Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Andrew Mumford challenged his conviction for possession of one gram or less of cocaine, arguing, among other things, that an incriminating statement he made to a law enforcement officer should have been suppressed because it was obtained without proper warnings under "Miranda v. Arizona" (384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of "Miranda" at the time he made the statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances at the time he made the incriminating statement, a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have felt deprived of his freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest. View "Mumford v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Riley challenged the court of appeals' affirmance of his convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter, reckless second degree assault, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer. Defendant was charged stemming from a verbal confrontation at a store in early 2006 with Nisa Peelman, after Peelman allegedly touched Defendant in an inappropriate way. Defendant left the store. Shortly thereafter, Peelman and her brother, Gabriel Velasquez, walked out. Velasquez and Defendant exchanged words and began physically wrestling when the argument became more hostile. During the tussle, Velasquez told Peelman to "grab the heat from the truck." Defendant believed that the term "heat" meant a gun. He then pulled out a small knife from his pocket and "swung it" at Velasquez, hitting Velasquez in the neck, but failing to damage any vital structures. The court of appeals, relying on its interpretation of "People v. Jones," (675 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1984)), concluded that the trial court erred when it declined to submit Defendant's suggested "multiple assailants" instruction to the jury. The court of appeals determined, however, that the error was harmless. It thus affirmed Defendant's convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err when it rejected Defendant's "multiple assailants" instruction because "Jones" did not require the instruction in this instance. View "Riley v. Colorado" on Justia Law

This appeal came from a judgment and decree of the water court and the Alamosa County District Court in two consolidated cases. The combination of the two involved an amended plan for water management adopted by Special Improvement District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District (Subdistrict). Several parties objected to the approval of the Subdistrict's plan for ground water management. After two trials, the trial court determined the Plan to be "conceptually compatible" with the legal requirements of ground water management plans and the intent of the legislature in enacting SB 04-222. Among a series of findings, it found that (1) the Plan properly sought to stabilize the storage level of the unconfined aquifer at a "sustainable" level; and (2) the strategies proposed to meet that goal were reasonable and supported by the evidence. However, the trial court sent the Plan back to the Subdistrict board of managers and District board of directors for "further consideration and amendment because it lack[ed] detail, grant[ed] discretion with no guidance, fail[ed] to acknowledge the replacement of injurious depletions as a priority, and simply is not a 'comprehensive and detailed plan'" as required by statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Plan as approved and decreed, adequately addressed the replacement of well depletions that injure adjudicated senior surface water rights, along with restoring and maintaining sustainable aquifer levels in accordance with the applicable statutes. "The Subdistrict bears the burden of going forward and the burden of proof to demonstrate that annual replacement plans prevent material injury to adjudicated senior surface water rights caused by ongoing and past well depletions that have future impact." The Court affirmed the water court and Alamosa County District Court's decisions. View "In re Subdistrict No. 1" on Justia Law

Colorado’s sexual assault statutes authorize the possibility of greater punishments for sexual crimes against children that are committed "as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse." Two cases, "Colorado v. Simon" and "Colorado v. Tillery" were consolidated for the Supreme Court's review in that they both involve interpretation of Section C.R.S. 18-3-405.3. The common issue presented by these cases was whether the statutory provisions and principles of double jeopardy permit only one class 3 felony conviction and sentence for a single "pattern" of abuse that comprises two or more incidents of sexual assault, or whether each separate act of sexual assault that composes a single "pattern" of abuse which may be elevated to a class 3 felony. In "Simon," one division of the court of appeals held that section 18-3-405.3(2)(b) and double jeopardy principles prohibit the trial court from entering multiple class 3 convictions and sentences for Simon’s ten counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, where those acts composed a single pattern of abuse against one victim. In "Tillery," a different division of the appellate court disagreed with the reasoning in "Simon." Finding no double jeopardy violation, the court upheld Tillery's class 3 convictions under 18-3-405(2)(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court held that these statutes unambiguously allow each separately charged incident of sexual assault to be elevated to a class 3 felony, where each incident is committed as part of a pattern of sexual abuse. Furthermore, the Court held that these statutes, construed according to their plain language, do not violate the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments under either the U.S. or the Colorado Constitution. View "Colorado v. Simon" on Justia Law

