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, irrespective of the officers' pretextual or subjective reason for stopping the vehicle, the officers possessed an independent and objective basis to make this traffic stop (the Defendant ran a red light). Having ruled that the stop was invalid, the trial court did not consider the State's argument that the search of the car was a valid inventory search and that the seizure of contraband from the car was therefore admissible. Hence, the Court reversed the trial court's order of suppression but remanded the case to the trial court with directions to make factual findings and conclusions of law concerning the validity of the inventory search consistent with our holding in "Pineda v. People," (230 P.3d 1181 (Colo. 2010)). View "Colorado v. Vissarriagas" on Justia Law