Justia Colorado Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether certain terms contained in a credit agreement between a lender and a bank was ambiguous with regard to the default interest rate. Because the Court held that the credit agreement was not ambiguous, it did not address whether Colorado's Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds allowed for the introduction of extrinsic evidence to resolve a facially ambiguous credit agreement. View "FDIC v. Fisher" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, The Hannon Law Firm ("Hannon"), Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P.("Melat"), and Howarth & Smith ("Howarth") entered into a contingent fee agreement to represent multiple plaintiffs in an action against the Cotter Corporation regarding contamination from a uranium mill. The three firms entered into a fee sharing agreement to apportion the fees and costs of the litigation among themselves. Hannon withdrew mid-representation, citing a strained relationship with Howarth. Six years later, after the underlying litigation settled, Hannon filed a quantum meruit action against Melat and Howarth, seeking the reasonable value of the services it provided up to the time of withdrawal. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's judgment with regard to its interpretation of C.R.C.P. Chapter23.3 allowing a quantum meruit claim among co-counsel, but reversed the trial court's determination that the claim accrued when Hannon withdrew from the litigation, instead of when the recovery occurred that made funds available to the attorneys. The Supreme Court held that, where multiple attorneys are co-counsel in a contingent fee agreement, C.R.C.P. Chapter 23.3 does not bar a withdrawing attorney from pursuing a quantum meruit action against former co-counsel for a share of attorney fees obtained in the case, even though that attorney was barred from pursuing such an action against the former client. The claim accrues at the time the withdrawing attorney knows or should know of the occurrence of the settlement or judgment that will result in the payment of attorney fees. View "Melat, Pressman & Higbie, LLP v. Hannon Law Firm, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Lego admitted his wife to Porter Hospital's emergency room. She stayed there for approximately two months. The Legos' insurance provider notified Respondent in writing that it would stop covering Mrs. Lego's hospital care after six weeks. Respondent disputed the insurer's position and refused to discharge his wife from the hospital after six weeks. The hospital followed the insurer in notifying Respondent the insurance coverage for Mrs. Lego would end, and that the Legos would be responsible for any uncovered charges. In an effort to recoup those charges Respondent refused to pay, the hospital sued on the grounds of unjust enrichment with recovery in quantum meruit. Respondent moved to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred by a general statute of limitations codified in section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) C.R.S. (2011). The trial court denied the motion; the appellate court reversed, finding the trial court erred in determining the amount the insurance company did not pay was liquidated or determinable damages within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, interpreting section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) C.R.S. (2011) to mean its six-year limitations period applied in this case, particularly when the amount owed was ascertainable either by reference to the agreement, or by simple computation using extrinsic evidence. View "Portercare Adventist Health System v. Lego" on Justia Law

Judith Koenig rented a car from a car rental company and was involved in an accident. PurCo sued Koenig to collect damages related to the incident, including damages for loss of the vehicle's use during the time it was being repaired. PurCo sought to measure loss of use damages by using the reasonable rental value of a substitute vehicle. Koenig filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted, holding that PurCo could prevail on its loss of use damages claim only if it suffered actual lost profits. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment ruling and remanded the case. It agreed with the trial court's conclusion that, in general, the appropriate measure of loss of use damages in a commercial setting is actual lost profits, but concluded the rental agreement in this case altered the measure of loss of use damages and held that PurCo was required to show certain loss prerequisites. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals judgment on different grounds, holding that loss of use damages in a commercial setting may be measured either by actual lost profits or by reasonable rental value. PurCo was entitled to recover loss of use damages irrespective of its actual lost profits. Accordingly, this case was remanded for calculation of the reasonable rental value of a substitute vehicle. View "Koenig v. PurCo Fleet Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine, whether an attorney owes fiduciary duties to third parties who are entitled to funds from Colorado Lawyer Trust Account Foundation (COLTAF) trust accounts. The court of appeals reversed a trial court judgment and held that an attorney did not owe fiduciary duties to a group of medical service providers who were owed funds held in the attorney's COLTAF account. The Providers and the attorney, David J. Mintz,had an extensive and often contentious personal and business relationship over several years. Typically, Mintz would refer an uninsured victim of a motor vehicle accident to the Providers for medical services, paying himself and his clients' medical costs out of proceeds he secured after negotiating insurance settlements for the clients. The relationship turned sour due to a dispute about costs of a joint advertising arrangement, and, for reasons disputed by the parties, Mintz began withholding funds owed to the Providers for his clients' medical costs. Mintz eventually initiated an interpleader action for the withheld funds, naming as defendants his clients and the Providers. The Providers answered with several counterclaims, including breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court bifurcated the action and first determined that the Providers were entitled to the specific amount withheld in Mintz's COLTAF account but no more. In the second trial, the trial court found for the Providers on their abuse of process and breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims.The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holdings for the Providers in the second trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals and affirmed judgment: "the Providers may not maintain a breach of fiduciary duty tort action against Mintz based on his obligations as trustee of his COLTAF account. The attorney-client relationship creates fiduciary obligations with corresponding liabilities on the part of the attorney to the client, not to third parties such as the medical providers in this case. Although Mintz may have had ethical or contractual obligations to disburse money that clients owed to the Providers out of insurance settlement proceeds placed into his COLTAF account, Mintz did not owe the Providers the duties of a fiduciary that give rise to tort liability." View "Accident & Injury Medical Specialists., P.C. v. Mintz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed a district court order that upheld a county court's decision that a six-year stattue of limitations did not bar Respondent Account Brokers of Larimer County, Inc.'s claim against Pettiioner Daniel Hassler. Petitioner financed the purchase of a vehicle by entering into a security agreement with Account Broker's predecessor-in-interest in which the vehicle served as collateral. Petitioner defaulted on the loan, and the predecessor repossessed the vehicle and later sold it at auction. The precedessor applied the proceeds of the auction to the balance of the loan. The proceeds were insufficient to cover the balance; thus Petitioner was still held responsible for the deficiency. The debt was eventually transferred to Account Brokers who sued Petitioner to recover the deficiency less than six years after the vehicle was sold. The county and district courts ruled in favor of Account Brokers, determining that the statute of limitations did not bar Account Brokers' claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the controlling issue was not the date that the debt was made liquidated or determinable but the date the debt accrued. "[U]nder Colorado law and the express terms of the parties' agreement, the present debt became due when it was accelerated following [the predecessor's] repossession of the vehicle and demand for full payment on the debt, which occurred more than six years before the initiation of the present suit. Accordingly, the action [was] barred by the statute of limitations." View "Hassler v. Account Brokers of Larimer County, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Amanda Vinton, Esq. sought relief from orders of the probate court that permitted Respondent Sharon Virzi to amend her challenge to a trust administration by adding a claim of fraud against Vinton, the attorney for the trustee. Over Petitioner's objection, the probate court summarily granted Respondent's motion to amend, forcing Petitioner to withdraw as counsel for the trustee. The probate court subsequently summarily denied two motions by Petitioner to dismiss the claim against her and ordered her to pay Respondent's attorney fees for having to defend against a substantially frivolous and groundless motion. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause. Because Respondent's fraud claim was not plead with sufficient particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss, it was futile, and the probate court abused its discretion in permitting the joinder of her opponent's attorney. The Supreme Court found that whether or not Petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the separate fraud claim was meritorious, the record was inadequate to support an award of attorney fees. The rule was therefore made absolute, and the matter was remanded to the probate court with directions to dismiss Respondent's claim of fraud against Petitioner and to vacate its award of attorney fees. View "Vinton v. Virzi" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' determination that Thomas Banner's assignment of his voting rights and right to receive distributions to Plaintiff Elizabeth Condo was ineffective because it violated an anti-assignment clause in the "Hut at Avon, LLC’s" (Hut Group) operating agreement. Plaintiff brought a tort action against the other members of the Hut Group, Thomas Conners and George Roberts, and the attorney who allegedly assisted them in purchasing Banner's membership interest in the Hut Group. She claimed that Defendants' purchase of Banner's membership interest tortiously interfered with his prior assignment to her and that that interference amounted to civil conspiracy because it was intended to destroy the value of her assignment. The Supreme Court held that the attempted assignment of the member's right to receive distributions and effective transfer of voting rights was invalid because it was made without the consent of the other members of the LLC, in violation of the anti-assignment clause in the operating agreement. Furthermore, because the Colorado LLC statute evinced a preference for the freedom of contract, the Court held that the anti-assignment clause at issue here rendered each LLC member powerless to make an assignment without the consent of all members and therefore was without any legal effect. View "Condo v. Conners" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a claim under Colorado law for civil theft of a copyrightable work required a trial court to instruct the jury on principles of federal copyright law. Petitioner Steward Software hired Respondent Richard Kopcho to develop and market a new software program. Steward never entered into a written agreement governing the ownership of the software with Holonyx, Inc. (one of Respondent's multiple corporate entities) or Respondent. By the time the software was ready for testing, the relationship between the parties had become strained. Steward refused to make further payments and under Respondent's direction, Holonyx locked Steward out of the software code and refused to turn it over. Holonyx then filed a copyright registration for the software with the U.S. Copyright Office, listing the software's author a new corporation Respondent controlled called Ruffdogs Software, Inc. Steward sued Respondent for breach of contract and civil theft. Before trial, the parties tendered proposed jury instructions; one of Steward's proposed instructions pertained to the ownership and registration of copyrightable works. The trial court determined that copyright law did not pertain to Steward's civil theft claim and rejected the tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that ownership of the copyright in the code was irrelevant. The Court thus concluded the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the principles of copyright law. The court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's opinion. View "Steward Software Co. v. Kopcho" on Justia Law

Consumers brought a class action against ten automobile dealerships operating under the "Medved" name and their owner John Medved, alleging violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). Plaintiffs alleged that Medved's sales documents failed to disclose the price and existence of various dealer-added aftermarket products, injuring Plaintiffs who paid for those products. Plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: one which included customers who paid for the add-ons but that were never installed, and another class for those who paid for the add-ons but who were unaware of them due to Medved's sales documents. The trial court determined that Plaintiffs could prove causation and injury in their CCPA claims with circumstantial evidence. However, the trial court did not consider whether the individual evidence presented by Medved rebutted the class-wide inferences of causation and injury which was crucial to certification of both classes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by not rigorously analyzing the evidence presented by Medved to refute Plaintiffs' theories of liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, and remanded the case back to the trial court for further analysis to determine "to its satisfaction whether Plaintiffs could establish causation and injury. View "Garcia v. Medved Chevrolet, Inc" on Justia Law