Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenged an order suppressing incriminating statements made by Defendant Michael Lynn while in custody. The trial court held that the statements came after Defendant's unambiguous request for counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that Defendant's question, "When can I talk to a lawyer?" was an unambiguous request for counsel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the trial court suppressing Defendant's statements. View "Colorado v. Lynn" on Justia Law

This original proceeding before the Supreme Court arose from a divorce and parenting case in its third year of post-dissolution decree litigation. Mother's petition challenged the district court's summary denial of her motion for a protective order and sanctions concerning the acquisition by Father's attorney of Mother's entire employment file from Mother's former employer by subpoena. The Court accepted jurisdiction to determine whether Father's attorney violated C.R.C.P. 45 when she made arrangements with Mother's former employer for the production of Mother's employment file without Mother's consent and before Mother had notice of the existence of the subpoena. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "[The Court] interpret[ed] Rule 45 to require that, unless the subpoenaed witness and other parties consent to an alternate arrangement or by other court order, subpoenaed documents are to be produced only at the deposition, hearing, or trial specified in the subpoena and hold that the conduct of Father's attorney in this case violated Rule 45." Furthermore, the Court held that Father's attorney frustrated the purpose of Rule 45 by depriving Mother of the opportunity to object to the subpoena before the documents were produced. The Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that Father and Father's attorney identify and recover, and then return or destroy all physical and electronic copies of the documents produced by Mother's former employer pursuant to the subpoena issued by Father's attorney, including Mother's entire employment file. The Court also directed the trial court to determine whether sanctions should be awarded to Mother against Father's attorney for the rule violation. View "In re Marriage of Wiggins" on Justia Law

Prior to a foreclosure sale, Petitioner Betty Amos and her late husband, Thomas Righetti, owned a condominium unit in Aspen. Amos borrowed approximately $1.6 million from Equitable Bank securing the loan with a Deed of Trust on the condominium unit in favor of Equitable Bank and granted by Amos and Righetti. In September 2002, Righetti died. Amos and Righetti's daughter, Brandy Righetti, were named as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Thomas Righetti. The loan fell into default and Equitable Bank decided to foreclose on the property. Equitable Bank filed a Rule 120 Motion for Order Authorizing Sale and sent notice of the proceeding to Amos in her individual capacity. Equitable Bank did not send notice of the Rule 120 proceeding to the Estate or to Brandy Righetti. Neither Amos nor the Estate opposed the order authorizing sale. The public trustee held a foreclosure sale in early 2007. Neither Amos nor the Estate submitted a bid. After Equitable Bank bid the amount of its debt, three individuals Respondent Aspen Alps 123, LLC was the successful bidder. The public trustee issued the deed quieting title in the property to Aspen Alps. Amos then brought this action against the public trustee and Equitable Bank to enjoin the issuance of the deed to Aspen Alps, and to compel the trustee to allow her to redeem. Concurrently, she filed a notice of lis pendens. When the trial court refused to grant a preliminary injunction in Amos' favor, she filed a second notice of lis pendens. Amos then amended her complaint to include a claim that Equitable Bank failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of Rule 120. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the parties received actual notice which afforded them an opportunity to present their objections and no prejudice resulted. Accordingly, the Court refused to disturb the completed foreclosure sale. View "Amos v. Aspen Alps 123, LLC Real Property" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review a district court order dismissing a misdemeanor charge in a county court case that was improperly transferred to the district court in violation of a chief judge's order governing such transfers within the judicial district. "While it is questionable whether the district court had jurisdiction to dismiss the county court charge," the Court nevertheless held that the only forum for an initial appeal of such a dismissal is in the court of appeals because it is a final judgment of the district court. The Court noted that to hold otherwise would render this "important issue of the respect owed to a controlling chief judge's order" unreviewable. Accordingly, the Court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over this appeal. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to review the district court's dismissal on the merits. View "Colorado v. Maser" on Justia Law