The State brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge a district court's suppression of evidence seized from the trunk of the Defendant Brittney Coates' vehicle. Upon discovering a bindle and single prescription pill in the driver's pants pocket, the police arrested the driver, placed him in their patrol car, and searched the vehicle. The district court found that the police lacked any reasonable and articulable basis to search Defendant's trunk incident to the arrest of the driver in accordance with "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)), and that they also lacked probable cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle's trunk pursuant to the automobile exception. The Supreme Court affirmed. It held, however, that because the evidence for which suppression was sought was not seized from the passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle, the search-incident-to-arrest exception could not justify its seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that it was able to determine from the district court's findings of fact that the police lacked probable cause to search Defendant's vehicle, whether or not they would have been justified in searching the passenger compartment on less than probable cause. View "Colorado v. Coates" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals' ruling that the Article X, Section 20 of the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 1) required statewide voter approval each time the Colorado Department of Revenue calculated an increase in the amount of tax due per ton of coal extracted as directed by the formula codified in C.R.S. 39-29-106. After Amendment 1 went into effect, the Department suspended using the tax mechanism for calculating upward adjustments in the amount of coal severance tax owed based on inflation. Following an auditor's review in 2006, an Attorney General's opinion and a rule-making proceedings, the Department recommended applying the statute to calculate the tax due. Implementation resorted in a tax of $0.76 per ton of coal as compared to $0.56 per ton collected in 1992 when Amendment 1 first passed. The Colorado Mining Association and taxpayer coal companies filed an action challenging collection of the $0.76 per ton amount. Colorado Mining asserted that whenever the Department calculated an upward adjustment in the amount of tax due under the statute, it must obtain voter approval. The Court of Appeals agreed, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the Department's implementation of section 39-29-106 was not a tax increase, but a "non-discretionary duty required by a pre-Amendment 1 taxing statute which did not require voter approval." Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which held that the Department must implement the statute as written. View "Huber v. Colo. Mining Ass'n" on Justia Law

The State petitioned the Supreme Court for review of an appellate court's judgment that affirmed two in limine evidentiary rulings in a prosecution for sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. The district court excluded testimony concerning the recantation of Defendant Mark Gabriesheski's step-daughter (the alleged victim). At trial, testimony by the victim's guardian ad litem appointed in a parallel dependency and neglect proceeding was ruled privileged under the attorney-client privilege. In addition, the trial court held that testimony by a social worker involved in the dependency and neglect proceeding could not be used without Defendant's consent (pursuant to Colorado law). The prosecutor conceded the victim's inability to go forward, and the case was dismissed. The appellate court concluded that Colorado law gave it jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal, but affirmed the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part the appellate court's decisions. The Court found the appellate court had jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal, but disapproved of its conclusions with regard to both evidentiary rulings. Because a child subject to a dependency and neglect proceeding is not a "client" of the guardian ad litem, the attorney-client privilege did not apply. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court misapplied Colorado law pertaining to the social worker's testimony, and accordingly failed to make sufficient findings to satisfy the statutory requirement that the statements at issue be made in compliance of that statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. Gabriesheski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed a judge disqualification issue raised by the appellate court's decision to reverse and remand an order that terminated the parental rights of Respondent, C.M. (Mother). In its review of the termination hearing, the court of appeals held that the trial judge should have recused himself on the grounds that his clerk was the mother of a material witness in the case. Although the court of appeals held that the judge should have been disqualified, Mother’s lateness in filing the motion for disqualification prompted the court to conclude that Mother may have waived her right to move for disqualification. According to the court of appeals, the question of whether Mother had waived the disqualification issue turned on whether her counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the motion for disqualification. Reasoning that Mother could not be bound by waiver if she had in fact received ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of appeals remanded for additional findings about counsel’s performance. The court then directed the chief judge of the district to transfer the case to himself or to a senior judge for the proceedings on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the transfer: "[w]ithout deciding what is required to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the supreme court acknowledges that, at the least, an allegation of prejudice is necessary. Moreover, the court holds that when an ineffective assistance claim is premised on counsel’s failure to file a motion for disqualification, the prejudice element cannot be satisfied without an allegation that the judge was actually biased. Because the respondent’s motion for disqualification was entirely based on an appearance of impropriety, rather than a claim of actual bias, it failed to satisfy the prejudice element." The Court held that Mother's motion was untimely and should not have been granted. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Colorado ex rel. A.G" on Justia Law

The State appealed the reversal of Respondent Jerad Pickering's conviction for reckless manslaughter. The court of appeals held that the trial court's self-defense jury instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent acted recklessly. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's instruction did not shift the State's burden, and accordingly reversed the court of appeals' judgment and overruled contrary rules announced in "People v. Lara" and "People v. Taylor." View "Colorado v. Pickering" on Justia Law

Defendant Gerald Lewis appealed his convictions and sentences for a number of offenses including three counts each of kidnapping and sexually assaulting his kidnap victims. The trial court sentenced Defendant for sexual assault and separately sentenced him for the second degree kidnapping of each victim, elevated to the level of a class two felony. Among its other holdings, the court of appeals rejected Defendant's contention that "People v. Henderson" should be overruled because of subsequent United States Supreme Court case law, and it affirmed each of his separate convictions and sentences. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether "Henderson" was still good law. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, holding that the federal Court's case law "neither undermine [the Colorado Court's] prior assessment of legislative intent in 'Henderson' nor in any way diminish[es] the dispositive impact of legislative intent on Lewis's double jeopardy and merger claims." View "Lewis v. Colorado" on Justia Law