Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an original proceeding, the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's order that quashed service on Defendant Paulo Rodriguez-Cera. Defendant resided in Mexico but was served by substituted service in Colorado. After previously granting substituted service, the trial court determined that C.R.C.P. 4(d) mandated that service on a defendant located in a foreign country be made according to international agreement, if any. Because Mexico and the United States are parties to the Convention on Service Arboad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (20 U.S.T. 361), the trial court concluded that Plaintiff Rex Willhite must serve Defendant via the Convention. As a result, the trial court quashed the substituted service. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that C.R.C.P. 4(d) did not establish service according to international agreement as the exclusive means of serving a defendant in a foreign country. The Court held that substituted service under Colorado law provides a valid alternative to service abroad. The Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Willhite v. Rodriguez-Cera" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed a district court order that upheld a county court's decision that a six-year stattue of limitations did not bar Respondent Account Brokers of Larimer County, Inc.'s claim against Pettiioner Daniel Hassler. Petitioner financed the purchase of a vehicle by entering into a security agreement with Account Broker's predecessor-in-interest in which the vehicle served as collateral. Petitioner defaulted on the loan, and the predecessor repossessed the vehicle and later sold it at auction. The precedessor applied the proceeds of the auction to the balance of the loan. The proceeds were insufficient to cover the balance; thus Petitioner was still held responsible for the deficiency. The debt was eventually transferred to Account Brokers who sued Petitioner to recover the deficiency less than six years after the vehicle was sold. The county and district courts ruled in favor of Account Brokers, determining that the statute of limitations did not bar Account Brokers' claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the controlling issue was not the date that the debt was made liquidated or determinable but the date the debt accrued. "[U]nder Colorado law and the express terms of the parties' agreement, the present debt became due when it was accelerated following [the predecessor's] repossession of the vehicle and demand for full payment on the debt, which occurred more than six years before the initiation of the present suit. Accordingly, the action [was] barred by the statute of limitations." View "Hassler v. Account Brokers of Larimer County, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Tyler Wilburn announced his intent to introduce expert testimony of a learning disability to challenge whether he "knowingly" violated his bail bond condition, a mistake-of-fact defense (he missed his court date after he allegedly wrote down the wrong date). The prosecution maintained that Defendant had to plead not guilty by reason of insanity in order to introduce expert testimony of his mental condition, a plea which requires a "commitment" to a state mental health facility. The trial court agreed and ordered Defendant committed for forty-five days to a state facility to conduct a court-ordered mental examination. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and made the rule absolute: Defendant's proposed expert testimony of a learning disability was admissible under the procedures of section 16-8-107(3)(b), which requires notice and a court-ordered mental examination. Defendant was not required to plead insanity to challenge whether he possessed the mens rea for the offense with expert testimony concerning his learning disability. Under section 16-8-106, the trial court has discretion to consider the circumstances and the nature of Defendant's defense to set a reasonable time, place, and length for a court-ordered mental health examination. View "In re Colorado v. Wilburn" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the district court's suppression of contraband seized from the defendant's vehicle on two separate occasions. In each case, after the defendant was arrested for driving under suspension, a police narcotics detection canine was brought to the scene and led around the defendant's truck, which had been parked and left at the location of her arrest. Also in each case, after the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, a search of the truck's cab revealed drug paraphernalia and suspected methamphetamine. The district court found that under these circumstances, the state constitution barred the police from bringing a trained narcotics detection dog within detection range of the defendant's vehicle without first having reasonable suspicion to believe it contained contraband, which the court found to be lacking in both cases. The Colorado Supreme Court held after it's review that an interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate under the state constitution any more than under the federal constitution, and that official conduct failing to compromise any legitimate interest in privacy cannot be deemed a search under the state constitution any more than under the federal constitution. Because narcotics dogs could not communicate anything more than reason to believe the defendant's truck either contained or did not contain contraband, no reasonable privacy interest was infringed upon in permitting narcotics dogs to sniff around the vehicle. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Esparza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' opinion in "People v. Laeke" (08CA79 (Colo. App. Feb. 4, 2010)). The court held that when the prosecution has conceded that defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, he has a statutory right under Colorado's insanity statutes to a jury trial on both the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity. The court of appeals further held that a defendant's constitutional rights are violated when a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) is entered without a trial. After review of the applicable legal authority and court precedent, the Supreme Court held that a defendant does not have a statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and his affirmative defense of insanity when he enters a NGRI plea and the prosecution concedes defendant was insane. "The legislature articulated its intent when it amended the insanity statutes. The explicit legislative wording did not include an intent to create a substantive statutory right to a jury trial on the merits and the affirmative defense of insanity after it has been established that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime." The Court held that the Constitution is not violated when NGRI is entered without a trial on the merits and an affirmative defense of insanity. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Laeke" on Justia Law

Petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation employed Respondent William Hoeper as a pilot. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Respondent a firearm under the federal statute that authorizes the TSA to deputize pilots as law enforcement officers to defend the aircraft should the need arise. After discontinuing its use of the type of aircraft Respondent had piloted for many years, Air Wisconsin required Respondent to undertake training and pass a proficiency test for a new aircraft. Respondent failed three proficiency tests, knowing that if he failed a fourth test, he would be fired. During the last test, Respondent became angry with the test administrators because he believed they were deliberately sabotaging his testing. Test administrators reported Respondent's angry outbursts during testing to the TSA that Respondent was "a disgruntled employee (an FFDO [Federal Flight Deck Officer] who may be armed)" and was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Respondents] firearm." Respondent brought suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado for defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin argued it was immune from defamation suits as this under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The jury found clear and convincing evidence that statements made by the airline test administrator were defamatory. Air Wisconsin appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the question of whether the judge or jury decided immunity under the ATSA was a procedural issue determined by Colorado law, and concluded that the trial court properly allowed the jury to decide the immunity question. Air Wisconsin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adding that the airline was not immune from suit or defamation under the ATSA. Furthermore, the Court held that the record supported the jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law

In this case alleging sexual assault on a child, Defendant Yrineo Salazar sought to introduce evidence of an alternate suspect (the child's grandfather). Defendant asserted the alternate suspect had sexually assaulted his own daughter when she was a child and was present in the home when the incidents for which Defendant was charged allegedly occurred. Defendant thus argued the alternate had motive and opportunity to commit the charged offenses, and therefore, evidence of the alternate's prior sexual conduct was relevant and its probative value not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. The Supreme Court determined after its review of the case that under its precedent, evidence of the alternate's prior sexual conduct with someone other than the victim was of "questionable relevance" to the identity of the perpetrator of the charged offense. "Even assuming the relevance of the alternate's prior sexual conduct, [the Court] concluded that the evidence should be excluded under the Colorado Rules of Evidence because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger or confusing the issues and misleading the jury." Noting that the grandfather was never charged for the alleged abuse of his daughter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that evidence was admissible in this case. View "In re People v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Defendant-Petitioner Thomas Lynn O'Hara, III was convicted of distribution of a schedule II controlled substance, adjudicated a habitual criminal, and sentenced to ninety-six years in the Department of Corrections. Prior to trial, Defendant moved unsuccessfully to suppress the State's wiretap evidence against him, contending, among other things, that the wiretaps were not properly authorized because the elected district attorney had not personally prepared or signed the applications to initiate or extend the wiretaps. On appeal, Defendant renewed his challenge to the wiretap evidence. The court of appeals held that the applicable law requires the attorney general or a district attorney to "specifically authorize a specific wiretap application," but the elected official "need not sign or personally submit the application." Because the court of appeals concluded that the record contained no finding by the trial court that the elected district attorney specifically authorized the wiretaps, it remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed in substance with the court of appeals' statutory interpretation, and affirmed the court's decision to remand for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that while the lack of the elected official's signature on the application is not fatal, in the absence of the elected official's signature, the requisite personal authorization cannot be presumed. "Under such circumstances, the prosecution must show compliance with section 16-15-102(1)(a) by establishing that the application was personally authorized by the attorney general or elected district attorney. This compliance may be shown through the sworn testimony or affidavit of the elected official, or similar proof." View "O'Hara v. Colorado" on Justia Law

The Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC, with Martha Altman, Eric Mote, and John Davis (collectively, Students), filed a complaint against the University of Colorado's Board of Regents alleging that the Board's Weapons Control Policy 14-I (which prohibits the carrying of handguns on campus by all persons but certified law enforcement personnel) violates the Colorado Concealed Carry Act (CCA) and the Colorado Constitution's right to bear arms. The Board filed a motion to dismiss which the district court granted. The Students appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the Students stated a claim for relief because the CCA expressly applied to "all areas of the state." The court further concluded that the Students had stated a claim for relief under article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution, which affords individuals the right to bear arms in self-defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the CCA's comprehensive statewide purpose, broad language, and narrow exclusions show that the General Assembly intended to divest the Board of Regents of its authority to regulate concealed handgun possession on campus. Accordingly, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that, by alleging the Policy violated the CCA, the Students stated a claim for relief. View "Regents of the University of Colorado v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus" on Justia Law

"Judicial redistricting is a truly 'unwelcome obligation.'" This case involved the redistricting of Colorado's congressional districts following the results of the 2010 census. The Supreme Court held that the district court adopted a lawful redistricting scheme in accordance with constitutional criteria, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the non-constitutional factors as set forth in C.R.S. 2-1-102 (2011). Furthermore, the Court held that the balancing was reasonable and supported by the evidence that was heard through the district court’s "thorough, inclusive and non-partisan proceedings." The Court affirmed the district court’s order that the secretary of state implement the adopted redistricting scheme in future congressional elections. View "Hall v. Moreno" on Justia Law