The prosecution brought this interlocutory appeal seeking to reverse the trial court's ruling that suppressed evidence obtained from the search of the apartment of the Defendant Andrian Arapu. Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents sought to contact Defendant, suspecting he was in the country illegally. In accordance with their standard protocol, ICE requested assistance from local law enforcement. When federal agents contacted Defendant, he refused to give them permission to enter his apartment, but he consented to the local detective entering the apartment to monitor a woman already inside. When the federal agents were arrested Defendant, he gave his consent to the local detective to gather his keys and phones, and to secure the apartment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a suspect who consented to a law enforcement officer entering his dwelling to monitor another person inside permits the law enforcement officer to ask the monitored person for identifying information. Further, the Court held that a suspect who consents to a law enforcement officer remaining inside his dwelling to gather belongings and to secure the dwelling, permits the law enforcement officer to remain in the apartment until all law enforcement personnel have left the dwelling. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's suppression of the drug-related evidence, and reversed the district court's suppression of a firearm because it would have been discovered in a search pursuant to a warrant supported by a redacted affidavit that independently established probable cause to search the apartment for drug-related evidence. Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Arapu" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 38-5-105 C.R.S. (2011) granted condemnation authority to a company for the construction of a petroleum pipeline. Upon review, the Court concluded that the General Assembly did not grant expressly or implication, the power of eminent domain to companies for the construction of pipelines conveying petroleum. Therefore, section 38-5-105 did not grant that authority to Respondent Sinclair Transportation Company for its proposed pipeline project. The Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion that upheld the trial court's order granting Sinclair immediate possession of the property belonging to Petitioners Ivar and Donna Larson and Lauren and Kay Sandberg. View "Larson v. Sinclair Transp. Co." on Justia Law

The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's suppression of evidence obtained following an investigatory stop of Defendant Adolph Funez-Paiagua. Defendant was standing on the property of a closed auto-body shop at 1:15 in the morning. One of two responding officers approached where Defendant had been standing. After hearing a loud crash and seeing Defendant fleeing the property with "some large bags," the officer ordered Defendant to stop. The trial court found the officer's testimony credible, but concluded that the evidence did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Specifically, the trial court determined that the seizure occurred "at the time the [first] officer contacted [Funez-Paiagua]." The trial court found that, at that time, the officer knew that Defendant was standing on private property late at night. The trial court concluded that these facts did not support reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop and therefore the trial court suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the stop. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop created reasonable suspicion. The investigatory stop was therefore not an unreasonable seizure, and the trial court incorrectly suppressed evidence resulting from the stop. View "Colorado v. Funez-Paiagua" on Justia Law

Respondent Colorado Public Utilities Commission challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court of Routt County to consider changing the venue in regard to a petition for judicial review, arguing that the petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 40-6-115(1) and (5), C.R.S. (2011). Holding that section 40-6-115(5) pertained to venue, not jurisdiction, the Routt County District Court allowed a transfer of the case to the District Court for the City and County of Denver. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court: section 40-6-115(5) mandated venue and did not limit jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court discharged the rule. On remand, the Routt County District Court could transfer this case to the Denver District Court. View "In re Associated Gov'ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

In its order, the trial court in this case ruled that the prosecutorial work product doctrine under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) was limited to work product prepared in anticipation of the case before the court, and did not extend to work product prepared in anticipation of a different but related criminal prosecution. Prior to disclosing the contested materials, the State petitioned the Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21 to reverse the trial court arguing the prosecutorial work product protection under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1) extended to all work product and was not limited to materials prepared in anticipation of prosecuting the case immediately before the court. Resolving this issue in accordance with the intent of Crim.P. 16(I)(e)(1) to protect the professional judgment and mental impressions of prosecutors from disclosure so that they may candidly analyze the merits of a case and plan their litigation strategy, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and made the rule absolute: the Court held that the protection of prosecutorial work product, under Crim. P. 16(I)(e)(1),extends to opinion work product prepared by the prosecution in anticipation of any criminal prosecution. Because the trial court did not inspect the contested materials nor decide whether they constituted opinion work product prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution, the Court remanded the case matter to the trial court to make this determination through an ex parte, in camera review. View "Colorado v. Angel" on Justia Law

Respondent Colorado Public Utilities Commission challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court of Routt County to consider changing the venue in regard to a petition for judicial review, arguing that Petitioner Associated Governments of Northwestern Colorado failed to meet the requirements of section 40-6-115(1) and (5), C.R.S. (2011). Holding that section 40-6-115(5) pertained to venue and not jurisdiction, the Routt County District Court allowed a transfer of the case to the District Court for the City and County of Denver. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court, and held that section 40-6-115(5) mandated venue and did not limit jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court discharged the rule. On remand, the Routt County District Court may transfer this case to the Denver District Court. View "In re Associated Gov'ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils." on Justia Law